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ABSTRACT

A general aviation industry segment member known as a Certified Non-scheduled Air Taxi
Operator (CNATO) conducts passenger flights on-demand for hire. While airline accidents have
reached historic lows, CNATO accident rates remain above one per 100,000 hours (NTSB,
2015b). Unlike airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration has not made safety management
system implementation mandatory within CNATOs. As a result, there has been no decrease in
CNATO organizational accidents over a 6-year period since 2009. Study goals strove to find a
predictable method of variable identification influencing at-risk CNATOs.
The study utilized a sequential transformative design comprising quantitative surveys and
aviation accident databases to answer four research questions. Research questions used
explanatory correlational methodology of independent and intervening variables examining
descriptive, relational, and comparative results. Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement
System (SCISMS) and Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) Form 5x served as survey
instruments that gathered leadership and safety culture information. Accident data was obtained
from government sources through the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
(ASAIS) database.
An inclusion criterion, stratified random cluster, and systematic random sampling
narrowed the entire 2,046 CNATO population to a sample size of 25 participants from three
FAA flight standards regional offices. Each participant had 3 weeks to complete an online
survey containing 106 questions. Twenty participants completed the survey. Data analysis
followed a discriminant function analysis to develop quantitative correlations between multiple
variables. Characteristics of each participant yielded no conclusive data to suggest CNATOs
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share common safety culture dimension dominance. Study results concluded there was no
relationship between leadership style, safety culture dominance, and accident rates. A
comparison of CNATOs using safety management systems and accident rates also showed no
relationship exists. The final research question sought to find a relationship between leadership
style, safety dimension, and accident rate. None was found, however, a statistical trend emerged
outside the research questions as a result of sequential research design. Data indicated a
relationship among transformational leadership characteristic scale and SCISMS mean score.
While the study yielded seminal individual results, research questions proved safety culture
remains difficult to define and found relationships to identify at-risk organizations remains
elusive.

Keywords: safety culture, high reliability organization, organizational accidents, aviation,
leadership, safety climate
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Chapter I: Introduction
According to the latest statistics, general aviation aircraft for hire classified as Certified
Non-scheduled Air Taxi Operators (CNATO), flew over 1.8 million hours (Federal Aviation
Administration [FAA], 2015). These commercial operators provide critical aviation charter
services, from medical transport to traffic reports. Although these professional aircraft operators
are certificated to serve the public, it was not until 2006 regulations that they became subject to
mandated safety management systems. Safety programs implemented by United States airlines
have demonstrated their effectiveness by eliminating any airline accidents: there have been no
fatalities since 2009. However, aircraft operators within the non-scheduled FAA Part 135
regulations, referred to in this study as CNATOs, have seen accident rates increase 36% in 2011
over that of 2010 (Air Safety Institute, 2011). The data for 2012 through 2014 revealed almost
no change in overall accident rates, however, the lethality of accidents increased from 14.8% to
15.9% (Air Safety Institute, 2012). Understanding how CNATOs and their leaders create a
culture of safety could aid the public good in stemming the increasing trend of accidents in the
industry segment.
Safety management systems (SMS) have evolved since their first development in military
and airline uses. The purpose of an SMS is to reduce the risk for catastrophic failure by
developing a set of tools for early detection of accidents and other potentially harmful processes
at the organizational level (Desai, Roberts, & Ciavarelli, 2006). Used exclusively in high
reliability organizations such as aircraft carrier operations and nuclear generation facilities, an
SMS develops reliable processes to mitigate risk. Now prevalent in aviation, it was not until the
late 1980s, after a series of maintenance and pilot errors that the scheduled airline industry
segment adopted the SMS model. After years of demonstrated success in airline operations, the
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general aviation segment of the industry began to look at using a less rigorous version of the
same methodology.
Dating back to 2001, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) had been
working to establish the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for adoption by the
worldwide aviation agency. The impetus for SARPs was in direct response to the desire by
member countries to uniformly enact a comprehensive safety management system across all
aircraft operations. In 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration released Advisory Circular
120-92A. This circular established a basic safety recommendation framework for aircraft
operators, and suggested new operating standards of SMS. It is important to note that an
Advisory Circular is an optional document that carries with it no penalties for non-compliance.
The advisory circular served as a recommendation to CNATOs previously untouched by direct
procedural regulation. Wide scale adoption by CNATOs has yet to occur; this creates an
opportunity to research how the industry segment manages potential implementation of a
voluntary SMS and the leader influence on cultural adoption.
Statement of the Problem
Aviation organizations rely heavily on a high level of operational safety in order to
function properly (Kelly & Patankar, 2004; Roberts & Libuser, 1993; Schein, 1983). A lapse in
safety can cause loss of life and organizational failures from which recovery is difficult. For this
reason, it is imperative that CNATOs adopt a culture which promotes safety and entrenches
safety practices with which all staff members comply. The classification of aviation as a high
reliability organization has unique implications as to leadership approach and organizational
culture development. The general aviation industry has a gap in knowledge in developing a
safety culture to its stakeholders despite the importance of safety integration into all passenger
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carrying entities. With the advancement of high reliability organization methodologies and
theory to prevent organizational accidents, the aviation industry has migrated toward the
development of a SMS to improve safety. Adoption of a SMS framework has taken many forms,
but no single methodology has emerged. Instead, CNATOs have chosen to implement a variety
of different programs to serve their purposes. Several differing methods of culture development
and SMS adoption has elevated leadership influence as a clearly defined variable.
When the rare organizational accident occurs, the people responsible for those actions
often have no comprehension as to the cause (Reason, 1998). After all, organizational accidents
are hard to predict and often occur in areas where production or protection fails to cover such
events. Production is an overarching concept related to the production of services; in the case of
aviation, the transportation of people (Reason, 1998). This activity is thick in processes and
procedures that comprise the various steps performed in order to produce the service. Protection
relates to the institutional methods taken to protect the service from human error (Reason, 1998).
These can include simple checklists evaluating whether a trip should even be initiated to a
complex task such as computer modeling to calculate the risk of the activity based on input
parameters.
There was substantial scholarly debate as to whether aviation safety can be categorized as
either prolonged state of existence known as culture, or climate, a temporary state subject to
change (O’Connor, O’Dea, Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011). Surprisingly, the literature was unclear
as to whether the existence of strong organizational safety culture impacts accident rates. There
were compelling examples of safety culture measurement within the military, but this has yet to
be applied to general aviation (La Porte, Roberts, & Rochlin, 1988; Rochlin, La Porte, &
Roberts, 1998). A previous culture survey was conducted within Part 121 airline operations in
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an attempt to measure safety culture effectiveness (Gibbons, von Thaden, & Wiegmann, 2006).
Aviation has enjoyed a historic decline in the number of fatal accidents in scheduled airline
operations in the past 20 years. This suggests that the decrease in fatal accidents is related to the
inculcation of safety culture into the organizations responsible for carrying the paying
passengers. Unfortunately, there was no analysis as to whether results would apply in other
aviation industry segments or what, if any, impact it had on organizational accidents. Leadership
influence and development of a strong safety culture largely influences whether CNATOs have
integrated production and protection to prevent accidents from happening. Therefore, research
was necessary to determine variables in CNATOs which may reduce organizational accident
rates.
Purpose and Significance of the Study
The present study addressed the gap in knowledge as to whether inculcation of a safety
culture in CNATOs has an effect on organizational accidents. The study (a) examined the way
leadership introduces and reinforces safety culture within an organization, (b) how the safety
culture is implemented by followers, (c) investigated the types of artifacts used by the aircraft
operator to provide reinforcement of established safety processes, and (d) determined the extent
to which safety culture has an effect on overall safety results.
Organizational safety in CNATOs has many intervening variables. Leaders influence the
creation and establishment of companywide methodologies and mechanisms for cultural
development (Bass & Avolio, 1993). These critical individuals serve as foundation blocks to
create a safety culture. Oversight agencies like the Federal Aviation Administration and
accrediting bodies only focus on basic compliance. Some organizations tie compliance to
culture, but many do not. Forced compliance could create an external artificial force influencing
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culture. The study investigated the causal link between leadership sponsored safety initiatives,
the development of a safety culture, and their effect on accident rates within a sampling of
CNATOs.
While NTSB statistics demonstrate aviation as low risk in relation to other transportation
methods, the high frequency of aviation operations allow more potential organizational accidents
to occur. CNATO safety culture development lacks consistency and provides an opportunity to
examine various factors that may influence a reduction in accident rates. Without a frequently
modified, time-tested, common set of best practices based on current data, industry safety rates
will likely remain unchanged. Third-party provided safety programs satisfy regulator demands,
but no study determined whether these programs influence the organizational culture as opposed
to internally developed safety programs. These are areas that were worthy of investigation and
could result in public good by increasing operational, organizational, and cultural safety.
Compliance with safety requirements has an impact on all areas of aviation in the public
perception of aviation as a safe mode of transportation. Due to intense media scrutiny for
aviation accidents and incidents, it is of critical importance for professionals in the industry to
promote safety culture and seek to achieve scheduled airline reliability. The study of newly
enacted SMS requirements is of major importance to CNATOs and to overall aviation.
Assumptions have been made that aviation, an industry already rich in processes, benefits further
from SMS programs. The addition of regulations to create a safety culture could artificially
influence the actual process of establishing a safety culture. Research had not been carried out to
assess the variables influencing safety culture. Further study of the causal relationship between
development of a safety culture and regulation can assist in creating effective regulatory policy.
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Due to the absence of research on whether safety culture has an effect on overall safety
results, the study aimed to measure safety culture practices among selected CNATOs and draw
inferences from the findings. There is a lack of literature providing analysis of the relationship
between SMS, safety culture and overall accident rates. The creation of safety culture in military
aviation operations has been previously examined, but the mission and style of military
operations are only minimally comparable to the typical CNATO (La Porte et al., 1988; Roberts,
Rousseau, & La Porte, 1994; Roberts, Stout, Halpern, Haas, & Hall, 1994; Rochlin et al., 1998).
A closer analysis of aviation safety culture and SMS effectiveness was conducted in Part 121
airline operations (Gibbons et al., 2006). The same rigor with which previous studies have
evaluated safety variables has not been applied to research in CNATOs. This study seeks to
bring clarity for a large segment of the industry who collectively fly 19 million flight hours a
year.
A sequential transformative mixed method approach used established theoretical
frameworks to measure the relationship between an existence of strong safety culture, the effect
of leadership influence, and organizational accidents. Research questions were explored using
quantitative methods. Accident databases provided data from NTSB, NASA, and FAA public
records available on the internet. At the same time, the effect of leadership and SMS influence
was explored using a survey with a representative group of CNATOs within a random stratified
sample demographic and geography. The rationale for using quantitative data was to encourage
impartiality in addressing the research problem by converging both broad numeric trends in
accident data and detailed statistical views of operations within each CNATO.
The purpose of this study was to (a) determine the safety culture characteristics possessed
a typical CNATO organization, (b) identify what relationship, if any, exists between
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organizational culture and performance outcomes, including accident rates, (c) identify what
difference, if any, exists in accident rates of CNATOs that use safety management system
programs and those that do not, and (d) identify what relationships, if any, exist between
CNATO leadership style, the development of a safety culture and accident rates.
Recent Statistics
The following tables classified total hours flown by CNATOs in comparison to the other
aircraft types in 2014 and accident rates for each phase of flight in 2012. While the total hours
flown demonstrate only a fraction of the total across the entire industry, the professional nature
of the flight implies a higher standard is required.
Table 1
Total Air Taxi Hours Flown by Aircraft Type in 2014
Aircraft Type
Total

On-Demand FAR Part 135 Use
Air Taxi

Air Tours

Air Med

Fixed Wing: Total
Est. Total Hours
% Std. Error

18,461,498
1.2

2,185,564
4.6

89,480
19.5

197,087
12.6

Piston: Total
Est. Total Hours
% Std. Error

11,967,414
1.6

553,555
10.0

63,697
30.0

24,260
32.5

Turboprop: Total
Est. Total Hours
% Std. Error

2,612,979
1.2

586,263
3.6

22,442
13.5

95,184
6.9

Turbojet: Total
Est. Total Hours
% Std. Error

3,881,105
1.0

1,045,745
2.5

3,342
34.8

77,643
8.3

Note. Data in this table are from General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Surveys - CY 2014,
Table 3.2, by FAA, 2015. Copyright 2015. In the public domain.
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Table 2
Non-Scheduled Air Taxi Accident Rates 2012
Types of Accidents

Accidents

Fatal Accidents

Lethality

Collision

3

7.3%

2

16.7%

66.7%

Descent/Approach
Fuel Management
Go-Around
Landing
Maneuvering
Mechanical
Other
Other (Power Loss)
Takeoff
Taxi
Weather

2
3
2
6
1
5
2
1
7
4
5

4.9%
7.3%
4.9%
14.6%
2.4%
12.2%
4.9%
2.4%
17.1%
9.8%
12.2%

2
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
2

16.7%
8.3%

100.0%
33.3%

8.3%
8.3%
8.3%
8.3%

16.7%
100.0%
20.0%
50.0%

8.3%

14.3%

16.7%

40.0%

Note: Adapted from the 24th Joseph Nall Report: General Aviation Accidents in 2012, by Air
Safety Institute, 2012. Copyright 2012 by Air Safety Institute. Adapted with permission.
Research Questions
This proposal created quantitative data points in order to address four key research
questions. The study answered the following questions:
1. What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO organization possess?
2. To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a relationship with

performance outcomes, including accident rates?
3. To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of CNATOs that use

commercially available safety management system programs and those that do not?
4. To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a relationship with the

development of a safety culture and accident rates?
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Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis
Established conceptual frameworks assisted in describing core constructs between
CNATO intervening variables and accident rates. Due to the highly complex nature of the topic,
these frameworks helped clarify the basic concepts to answer research question. Organizational
accident, high reliability organization, and safety culture theory all play critical roles in the
study.
The theoretical framework of organizational accident theory assisted in the ability to
define what is outside of normal operations. Reaching prominence in the wake of organizational
failures, the field is highly mature and provided characteristics of lapses in culture that create
accidents. An organizational accident is the result of technological processes that have radically
altered the relationship between machines and their human elements (Reason, 1997). The
relationship between man and aircraft describes such a situation. Organizational accident theory
examines the casual sequence, organizational factors, workplace conditions, and unsafe acts as
root causes of individual accidents. Scientific inquiry was then employed to examine upstream
organizational factors contributing to the accident to investigate variable interactions addressed
in the research questions.
Second, the concept of high reliability organization (HRO) theory was used to create a
link between industries demanding greater operational standards. Measurements in the HRO
fields have established the ability to qualitatively and quantitatively capture the degree to which
an organization has achieved culture change. In framing the research in this method, a
comparison was drawn across industries.
A theoretical framework used by the study was the influence of leadership on the creation
of a strong safety culture. One of the most relevant and well-researched area relates to highly
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uncertain and changing organizations to assess leaders’ resiliency. The literature created a
structural and static construct of meanings which a group collectively addressed hazards in a
systematic way (Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Empowering participants in high-risk
activities create positive cognitive mindsets, thus preventing hazards (Pidgeon, 1991). When
assessing the true ability of a participant organization to reach safety culture, a construct rich in
meaning to the aviation industry is used. Patankar and Sabin (2010) developed a theoretical
framework to help understand the elements of safety culture and their interactions with
organizations.

Figure 1. Safety culture pyramid. Describes progression of safety culture methods, results of
assessment, and transformation. From Human Factors in Aviation (2nd ed., pp. 95-122), by M. S.
Patankar and E. J. Sabin, 2010, Burlingame, MA: Ashgate. Copyright 2010 by Ashgate
Publishing. Reprinted with permission.
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Figure 1 shows various levels of organizational safety culture development from cursory
behaviors to underlying values and unquestioned assumptions. Leadership in combination with
the use of this widely accepted process methodology around aviation safety culture and related
fields ranging from healthcare to military applications will allow for the study to establish a
strong theoretical foundation (Beebe, 2013; Kelly, Meyer, & Patankar, 2012).
Organizational culture is a nebulous term with various meanings. This seemingly simple
concept has sparked great debate whether an activity or behavior is sustainable enough to
become a culture, or whether it remains a climate. The general definition of culture is a system
of shared meaning held by members that distinguish one organization from another organization
(Schein, 1983). In contrast, Zohar (1980) defines climate as a summary of perceptions that
employees share about their work environment. The general consensus is climate comprises an
element within organizational culture that focuses on the more short term impact of storytelling
(Schein, 1996). More specifically, climate can be characterized as a “mood state” at a particular
moment in time (Cox & Flin, 1998, p. 192). Culture is more inherently a sustained state of being
that resists frequent changes and distractions within the organization.
It is important to note that the inculcation of a successful safety culture in a CNATO is
dependent upon the existence of strong leadership and foundation of rich processes. The
resulting safety culture creates an environment free from organizational accidents.
Interdependency of these theoretical frameworks necessitate a reference to each idea
independently.
Figure 2 graphically represents the foundational building blocks of frameworks used in
the study. The process and leadership influence together form either a weak or strong HRO
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safety culture. From data collected, the study will answer whether organizational accidents
occur if one or many of the foundational blocks exist.

Organizational Accidents
HRO Safety Culture
Leadership Influence

Processes

Figure 2. Dissertation conceptual framework. Represents building block knowledge constructs.
Leadership influence and processes forms foundation of understanding HRO safety culture,
which then creates reader context for organizational accidents.

Directional hypothesis. The quantitative data presented in military safety literature and
the experience of the researcher lead to a hypothesis regarding the relationship between
variables. In a directional hypothesis “the investigator makes a prediction about the expected
outcome, basing this prediction on prior literature and studies on the topic that suggest a potential
outcome” (Creswell, 2009, p. 145). A common business process analysis tool used in the private
sector is the Gartner Group Magic Quadrant.
Figure 3 represents a graphical visualization of theoretical frameworks and their
relationship to the study hypothesis. The chart represents relationships in a 2x2 chart with the
least advantageous process or product being in the bottom right quadrant. In listing the two
prevailing variables on the axis, a curvilinear representation develops based on hypothesized data
results. The curvilinear relationship with various safety phenomenon and behavioral outcomes
has been statistically proven by Zohar and Luria (2005) and Perrow (1984). Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume leadership and organizational accidents would yield no different results due
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to an absence of contradictory anecdotal data. For the directional hypothesis posed here, the
greater the influence of safety culture and leadership influence, the less organizations are prone
to accidents. This hypothesis remains true as culture reaches equilibrium with leadership
influence at which point micromanagement negatively affects organizational accident reduction
rates. A set of quasi-experimental procedures embedded within the selected instrumentation
yielded specific statements for hypothesis testing to either validate or invalidate this hypothesis.

Leadership/Processes

Low-High

High-High

Low-Low

High-Low

AT RISK FOR
ORGANIZATIONAL
ACCIDENT

Safety Culture

Figure 3. Aviation safety magic quadrant.
The following quantitative statement describes the relational phenomenon hypothesis
between study variables:
H1: Organizational accidents moderate the curvilinear relationship between safety culture
and leadership influence in such a way that an intermediate level of detail of leadership influence
is associated with higher safety culture when the priority of safety is high rather than low.
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Limitations of the Study
As with any academic research study, there were limitations as to the reach and abilities
of the researcher to conduct a comprehensive examination of the topic. The study sought to
generalize findings to those CNATOs in the most concentrated FAA regions to represent the
entire population. Further, there are a large number of variables across the entire population that
may have a factor on the effectiveness of safety culture and leadership impacts on accident rates.
The limited number of variables selected for consideration in the research design are stated
within Chapter III.
The method in which federal government statisticians stratify accident data is difficult to
isolate CNATO generalities within the random sample size. This will require the researcher to
make assumptions as to the type of aircraft operated by the CNATO and correspond accident
data to those types of operations.
The participants’ willingness to answer survey instrumentation honestly and openly is
outside the control of researchers. Every effort was made to ensure validation of outlier data is
verified while maintaining the study integrity. Should participants not divulge information,
study results will be limited.
Leadership styles, organizational safety culture are highly subjective. Even with a
reliable and valid instrument, there were influences and variables not considered which may be
materially relevant to each study participant.
Definition of Terms
The purpose of this section is to assist in establishing a common understanding of how
terms are used within the study. Precise terminology using authoritative definitions provides
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scientifically grounded research (Creswell, 2009). Terms used throughout the study were
presented in alphabetical order below:
Abductive reasoning: The collection and analysis of research data using multiple stages
to gain clarity and meaning to an observation. This is achieved by combining the reliability of
empirical data with validity of lived experience. Abductive reasoning is “understood as a
process that values both deductive and inductive approaches but relies principally on the
expertise, experience, and intuition of researchers” (Wheeldon & Åhlberg, 2012, p. 7).
Aircraft accident:
an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place between the
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the
aircraft receives substantial damage. (14 CFR Title 49 §830.2)
AOPA: Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
Annex 1 through 19: Amendments and additions to the Chicago Convention
ASF: Air Safety Foundation
ATP: Airline Transport Pilot
CASA: Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Chicago Convention: ICAO Chicago Convention of December 07, 1944
CNATO: Certificated Non-scheduled Air Taxi Operator classified under Part 135 of the
Federal Aviation Administration regulations.
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
High Reliability Organization (HRO): a subset of high-risk organizations designed and
managed to avoid such accidents characterized by the response of the organization’s
constituencies when it fails, the tendency to operate at or near the edge of human capacity, and
diverse constituencies (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989).
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IBAC: International Business Aircraft Council
ICAO: International Civil Aeronautics Organisation
Incident: “an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an
aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations” 49 CFR §830.2
ISBAO: International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations
NASA: National Aeronautical and Space Administration
NBAA: National Business Aircraft Association
Normal accidents: unpreventable and unpredictable accidents involving complex
systematic or equipment failures, signals only visible in retrospect, and/or operator error which is
not fully correctable until after the accident has occurred (Perrow, 1984).
Operating certificate: a regulatory designation issued by a local FAA Flight Standards
District Office to each CNATO authorizing and defining operating parameters of aircraft.
Organizational Accident: a comparatively rare but often catastrophic event that occurs
within complex modern technology, such as nuclear power plants, commercial aviation, the
petrochemical industry, chemical process plants, marine and rail transport, and the off-shore oil
industry (Reason, 1997).
Post hoc ergo propter hoc: Philosophical fallacy theory from latin phrase meaning “after
this, because of this”. From the 1662 textbook of logic, La logique, ou l'art de penser was
written anonymously by published by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole outlining the post hoc
theory.
Safety climate: perceptions held by participants regarding molar perceptions they share
of their organizational environment at a particular moment in time (Zohar, 1980). A cultural
artifact resulting from espoused values and shared tacit assumptions (Schein, 2000).
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Safety culture: a prolonged state of organizational understanding, shared by the
participants, of safety and its antecedents. “The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social
and technical practices that are concerned with minimising the exposure of employees,
managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or
injurious” (Guldenmund, 2000, p. 228)
Safety Management Systems (SMS): “the formal, top-down business-like approach to
managing safety risk. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the
management of safety (including safety risk management, safety policy, safety assurance, and
safety promotion)” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007, p. 1).
Sociotechnical systems: the tight integration and interdependency of systems with human
interaction.
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs): a proactive safety strategy based on
the implementation of a State Safety Programme (SSP) that systematically addresses safety risks,
in agreement with the implementation of safety management systems (Parker, Lawrie, &
Hudson, 2006).
Summary
NTSB statistical data has shown the rate of organizational accidents in CNATOs exceeds
scheduled airline occurrences and has repeatedly placed it on their 2015 “Most Wanted List”
(NTSB, n.d., 2015b). A lack of academic research specific to CNATOs regarding identification
of variables leading to organizational accidents has exposed the flying public to risk. By
applying established theoretical frameworks in organizational accidents, HRO, and safety
culture, to a set of variables such as leadership influence and operational process compliance, a
better picture emerges about the effects of factors involved in organizational accidents. These
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discoveries could help shape CNATO public policy and aid the public good in creating a safer
flying experience.
Using established theoretical frameworks in the field of organizational safety culture,
HRO, and aviation, a context was created to better understand study objectives. Little academic
argument exists as to whether leadership influences safety culture because inclusion of SMS and
organizational culture development is dependent upon leader initiation. Examples of these
variables reducing accident rates has been found in military applications, but has never been
applied to CNATOs.
The study seeks to answer four research questions:
1. What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO organization possess?
2. To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a relationship with

performance outcomes, including accident rates?
3. To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of CNATOs that use

commercially available safety management system programs and those that do not?
4. To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a relationship with the

development of a safety culture and accident rates?
To address the research questions, a sequential transformative mixed method approach
determined whether a multivariate relationship exists among safety culture inculcation,
leadership influence, and organizational accidents. Finding an association and/or a relationship
determines the degree to which CNATOs could create a common set of aviation safety best
practices.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
Introduction
The purpose of this multi-disciplinary literature review was to properly provide a frame
of reference for this study in the context of existing research addressing the topic of leadership
and organizational culture development as it relates to aviation safety and to confirm the study’s
unique contribution to the field. The literature search utilized two university institutional
libraries, Pepperdine University and Oklahoma State University, for cross-reference and access
to additional resources. Research was conducted via electronic database search of WorldCat and
Summons search engines to identify peer-reviewed academic journal resources primarily
consisting of EBSCOhost academic search complete, ABI/Inform Global, Emerald management
extra, Wiley online library, Sage journals online, JSTOR, and Scopus. In addition, ProQuest
Dissertation and Thesis searches identified emerging research in the field of aviation safety and
organizational dynamics.
A search included word combinations of key terms to identify relevant empirical studies.
Combinations included aviation leadership, high-trust, organizational culture, safety culture,
safety climate, high reliability organizations, organizational accidents, and aviation accident data.
Research regarding leadership and organizational culture yield largely qualitative studies. Each
study selected had to be an empirical investigation and meet one of three inclusion criterion.
First was relevancy in the following areas of core leadership principles, organizational culture,
and operational aviation characteristics at the individual level of analysis. Second, studies had to
base their findings on sound academic qualitative or quantitative investigative theory, and third,
they must have been peer reviewed.
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The body of literature strongly indicated a lack of research has occurred pertaining to
identification of leadership traits and organizational culture development within aviation. For
this reason, Chapter II presents multi-discipline theory, constructs, and research that underlie the
factors of creating an inculcation of a safety climate within certificated non-scheduled air taxi
operators from the perspective of four domains: (a) the study of organizations’ (and thereby
organizational leaders’) approach to leadership and its response to the development of a safety
culture, (b) performance within an operating environment of high reliability organizations and
their interrelationship with organizational culture, (c) the selection of core elements which
contributed to the creation of an approved safety management system, and (d) the influence of
safety culture on aircraft operator accident rates.
Leadership Characteristics in Aviation
“The organization's culture develops in large part from its leadership while the culture of
an organization can also affect the development of its leadership” (Bass & Avolio, 1993, p. 112).
The study of leadership is a broad and vast topic to explore. A simple search in WorldCat using
the word leadership yields over 839,000 entries. Literature abounds in relation to the types,
methods, and characteristics of leadership. Despite the vastness of research, only a small,
disconnected amount of literature supports the application of any prevalent traits or
characteristics to aviation leaders. While the literature has conducted individual research of
leaders in airlines, aerospace, and other related occupations within aviation, there has been no
consensus as to one superior leadership model (Kutz, 1998). There is also an extensive presence
of literature to support the connection to leadership influence on the development of a strong
organizational culture (Beebe, 2013; Berkowitz & Wren, 2013; Chang & Lee, 2007; Meier,
2014; Tsai, 2011). Due to the absence of substantive literature directly related to leadership
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traits specifically in aviation, three distinct leadership models will be discussed for potential
inclusion as a direct application to the operation of a certificated non-scheduled air taxi operator.
Situational approach. The aviation industry has a high degree of variability and
regulatory restrictions. Leaders must constantly adapt to a changing environment in which they
operate. As a result, a situational approach to leadership emerges as one industry prevalent
construct. Situational leadership was established by Hersey and Blanchard (1969) as a response
to Reddin’s (1967) 3-D management style theory and the Managerial Grid of Blake and Mouton
(1964). Both these new models were based on the groundbreaking work of Stodgill (1948) and
his attempts to define and focus research on the identification of leadership traits (Northouse,
2012). The rigidity and absoluteness of prior leadership grids did not appeal to Hersey and
Blanchard. Researchers set out to address the gap in research and believed there was an
opportunity to create a more relevant and workable model to account for variable situations
(Hambleton & Gumpert, 1982). After several iterations of the situational leadership model, they
introduced the concept of tri-dimensional leadership.
A Tri-Dimensional Leadership Effectiveness model posits a leader response does not
exhibit a single characteristic or style, but rather is completely situational and varies based on the
leader, follower, and situation (Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson, 1996; Northouse, 2012). While
not directly including aviation organizations in the list of applicable industries, they state:
Crisis-oriented organizations such as the military or fire department, there is considerable
evidence that the most appropriate style would be high task and low relationship, since
under combat, fire, or emergency conditions success often depends on immediate
response to orders. (Hersey et al., 1996, p. 243)
Application of the tri-dimensional leadership model is appropriate due to the high command and
control environment required within aviation. While the ability to adapt to the situation is
critical, the ability to continue to relate on a personal level still proves critical to success. The
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situational leadership style builds a culture where adaptation to the environment allows for action
and recognition of follower needs. While the leader may not be the most charismatic, followers
recognize the rational response to the situation and agree to follow the leader. This resulting
action builds trust between leader-follower. Studies found “the quality of leader-member
interaction influences the leader's concern for members' welfare, which in turn influences safetyclimate perceptions in the group and hence the safety behavior of the group” (Zohar, 2002b, p.
76). The situational leadership model demonstrates through evidence that closer, higher-quality
relationships increase leader concerns for follower welfare. This concept provides the base for
the successful creation of culture and high-trust in organizations.
Another reoccurring theme in the literature tying aviation to situational leaders was the
concept of sense-making. Human nature dictates that individuals interpret activities through
their own lens. Interviews of post-accident aviation accidents typically yield differing accounts
of the same set of outcomes. Sense-making in situational leadership shifts the evaluation of an
experience from past tense to instantaneous streams of information evaluated in real-time
(Roberts & Bea, 2001b). This concept is repeated throughout the literature and was often
described as being from a positivist point of view. Further examples of situational leadership in
aviation existed within studies of air traffic control organizations. Two air traffic facilities were
studied to measure how leader adaptability was handled using various situations, conditions,
tasks and structure (Arvidsson, Johansson, Ek, & Akselsson, 2007). These two examples
provide an example of the strong foundation of situational leadership in aviation.
Situational approach has its downside. When Hersey and Blanchard (1996) revised their
life-cycle behavioral theory 25 years later, they acknowledge numerous gaps in applying only
two dimensions to expand upon the previous work presented by Blake and Mouton. While
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situational leadership theory and tri-dimensional models were updated from their original, the
application remains incomplete due to descriptions for only four out of a possible nine
dimensions (Graeff, 1997). Ambiguity caused by the lack of further description allows the
literature to indicate ambiguity and incompleteness as key descriptors for the situational
leadership theory. However, the nature of the dynamic environment in which aviation operates
and the level of industry maturity demands inclusion of this still popular leadership type.
Path-goal theory. The leader member exchange (LMX) construct was first proposed by
Graen and colleagues as a method to describe and explain the unique relationship between leader
and follower (Graen, Dansereau, & Minami, 1972; Graen, Orris, & Johnson, 1973). LMX relies
upon a strong relationship between members within the organization. In creating these complex
ecosystems, groups self-organize based on common goals. The byproduct of this type of selforganization is the isolation of out-groups that do not actively follow or fall in line with the
leader at the top of a LMX organization. LMX leaders reward members of these in-groups with
honesty, open exchange of information, and support. This concept has been identified in
literature as social exchange based contracts.
Further literature reveals a more recent trend toward a horizontal version of LMX called
team member exchange (TMX). Similar in its relationship between the members, TMX uses
social exchanges inside work groups rather than between a dyadic leader-follower arrangement
to identify the quality within teams (Banks et al., 2014; Seers, 1989; Seers, Petty, & Cashman,
1995). This latest theory reflects a more modern view of workplace dynamics where teams have
emerged as centers of organizational power. The evolution of LMX to TMX provides an
opportunity to evaluate the potential relationships of aviation to both constructs while
statistically treating them in the same manner. Meta-analysis research proves the two have
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strong comparisons and can be related by applying proper assumptions (Banks et al., 2014).
Both LMX and TMX have strong applications and a history of ties to aviation leadership.
Researchers have identified clear examples of LMX within aviation organizations. The
strongest historical example were the leaders of Eastern Airlines. The first leader of the
organization was World War I flying ace, Eddie Rickenbacker. Rickenbacker was frequently
referred to as having a militaristic style of leadership and often referred to his employees as
privates (Lewis, 2005). His blind allegiance to the International Association of Machinists union
resulted in a series of critical mistakes that shuttered the airline for nearly a month. Despite
being the father figure to many within the organization, his leadership style was often a source of
contention. Rickenbacker was known to be hard-lined and arrogant, but this behavior was rooted
in his inferiority of only having a seventh grade education (Berstein, 1991; Lewis, 2005).
Despite strong command and control characteristics, accidents were frequent during his 28 year
reign as leader of the airline. Eastern Airlines flourished under his leadership in the early days of
aviation where reliability and accidents were common. The next leader of Eastern Airlines
reflected the strong ties to military aviation. Frank Borman was a graduate of the United States
Military Academy, fighter pilot, and a member of the second class of NASA astronauts. In one
of his first actions as the leader of Eastern Air Lines, Borman sent a clear message to the
employees and fired or demoted 24 vice presidents in a clear attempt to strip autonomy from the
lower levels of management (Conger, 2000). While a main objective of profitability was a clear
mission, Borman often delivered the news to employees in a callous, pessimistic, and rough
manner. He frequently relegated employees to menial assignments when they lost favor with
Borman.
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Transactional-transformational leadership. Extensive studies linking transactional
and transformational leadership styles have been performed. For the purposes of this study,
meta-analysis of the literature supports the characteristics of both styles are similar enough to
discuss in one context (McCleskey, 2014). A summary of literature perspectives on both styles
will provide a foundation and demonstrate a pattern of evolutionary validation the two are
inextricably related.
In a transactional leadership arrangement, the leader and follower enter into a social
contract to accomplish specific goals and outcomes. Relationships are formed to maximize both
individual and organizational advancements through exchanges with gratification components
for each participant (Burns, 1978). In this theory, gratification is provided through contingent
awards such as praise and tangible reward like a promotion, salary increase or bonus. This
symbiotic relationship created by contingent reward has been proven to increase organizational
effectiveness in situations free from complex external factors (Bass, 1985; Bass, Avolio, Jung, &
Berson, 2003; Bass & Bass, 2009; Gregory, Harris, Armenakis, & Shook, 2009). After extensive
study, transactional leadership proved ineffective in developing long term relationships with
followers and therefore was seen as a short-term solution.
Bass’ (1985) transformational leadership theory (TFL) has generated considerable
empirical research interest over the past decades. The creation of transformational leadership
stemmed from a perceived shortcoming of fundamental transactional leadership interaction in
relation to basic worker needs. Meaningful transformation includes leader interactions that
include: presenting outcomes in a way where values are enhanced, putting team above individual
needs, and recognizing others need for recognition (Bass, 1985). As opposed to the purely
transactional nature of previous follower interaction, transformational emphasizes the inclusion
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of charisma by providing followers with inspirational motivation and idealized influence (Bass &
Riggio, 2006). Some of the characteristics of transformational leaders include articulating a
captivating vision for the future, acting as charismatic role models, fostering the acceptance of
common goals, setting high performance expectations, and providing individualized support and
intellectual stimulation for followers (Bass, 1985; Bass & Avolio, 1993; Menges, Walter, Vogel,
& Bruch, 2011).
Numerous studies of relationships between transformational leadership and performance
have been conducted in settings considered stable or free from external influences. These studies
are not applicable to the highly regulated, externally rich, and changing aviation setting. A lack
of study around dynamic work environments led Bass et al. (2003) to further examine the
relationship between leadership and performance in operating environments under high levels of
stress and uncertainty. Researchers built upon the operationalized notion of relative validity and
studied other instances of transformational leadership within highly dynamic workplaces. A
meta-analysis reported 87 studies with positive relationships among transformational leadership
and pre-determined organizational outcomes (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). In a sample of 72 light
infantry rifle platoons, the researchers examined how transformational leadership, transactional
leadership, unit potency (unit confidence to perform tasks), and unit cohesion (teamwork)
predicted performance on a training platoon mission. The results indicated a predictable
transformational and transactional relationship with an indicated medium correlation of r = 0.44,
p < .05 (Judge & Piccolo, 2004). Scoring a medium correlation, the stress environments must be
evaluated individually and not generalized.
Building on the groundbreaking behaviorists such as Skinner, Watson, and Pavlov, Isreali
industrial engineering and management professor Dov Zohar sought to apply meaning in the
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highly complex industrial systems to achieve a higher level of safety. In addition to creating the
term safety climate, he studied the supervisory practices in transformational leaders as they
related to creating safe work environments (Zohar, 1980). The quantitative study of 427 workers
repairing industrial equipment in a hazardous workplace revealed a transformational leadership
based intervention model resulted in a significant decrease in microaccident rates (Zohar, 2000,
2002a). This and other research demonstrates the importance transactional and transformational
leadership in developing a strong leader-follower relationship built on trust.
Despite the seemingly positive aspects of transactional leadership, the literature cited
many critics of the leadership style. Perhaps the most surprising was Bass himself. The model
showed deficiencies regarding internal consistency, conceptual contradictions, and ambiguities
(Bass & Bass, 2009). Transformational leadership relies greatly on the characteristics of the
leader, but academic debate continues about reliability and validity of how follower outcomes
are measured within the leader context. Yukl (2008) suggested the impact on work groups,
teams and organizations was unclear due to a lack of weight placed on the measurement of
variables in previous studies. The debate will continue on the merits and detractions of
transformational-transactional leadership, but its presence in aviation organizations is strong and
will provide a framework to help describe this study.
Leadership and safety behaviors have been studied in literature often enough to have
warranted a meta-analysis. Clarke (2013) examined articles containing any combination of five
safety dimensions and the term leadership. Over 800 papers were identified in the search. From
that sample, 32 studies identified as having measured leadership using safety variables. Findings
indicated safety compliance was strongest in transactional leadership (p = .41) while safety
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participation (p = .44) was stronger in transformational leadership (Clarke, 2013). Figure 4
graphically represents the leadership style relationships to safety variables measured.

Figure 4. Final model of relationships between leadership, perceived safety climate, safety.
From “Safety Leadership: A Meta-analytic Review of Transformational and Transactional
Leadership Styles as Antecedents of Safety Behaviours,” S. Clarke, 2013, Journal of
Occupational & Organizational Psychology, 86(1), p. 34. Copyright 2013 by Wiley-Blackwell.
Reprinted with permission.
The meta-analysis discussion provides great insight into the importance of leader
adaptation to variables in stating the following:
The findings indicate that there is empirical evidence to support a role of active
transactional leadership that is distinct from transformational leadership, suggesting that
the overall concept of safety leadership needs to be extended beyond the idea of
transformational leadership to include other types of leader behavior. (Clarke, 2013, p.
33)
Beyond those findings, the author recognizes several limitations in the body of literature. There
has been little research done in the area of active transactional leadership in the context of safety.
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Additional limitations exist in the causal link interpretation of the cross-sectional data
methodology. As discussed later, this meta-analysis also operationalized safety climate as an
individual level variable but states there is strong evidence to support treating climate as a grouplevel effect. Aviation requires safety climate and culture to be considered group level in order to
consider the dyadic unit created as a result of the close work environment and interactions.
Importance of High-Trust Organizations
“Trust between individuals and groups is a highly important ingredient in the long-term
stability of the organization and the well-being of its members” (Cook & Wall, 1980, p. 39).
Research consistently showed the relationship between leaders and followers require high-trust
in a workplace susceptible to organizational accidents regardless of individual leadership traits
(Cox, Jones, & Collinson, 2006; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Freiwald, 2013; Schein, 2010). In
conducting extensive quantitative study, a team of researchers learned five drivers were strong
and stable predictors of organizational trust across cultures, languages, industries, and types of
organizations: competence, openness and honesty, concern for employees and stakeholders,
reliability, and identification (Shockley-Zalabak & Morreale, 2011; Shockley-Zalabak, Morreale,
& Hackman, 2010). These characteristics are consistent with early research performed in
military operations where trust is critical to developing a safety culture and following
organizational accidents at NASA (Ciavarelli, 2006; Roberts, Stout, et al., 1994; Wong, Desai,
Madsen, Roberts, & Ciavarelli, 2005).
Understanding trust building and the creation of an established theoretical framework for
leader-follower performance outcomes led to the application of the model to civilian aviation
related fields. Commitment to the job, an antecedent of employee satisfaction, was
quantitatively measured inside the FAA air traffic control system to draw inferences on trust
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(Cho & Park, 2011). Based on the previously reviewed management theories, the relationship
between the leader and follower of great importance. LMX considers trust as a key predictor in
the ability of an organization to act effectively (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975). Transactional
and transformational describes trust as fundamental to ensure exchange of contingent reward.
Situational leadership demonstrates a leader adapting and formulating a rational response as the
foundation of trust. Without trust, each style of leadership weakens. A comprehensive study
revealed, from a sample size of 19,849 respondents and p < .001, that trust in management has
the strongest tie to performance outcomes (Cho & Park, 2011). Other relative effects of trust
revealed in the study is included in Figure 5 and serves as a framework for future studies using
structure equation modeling.

Figure 5. Antecedents of high-trust organizations. From “Exploring the Relationships Among
Trust, Employee Satisfaction, and Organizational Commitment,” Y. J. Cho, & H. Park, 2011,
Public Management Review, Vol. 13, p. 556. Copyright 2011 by Taylor & Francis. Reprinted
with permission.
The literature overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that trust in the organizational
leader is the foundation for the development of a strong safety culture (Cox & Flin, 1998; Cox et
al., 2006; Mercurio & Roughton, 2002; Schobel, 2009). Beyond trust established by the leader,
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there are behaviors required within the organization. Trust created between human interactions
becomes a factor in the development of high-trust organizations, particularly through cooperation
and communication. This high level of integration of human interaction and trust has been
supported in the literature through a comprehensive meta-analysis (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine,
2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). Another critical variable in understanding how high-trust
organizations form and operate is the complex interaction between humans and machines. As
technology advanced, the relationship humans developed with machines changed. Complex
processes and systemization of critical tasks have created two methods of dealing with
uncertainty: minimization and coping (Grote, 2007). Each have become a factor in every
operational discussion. Creation of trust and safety performance within an organization is
largely determined only when placed in context where trust is conferred (Schobel, 2009). As
with aviation, other industries reliant upon technological interaction have similar challenges.
Historic research emerged further describing these complex interactions within industries where
the organizational systems and processes failed.
Organizational Accidents
Following the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor accident, researchers began to attempt
understanding the relationship between complex organizational systems and accidents. The first
study to explore the interrelationship of increasingly complicated technology and the causes of
accidents developed into the theory of normal accidents (Perrow, 1984). Normal Accidents
Theory proposes tightly-coupled technological systems and unexpected failures are inevitable
and cannot be eliminated through redundancy. The adaptation of social science and inquiry into
human factors, which cause accidents, quickly evolved with the space shuttle Challenger disaster
and Chernobyl nuclear disaster in January and April 1986 respectively. Seminal work was
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undertaken in a series of governmental inquiries conducted by NASA into the shuttle disaster
tying the accident to organizational level failures (President’s Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, 1986; Wong et al., 2005).
An organizational accident is defined as a comparatively rare but often catastrophic
event that occurs within complex modern technology, such as nuclear power plants, commercial
aviation, the petrochemical industry, chemical process plants, marine and rail transport, and the
off-shore oil industry (Reason, 1997, 2000). Much like normal accidents described by Perrow
(1984), organizational accidents are a product of changing systematic relationships between
human interaction and technological innovations. However, the introduction of latent and active
factors further clarify the organizational accident. Latent conditions are inherent to all
organizations and can remain dormant for years prior to combining with active failures or
external hazards to cause an accident. Organizational accidents arise not only as a consequence
of organizational decisions, but also as a result of external decision paths, many of which are
outside the control of the organization. Using the space shuttle Challenger disaster, the active
condition was the decision by mission leadership to ignore the manufacturers’ engineer, Roger
Boijoly, expressing concern about the O-ring 6 months prior to the launch (McDonald & Hansen,
2009). The weather served as the latent condition by dropping unseasonably low the day of
launch. Without both active and latent conditions precedent, the organizational accident would
not have occurred. Additional research was subsequently performed in order to explain this
complex phenomenon further and create the comprehensive organizational accident definition.
The field of study continued to develop and in addition to a formal definition for
organizational accident, James Reason postulated a model called Swiss Cheese Model (SCM)
that identifies four failure domains: organizational influences, supervision, preconditions, and
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specific acts (Reason, 1997; Underwood & Waterson, 2014). In ordinary circumstances, the risk
mitigation process, enhanced by the domain layers, coordinate to create a solid mass. However,
when either active or latent errors are exposed within each domain at the precise time of an
incident, the failure is allowed to pass through each layer like Swiss cheese. Organizational
accidents using the SCM have been directly related to the aviation industry by using the FAA air
traffic control system (Underwood & Waterson, 2014).

Figure 6. Accident system relationships. From FAA Advisory Circular 120-92, (p. 5), by the
Federal Aviation Administration. Copyright 2006. In the public domain.

Reason (1998) also states that when the rare organizational accident occurs, the people
responsible for those actions often have no comprehension as to the cause. The FAA quickly
adopted Reason’s work to aviation and used the SCM to complex techno human aviation
interactions. Understanding the root cause and preventing organizational accidents rely upon
two concepts: production and protection. Production is an overarching concept related to the
production of services; in the case of aviation, the transportation of people (Reason, 1998).
Figure 6 graphically represents the concept of protection and production to aviation as
described in FAA (2006) Advisory Circular 120-92. Production in aviation primarily involves a
customer requirement of safe passage. Internally, the processes involved in operating the aircraft
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in a safe manner relies upon inputs from machine, man, and nature. Protection relates to the
institutional methods taken to protect the service from human error (Reason, 1998). These
systems can range from simple checklists to a complex computer model mitigating the risk of the
activity based on input parameters. Complete systems that address both protection and
production include an SMS.
Researchers discovered human factor involvement accelerates the ability for the error to
occur in most cases (Lindvall, 2011; Taylor, van Wijk, May, & Carhart, 2014; Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003). Human interaction was previously mentioned as a key component in the
successful development of high-trust organizations. That interaction serves a critical role in
organizational accidents as well. Human factors in aviation is widely accepted by the safety
community and National Transportation Safety Board as the leading cause of most aircraft
accidents (Air Safety Institute, 2011). A field of study emerging within aviation to study humansystem interaction is human factors analysis.
High Reliability Organization (HRO)
High reliability organization (HRO) theory relates to enterprises that operate within low
error tolerances, are committed to a continual reduction in the causes of error, and contend with
complex technical systems as a normal course of operations (Rochlin, 1993; Schulman, 1993;
Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Early adaptations applied HRO theory to industries where
organizational accidents violated the public trust. While all industries may have elements of
high risk operations, there are only a few that have the potential to harm large numbers of people
in a single organizational accident. From a scientific approach, an example of a null hypothesis
to describe a HRO could be defined as: “organizations do not vary in internal processes as a
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function of the degree to which their production technologies are perceived as hazardous or the
consequences of individual failures vary in severity” (Roberts, 1990b, p. 160).
There are eight distinct characteristics to help identify a HRO. They are hyper
complexity, operational urgency, extreme hierarchical differentiation, complex communication
networks, high degree of accountability, high frequency of immediate feedback about decisions,
compressed time factors, and more than one critical outcome must happen simultaneously
(Roberts & Rousseau, 1989). These characteristics combine to form a highly complex
interrelationship as described by Perrow, Reason and Roberts. Researchers believed there was
more to understanding HRO behavior and proposed in conjunction with the University of
California at Berkley the creation of a working group called the “HRO project”. “The HRO
project then sought to explicate phenomena which are surprising and unexpected - as well as
skeptically received as incredible within the scope of current social science understanding of
complex organization” (La Porte, 1996, p. 61). Figure 7 represents the culmination of the
working group to describe the phenomenon in the context of other familiar functional
relationships.

35

Figure 7. Conceptual logic undergirding HRO studies. From “High Reliability Organizations:
Unlikely, Demanding and at Risk”, (p. 62), T. R. La Porte, 1996, Journal of Contingencies &
Crisis Management, 4(2). Copyright 1996 by Wiley-Blackwell. Reprinted with permission.
HROs are not necessarily high-risk organizations by nature, but rather take extraordinary
measures to achieve error-free performance (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2008). Reliability is
an extremely hard standard to reach. Regardless of previous success, HROs operate in an
environment which demand continuous predictability. Unfortunately, organizational accidents
cannot be offset with previously successful performance; they do not have the ability to be
credited to the next event (Schulman, 1993). An examination of literature on the lessons learned
from HRO research provide a relevant framework in which to understand organizations
operating within an industry that demands error-free performance.
Evolution of HRO theory. As described earlier in the context of organizational
accidents, Perrow’s (1984) High Reliability Theory, provides a foundation to describe activities
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within the HRO. The theory remains actively debated in HRO literature as to whether
exogenous influences can be effectively integrated or whether the highest degree of reliability
exists in a closed system free from trial and error (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989; Weick, 1987;
Weick et al., 2008). In contrast, many HROs believe trial and error leads to a better
understanding of how systems fail and the human interaction necessary to disrupt organizational
accidents (La Porte & Consolini, 2008; Rochlin et al., 1998; Schulman, 1993). Those
advocating trial and error believe experimentation increases system understanding which in turn
increases the human ability to intervene appropriately. In articulating the position that trial and
error is the only way to achieve true understanding, Rochlin (1999) made the following
argument:
The maintenance of safe operation so defined is an interactive, dynamic, and
communicative act, hence it is particularly vulnerable to disruption or distortion by wellmeant but imperfectly informed interactions aimed at eliminating or reducing ‘human
error’ that do not take into account the importance of the processes by which the
construction of safe operation is created and maintained. (p. 1549)
The debate in literature will continue as to whether it is truly feasible to achieve error-free
performance in a HRO through predefined processes and systems versus trial and error. The
application of this argument to aviation has been clearly resolved through extensive
experimentation in activities ranging from airborne flight testing to the constant adjustment of
checklists by manufacturers. Regardless what position the literature argues, there is compelling
evidence to support aviation has a rich history in applying the concepts of HRO to a wide range
of activities.
HRO in military operations. In a quest to understand organizational accidents on a
massive scale, a more focused field of research applying HRO theory to military flight
applications emerged. The first comprehensive studies into operating within a HRO involved
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Naval aircraft carrier operations (La Porte, 1996; La Porte et al., 1988; Roberts, 1990a; Roberts,
Stout, et al., 1994; Rochlin et al., 1998; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Due to the high number of
fatalities of carrier-based aircraft, the Navy undertook a project to determine root causes and
create a high performing safety environment. Researchers described the high-risk environment
of carriers could have applications in any area containing complex processes and human-systems
interaction. Mishaps peaked in 1953 with 57 accidents, but through the continued diligence and
increased process analysis, the mishaps steadily decreased to 15 by 1965 (Roberts, 1990a). The
incredible success reported in the study represents high validity since the accident rates
continuously improved through 2013 when the accident rate fell to 0.48 per 100,000 hours
(Naval Safety Center, 2014). Many of the lessons from this literature informed future research in
other industries.
HRO within NASA. HRO theories and concepts quickly became adopted and ingrained
into NASA due to a series of unfortunate accidents (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Casler, 2013; La
Porte, 1996). Beginning with STS-51, space shuttle Challenger, NASA and researchers began to
study the institutional level failures that occurred. In using STS-51 as a representative model,
Reason (1997) was able to accurately describe organizational accidents. Unfortunately, it was
not until the second accident of STS-107 and the loss of vehicle and crew of Columbia in 2003
that NASA acted in response to extremely critical identification of organizational failures (Boin
& Schulman, 2008; Mahler & Casamayou, 2009). HRO research took the fundamental concepts
of organizational accidents and evaluated the situation for its relationship with characteristics of
other activities requiring failure-free operations. NASA operates in an environment where risk is
inevitable. The complexity involved with basic components of space travel such as the vehicle,
tightly coupled systems, and high reliance on technology clearly support NASA as an HRO
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(Casler, 2013; Mahler & Casamayou, 2009). Add the large number of decision makers and
operational urgency to the process and it matches all the previous criteria previously stated.
There was also a tight correlation between leadership, culture, and safety at NASA (Norelli,
2015). Later research describes the method in which NASA has rejected integration of HRO
concepts into organizational culture development. In operationalizing 10 components of HRO,
NASA was found to fit only four (Casler, 2013). The failure to recognize a need to integrate
HRO thinking is troubling after two very high profile organizational accidents that led to the
eventual de-funding of multiple re-entry space flight. Failures at NASA may have facilitated
other governmental organizations to fully embrace HRO concepts.
HRO in the FAA Air Traffic Control system. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has utilized the HRO theoretical model in air traffic control operations. At the time of
adoption by the FAA in 1982, several high profile mid-air collisions had occurred, a controller
strike had just occurred, and the agency was in the process of a technology update (Schulman,
1993). Management was seeking a solution to redesign the organizational culture to achieve
greater reliability and keep pace with aviation technological advancements. In order to ensure
success, the FAA understood full implementation would mean not only an organizational
change, but a policy change (O’Neil & Krane, 2012). Air traffic controllers have highly complex
reciprocal interdependencies between pilots, systems, and even other controllers (Busby &
Iszatt-White, 2014; Nævestad, 2009; Roberts & Bea, 2001a). This tightly coupled
interdependence creates a dynamic workplace ripe with potential for organizational accidents (La
Porte & Consolini, 2008; O’Neil, 2011). Using the mitigation tactics of HRO allowed the FAA
to understand the organizational subtleties that cause accidents and eliminate them. By 2000, the
accident rate was 0.0004, and by 2002 the FAA Air Traffic Control system had achieved a zero
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fatal accident rate (O’Neil & Krane, 2012). HROs are inherently concerned with reliability over
performance, therefore the FAA example proved no different to NASA, nuclear power plant, and
aircraft carrier aviation operations in demanding adherence to both at the same time.
HRO adoption in commercial aviation. After the clear success of HRO theory within
military operations and the FAA, the concept gained favor in commercial aviation. Prevalence
of hiring participants from these two early adopters allowed airlines to re-evaluate their
operations from a new perspective, but the adoption was slow in coming. The identification of
commercial aviation as a HRO has also been studied and well-grounded in literature. The
empirical results from the literature demonstrate the ability of HROs to reduce the number of
errors (O’Neil & Kriz, 2013; Roberts & Bea, 2001a). In a 68-year study of commercial airline
operations and accident rates, the advent of HRO theory proved statistically significant. “Our
analysis of the American aviation policy-agency regulatory framework revealed a statistically
significant relationship between the emergence of specific high-reliability policy and the
regulatory agency characteristics that produced a reduction of commercial airline Part 121
accidents” (O’Neil & Kriz, 2013, p. 609).
Commercial aviation has a long history of hierarchical deities in the cockpit known as
pilots (Rochlin, 1999). The mere nature of the official designation of ‘pilot-in-command’
provided little ambiguity as to who was ultimately responsible for the operation of the aircraft.
However, the human relationship evolved into a more complex system as the level of
cooperation necessary to operate the aircraft increased (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). In
addition, increasing technology in flight systems removed the predictability and simplicity of the
aircraft (Rochlin, 1999). Previous training focused on piloting skills and less on the aircraft
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systems. Now highly complex engine power plants and advanced navigation avionics proved an
inability of humans to effectively understand the infinite variability.
A clear criticism of the literature is that no one appears to dispute the presence of each
HRO characteristic within aviation, but no empirical research conducted support such claims. It
appears the reliable and valid measurement tools used in military outcome analysis or various
other fields has not resulted in meaningful study of HRO practices in commercial aviation.
HRO in healthcare. Since the establishment of HRO organizational theory, numerous
industries have joined the quest to achieve error-free operations. Healthcare has been the most
recent entrant into HRO due to the parallels in imagery between aviation operations and
medicine to the consumer. Examples in clinical operations have been well researched and have
shown successful outcomes (Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, & Ciavarelli, 2003; Singer, Rosen,
Zhao, Ciavarelli, & Gaba, 2010). One study went so far as to compare safety related attitudes
and experiences of 2,989 California hospital employees in 15 locations to 6,901 members of
naval aviation units. The conclusion was the hospitals lacked a strong HRO characteristics in
comparison to the Naval Aviators (Gaba et al., 2003). This result was not unexpected since the
hospitals did not claim to have fully implemented HRO and the Navy has been a self-proclaimed
HRO for over 20 years. Researchers were not satisfied with the results from the first survey and
many of the same investigators participated in a more wide-scale evaluation using the same
question set. In the second study, 13,841 hospital workers and 14,854 naval aviators were
administered the same survey with significantly different results. One hospital performed at the
same level of the Navy and at least one hospital outperformed the Navy in all but 3 of the 16
benchmarks (Singer et al., 2010). The study results prove the ability of HRO theory application
in environments placing value on creating near error-free organizations.
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Table 3 represents other industries experimenting with HRO application along with those
previously mentioned as having pioneered the effort (Binci, Cerruti, & Donnarumma, 2012).

Table 3
Examples of HRO Typologies
HRO’s typologies
Fire emergency services
Healthcare

Power grid

Air Traffic Control
Civil Aviation

HRO’s priorities
To prevent, prepare for, respond to and
recover from a diverse range of fire
emergencies
To ensure effective performance and
safety with results close to zero error
despite operating in unpredictable
environments and organization being
inherently risky
To maintain reliability of power grids
and guarantee electric service
continuity avoiding service
interruptions and blackouts
To effectively manage the air traffic
flow with safety of flight operations
and avoid possible disasters
To ensure the safety and reliability of
air transport

Examples of organizations
targeting high reliability
US wildland and urban fire
fighting
Loma Linda Hospital
Kaiser Permanente

Norwegian electricity network
operators
California Independent System
Operator (CAISO)
Federal Aviation
Administration’s Air Traffic
Control Centers
SAS Airlines
United Airlines

Space Flight

To reach new and unknown places for
the benefit of humanity in conditions
of safety and reliability

Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB)

Railway sector

To provide a safe, fast and reliable
transport service

UK train operators

Petroleum and chemical
industries

Research, production, transportation
and marketing of oil and natural gas by
avoiding natural disasters and
minimising organisational risk

Chevron

Nuclear power

To provide low-cost electricity in a
safe, clean and reliable way

Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Note. From “Resistance in HROs, Setback or Resource?” D. Binci, C. Cerruti, and S.A Donnarumma,
2012, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 25(6), p. 868. Copyright 2012 by Emerald Group
Publishing. Reprinted with permission.
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HRO as a construct. Various stated examples of successful implementation of HRO
have proven the applicability of the theory. The continued debate highlighted by the literature is
the lack of conceptualization of key reliability characteristics such as culture, technology,
structure, and collective mind (Nævestad, 2008; Offstein, Kniphuisen, Bichy, & Childers, 2013;
Roberts & Bea, 2001a, 2001b, Rochlin, 1996, 1999). Scholars refer to these core characteristics
as sociotechnical systems. Sociotechnical systems approach relies upon jointly optimized
technical and social subsystems. This tightly coupled system allows the primary task to be
accomplished with the highest degree of efficiency (Nævestad, 2009). There is little argument
that HROs, and by default sociotechnical systems, rely upon a high degree of shared beliefs and
expectations. With the tightly coupled human systems, the hypersensitivity to prevent failure
results in unwarranted simplification and creation of rigid processes that jeopardize HRO
effectiveness (Roberts & Bea, 2001a; Weick et al., 2008).
Any time a pilot or other participant in HRO relies upon rote memory to perform tasks,
the system has failed. Studies prove the danger of collective mindfulness is rooted in the fact
that HROs have so few accidents it results in unrealistic ideas and over-confidence (Offstein et
al., 2013; Rochlin, 1999). In a series of maritime examples, one study used the Titanic as an
example of this contradiction to HRO philosophy. Everyone from the captain to the dishwasher
was told the Titanic was unsinkable and therefore created a false sense of fantasy based on
unrealistic ideas. The crew had little training in the massive ship and based decisions based on
efficiency rather than reliability (Roberts & Bea, 2001b). “In the more effective HROs,
complacency is interpreted as a failure of striving, inattention is interpreted as a failure of
vigilance, and habituation is interpreted as a failure of continuous adjustment” (Weick et al.,
2008, p. 41).
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HRO conclusion. Each example included in various settings underscore a broader point
of how a HRO theory integrates with organizational culture. The goal for every HRO is to
achieve organizational reliability. Weick (1987) states that the Challenger accident, Three Mile
Island, and Bhopal were all organizational issues related to reliability and not efficiency. The
unintentional result is efficiency inherently creates an organizational culture of unreliability. As
system complexity is introduced into an organization, the human must match that complexity and
account for a variety of possible variables to achieve predictability (Bigley & Roberts, 2001;
Schulman, 1993). This predictability, whether in human behavior, systems, or processes serves
as a critical component to create organizational reliability, a key component to a successful
HRO. Therefore, we must examine the concepts of organizational culture and how the
environment to sustain a HRO can be created. While integration of culture to organizational
accident is not mentioned in Perrow (1984), the literature suggests a strong connection within
HRO. This would account for an updating of the basic theory to cover additional variables
uncovered during subsequent studies. Criticism has been voiced as to the unintended diversion
resulting in a rush to solve the argument whether HRO and NAT are related (Roberts, 2009). It
is clear from meta-analysis the two have similar overlapping characteristics, but are in fact two
distinct theories. Taking into consideration the body of literature on HRO theory, perhaps one
quote can accurately summarize the entire field of study:
While the conceptual problems of interdependence and complexity have been part of the
social science agenda for at least twenty years, this work is still in a very early stage of
development when set against the organizational phenomena being observed. (La Porte &
Consolini, 2008, p. 74)
Organizational Culture and Climate
There is substantial scholarly debate as to whether aviation safety can be categorized as
either prolonged state of existence known as culture, or climate, a temporary state subject to
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change (O’Connor et al., 2011). Surprisingly, the literature is unclear as to whether the existence
of strong organizational safety culture impacts accident rates. There are strong examples in
measurement of safety culture in the military, but this has yet to be applied to general aviation.
Organizational culture. Organizational culture is a broad term established to explain
the interrelationship between leaders, followers, and the organization. To state organizational
culture is a frequently studied topic would be an understatement; in a WorldCat search using
organizational culture as a term, over 24,000 peer-reviewed articles appear. Researchers have
been actively searching for a clear definition of culture and attempting to understand the impact
to organizations from a sociological, psychological, and anthropological perspective. Culture
has been discussed in the context of organizational development for many years, but the
academic literature did not apply scientific rigor to the topic until its peak in 2011 with 1,882
peer-reviewed articles. The relative infancy of organizational culture research as a phenomenon
has allowed researchers to explore a great deal of related topics.
The creation of a high functioning, nearly error-free organization relies upon elements of
centralized processes, but also development of a successful culture. Interpretation,
improvisation, and unique action are all necessary for highly dynamic operating environments
and without organizational culture, there would be no inability to adapt (Weick, 1987). Due to
the high number of articles on the topic, studies have formulated unique definitions of
organizational culture over the years. Researchers continue to frame the conversation in a way
that is beneficial for them. One recent study cited 164 different definitions for organizational
culture (Fisher & Alford, 2000). Despite the ongoing debate, the literature has accepted a
definition of organizational culture proposed by Schein (1990):
(a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given
group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal
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integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to
be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to
those problems. (p. 111)
Schein (1990) explains further that Lewinian field theory cannot explain the complex
relationship of organizational subgroups and units. Therefore, a return to a natural state of
equilibrium is impossible due to the amount of dynamic social systems, or culture, within an
organization.
Early research into organizational culture focused on identifying how it was created,
communicated, and rooted using a single workplace. Due to the measurement of culture being
very subjective and from a sociological viewpoint, studies relied heavily on qualitative analysis
(Büschgens, Bausch, & Balkin, 2013; Denison, 1996; Marchand, Haines, & Dextras-Gauthier,
2013; Schein, 2010). This myopic research agenda created a large volume of studies on the
theoretical limits and conceptual development of organizational culture, but very little on
measurable outcomes. It was not until recently that literature began to research differences in
culture and how they affect the organization.
Since organizational culture is a variable in the behavioral outcomes of followers, the
effect of a strong culture could stifle innovation. In a meta-analytic review of 43 studies
examining 6,341 organizations, the effect of a strong culture impacting both radical and
incremental innovation was found to not be statistically significant in hindering the innovation
process (Büschgens et al., 2013). This finding lends validity to HRO theory of enhanced
performance when a strong organizational culture is present. The lack of impact in innovation
allows the follower the freedom to interpret and adapt to changing environments to avoid
catastrophic failures (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). Effectiveness is also a key driver to successful
organizational culture and is easily measured using quantitative measures. The issue of how to
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measure effectiveness has become a central question in the research. Various opinions have
emerged as to what constitutes effectiveness since the multidimensional nature of operational
criteria differs between organizations and individual decision makers (Denison & Mishra, 1995).
It is therefore nearly impossible to measure effectiveness in a context that is meaningful to the
body of literature. One meta-analytic review looked at 84 studies to measure overall
effectiveness using dimensions specified by the Competing Values Framework. Each dimension
utilizes a recognized element of organizational culture to effectively categorize the
characteristics but lacked any tangible measure. The study found that positive correlations in 23
out of 25 possible effectiveness measures (Hartnell, Ou, & Kinicki, 2011). Despite the
shortcomings of measuring effectiveness, these two meta-analysis examples prove the presence
of a strong organizational culture leads to higher effectiveness and innovation than those without.
In the end, organizational culture must be evaluated in its most basic form. The
literature must temporarily set aside the philosophical argument of whether it is sociological,
psychological, normative, pragmatic, or anthropological (Brinkmann, 2007; Edwards, Davey, &
Armstrong, 2013). For this and other studies, organizational culture has been viewed in the
context of a variable acting as a subsystem within human, process, and organization interaction
driving the outcomes like an invisible hand. The magnitude of complexity and interdependency
of organizational culture has proven too much for the literature to draw meaningful conclusions
and assumptions. A few aviation related studies lacked empirical meaning, or used conjecture
for effect to describe another industry.
Organizational climate. Organizational climate can be regarded as the surface features
of the culture attributed to leader-follower attitudes and perceptions at a given point in time. It is
a snapshot of the state of an organization providing an indicator of the underlying culture of a
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work group, plant, or organization (Flin, Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000). A major
distinguishing factor highlighted in literature relates to climate is a lack of organizational
memory and therefore can be easily changed or manipulated by leaders. “Climate refers to a
situation and its link to thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of organizational members. This it is
temporal, and subjective” (Denison, 1996, p. 644).
In order to highlight and summarize the various theories of thought of climate versus
culture, Table 4 provides additional insight as to how the literature treats the two distinct
theories. Many researchers distinguish the differences using the temporal orientation and level
of analysis characteristics. Organizational climate only touches on the surface-level
manifestations of a particular phenomenon, where culture attempts to seek understanding of the
underlying values driving the behavior. Schein (1990), the recognized founder of organizational
culture, articulates his struggles with the very question of how to distinguish the two. He
resolves this conflict by making a general statement that climate can be considered a cultural
artifact comprising several concepts (climates) in order to adequately describe the situation
(Schein, 2000).

Table 4
Contrasting Organizational Culture and Climate Research Perspectives
Differences
Epistemology

Culture Literature

Climate Literature
Comparative & nomothetic

Point of View

Contextualized and
idiographic
Emic (native point of view)

Methodology

Qualitative field observation

Quantitative survey data

Etic (researcher’s viewpoint)

(continued)
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Differences
Level of Analysis
Temporal Orientation
Theoretical Foundations
Discipline

Culture Literature
Underlying values and
assumptions
Historical evolution
Social construction; critical
theory
Sociology & anthropology

Climate Literature
Surface-level manifestations
Ahistorical snapshot
Lewinian field theory
Psychology

Note. From “What is the Difference Between Organizational Culture and Organizational
Climate? A native’s point of view on a decade of paradigm wars,” D.R. Denison, 1996, Academy
of Management Review, 21(3), p. 625. Copyright 1996 by Academy of Management Review.
Adapted with permission.
High reliability organizations like aviation are not resilient when only operating as an
organizational climate. Evidence from the HRO literature overwhelmingly supports culture is
superior to climate (Klein, Bigley, & Roberts, 1995; Nævestad, 2009; Roberts, Rousseau, et al.,
1994; Rochlin, 1999). Much of the early literature on organizational climate infers culture is
similar without distinction. The purpose of describing distinct differences in literature is to
prevent interchangeable use of organizational climate and culture. It is especially important
while introducing the concept of safety culture.
Safety Culture
Based on the pioneering work of Perrow (1984), Pidgeon (1991), Reason (1998), and
Schein (1990), the field of organizational culture found clarification and purpose in creating the
subset known as safety culture. “The safety culture of an organization is the product of
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and
safety management” (Cox & Flin, 1998, p. 191). Placing culture in an organizational context
allows for qualitatively thick description. The need to avoid catastrophic failures gave rise to a
theory where robust human relationships between systems and technology could limit
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organizational accidents. The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) first
described safety culture to reflect on the operational and human failures at Chernobyl. The
report stated, “Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and
individuals that establish an overriding priority” (INSAG, 1991, p. 1). As with any emerging
theory of thought, there is significant dispute in literature as to how to define safety culture.
Guldenmund (2010) summarizes the literature well and captured the diversity of thought as
represented in Table 5. The inconsistency in the definitions used by the studies reflects a
continued debate. Due to the complex nature of safety culture and the sociological interactions,
two schools of thought emerged to provide constructs and potentially solve the uncertainty:
functionalist and interpretive approaches.

Table 5
Definitions of Safety Culture
Author(s)
Deal & Kennedy, (1982)
but used by numerous
other authors also in the
field of safety Cox
Cox & Cox (1991)
INSAG (1991)
Pidgeon (1991)

ACSNI (1993)

Ostrom,Wilhelmsen, &
Kaplan (1993)

Definition of Organizational Safety Culture
The way we do things around here

Part*
M

Safety cultures reflect the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that
C
employees share in relation to safety
Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations C
and individuals that establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant
safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance
The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices
W
that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of employees, managers,
customers, and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or
injurious
The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group
W
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an
organization’s health and safety management Organizations with a positive
safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust,
by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the
efficacy of preventive measures
The concept that the organization’s beliefs and attitudes, manifested in
W
actions, policies, and procedures, affects its safety performance
(continued)
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Author(s)

Definition of Organizational Safety Culture

Part*

Geller, E.S. (1994)

In a total safety culture (TSC), everyone feels responsible for safety and
M
pursues it on a daily basis
Berends (1996)
The collective mental programming toward safety of a group of organization
C
members
Guldenmund (2000)
Those aspects of the organizational culture that will impact on attitudes and
C
behavior related to increasing or decreasing risk
Hale (2000)
The attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining
C
norms and values, which determine how they act and react in relation to risks
and risk control systems
Richter & Koch (2004)
The shared and learned meanings, experiences, and interpretations of work
C
and safety—expressed partially symbolically—which guide peoples’ actions
toward risks, accidents, and prevention
Westrum (2004)
The organization’s pattern of response to the problems and opportunities it
M
encounters
Note. * The part of culture the definition primarily focuses on; C = core, M = manifestations, W = whole. From
“(Mis)understanding safety culture and its relationship to safety management,” F.W. Guldenmund, 2010, Risk
Analysis, 30(10), p. 1467. Copyright 2010 Society for Risk Analysis. Reprinted with permission.

Functionalist approach. Scholars have identified the functionalist approach to safety
culture as shared patterns of behavior (Denison & Mishra, 1995; Nævestad, 2009). These shared
patters are collected qualitatively through surveys of a variety of stakeholders within the
organization. In many cases, researchers interpret the data subjectively and construct scales in
order to articulate the study findings. A functionalist approach sacrifices reliability in favor of
observational richness and context (Nævestad, 2009). For researchers skilled in the industry or
familiar with the human factors being studied, identification of shared patters and a functionalist
approach may be preferred. Safety culture research has traditionally been conducted through a
social and organizational philosophy lens (Guldenmund, 2000).
Interpretive approach. Interpretive approach to culture assigns order and meaning to
organizational phenomena. Scholars draw upon anthropology theorists to understand culture as
shared systems of meaning where humans interpret their experience through a theoretical lens
and guide their action based upon those interactions (Nævestad, 2009). They understand culture
as shared patterns of meaning that members of organizations draw on as they interpret their
beliefs, behavior and collective identity (Alvesson, 2012; Glendon & Stanton, 2000).
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Interpretive analysis of safety phenomenon excel at revealing how meaning is applied to
patterns, motivations, and preventative measures.
Safety culture as a construct. Safety culture has been described in management
literature as a systemic, structural, and static construct (Pidgeon, 1991). The basic premise of
safety culture creation is the ability of the organization to align policy and action. Safety culture
relies upon the development of high-trust and leader-follower relationships to be effective.
Organizational culture exists as a part of the entity, therefore an organizations is rather than was
and created as a result of historical actions that formed the culture (Guldenmund, 2010; Patankar,
Bigda-Peyton, Brown, & Kelly, 2005). The social contract established to provide reward,
whether in transactional, path-goal, or situational leadership, relies on the enacted policies being
supported for safety culture to be effective (Zohar, 2008). It was not until Reason (1997)
specifically created a series of criterion that safety culture gained wide scale acceptance. He
proposed the following characteristics:
•

has a safety information system that collects, analyses and disseminates
information from incidents and near misses, as well as from regular proactive
checks on the system;

•

has a reporting culture where people are prepared to report their errors, mistakes
and violations;

•

has a culture of trust where people are encouraged and even rewarded to provide
essential safety-related information, but also in which it is clear where the line
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior is drawn;

•

is flexible, in terms of the ability to reconfigure the organizational structure in the
face of a dynamic and demanding task environment;
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•

has the willingness and competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety
system, and is willing to implement reform when it is required. (Parker et al.,
2006, p. 552)

This construct had been accepted until reflective analysis was performed of existing literature
and a new shortened safety culture construct was created. Four elements were identified in the
new model: management concern, personal responsibility, peer support for safety, and safety
management systems (Flin et al., 2000; Frazier, Ludwig, Whitaker, & Roberts, 2013;
Guldenmund, 2000). For the purposes of this study, the new safety culture construct was used to
provide meaning and frame actions within culture data collected.
In a comprehensive review of safety culture 30 years after first proposing such a concept,
Zohar (2010) performed a meta-analysis of academic progress on his topic. The results were
mixed. On one hand, the meta-analysis validated results of previous studies by Zohar (2000) and
confirmed variation for within-group and between-group safety culture. This demonstrated
culture was individualistic in nature. Safety culture has been lacking research to address the
organizational hierarchy arising from inconsistent policy implementation (Zohar, 2002a; Zohar
& Luria, 2005). The meta-analysis proved qualitatively that no progress had been made in
solving this issue.
It is relevant to note that while safety culture in aviation is assumed as a perceived
necessity and conceded fact, there has been astonishingly little literature written addressing the
topic (Guldenmund, 2007; Parker et al., 2006; Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2013; Zhang, Wiegmann,
von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002; Zohar, 2010). Additional empirical research is needed
in this field to help overcome conflicting theoretical frameworks and complex theories that
dominate the literature in this topic area. Safety culture will continue to be recognized in
53

literature as a multi-dimensional concept (Cox & Flin, 1998; Dov, 2008; Fernández-Muñiz,
Montes-Peón, & Vázquez-Ordás, 2007; Lawrie, Parker, & Hudson, 2006; Pousette, Larsson, &
Törner, 2008).
Development of Safety Programs
Researchers have long associated safe operating environments with development of
safety programs (Hale, Heming, Carthey, & Kirwan, 1997; Pidgeon, 1991; Weick et al., 2008).
After processing the groundbreaking work of organizational safety theorists, researchers turned
their focus creating processes to make organizations safety reliable and sustainable. Human
error has long been associated with the worst organizational accidents in history and accounts for
80% of all aviation accidents in history (Gibbons et al., 2006; Reason, 1997). A reduction of
human error through methodical approaches to complex processes creates the opportunity for
safety culture inculcation. The resulting safety programs originated in energy sector industries
which required tight coupling of technology and human interaction (Rochlin, 1996; Wold &
Laumann, 2015). Generally, safety programs are merely tools for organizations to interact with
their influencers through advanced communication (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011). Safety
programs quickly gained wide-scale acceptance to address all kinds of organizational accidents
and was embraced as early as 1995 by the International Standards Organization and American
National Standards Institute (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011). To further cement the theoretical
framework of specialized safety programs to highly complex processes, safety management
systems (SMS) incorporate key organizational functions.
Safety Management Systems. An SMS can be described as an attempt to systematize
safety culture with repeatable methodologies. Through a culmination of extensive research,
SMS was designed to meet organizational effectiveness measures to include “internal control
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systems, safety experts, safety committees and quality circles, supervision and behavior
modification, audits, decision making, and safety culture” (Hale et al., 1997, p. 123). These
multidimensional elements merge to define the purpose of developing successful SMS programs
aimed at preventing accidents. Several researchers provide an alternative purpose of SMS,
which is to help the organization meet the regulatory requirements (Cox & Flin, 1998; Hale et
al., 1997; Neal & Griffin, 2006). Regardless of conflicting dimensions postulated by researchers,
the concept of SMS originated from a theory of coordinating mechanisms. Mintzberg (1980)
stated that coordination to accomplish a common mission were guided by five tasks:
standardization of work processes, outputs, skills, direct supervision, and mutual adjustment. An
effort to continue Mintzberg’s work and place definitive safety science research parameters
resulted in the Delft framework.
The purpose of this is to show what organizational and management factors can be
introduced or improved in order to improve the performance of the SMS. The framework
therefore aims to provide the basis for assessing and improving an existing SMS and for
designing a new one from scratch. (Hale & de Kroes, 1997, p. 125)
While Delft failed to gain momentum, modern SMS program development continues to follow
these basic frameworks.
There is also a general agreement in meta-analytic research that SMS is a means to
change safety management from being reactive to being proactive (Liou, Yen, & Tzeng, 2008).
Anticipating hazardous situations before they occur was more important and not just acting after
an accident has occurred, or phrased differently; to protect against human error (Antonsen, 2009;
Dekker, 2003; Dien, 1998). Inclusion and involvement by decision-making participants actively
engaging in HRO activity improves communication flow throughout the organization. With
improvement in communication and involvement, SMS programs are statistically more effective
(Block, Sabin, & Patankar, 2007; Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011;
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Zohar & Luria, 2005). Meta-analysis overwhelmingly supports the importance of safety culture
development and its interrelationship with SMS program usage across all industries
(Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011). Successful use of SMS specifically in accident prevention within
HRO operations resulted in aviation industry leaders considering the adoption of SMS.
Adaptation to of safety programs to scheduled air carriers. Military aviation
developed a strong safety culture by using SMS as previously discussed in the context of HRO
theory. Civil aviation took notice on the heels of numerous high profile scheduled air carrier
accidents. Air carriers operate under Part 121 of the federal regulations, more colloquially
referred to as the airlines. The issue was not only airline accidents, but an organizational failure
to proactively prevent incidents of all types. While it was in the best interest of airlines to
become reflective in their organizational practices, it was a 1991 push from NTSB Safety Board
member Dr. John Lauber who was credited for beginning the safety climate conversation to
airlines (Kelly, 2013). As Logan (2008) states, “Before 1995, safety in the airline industry was
reactive. An accident or accidents would occur, and, eventually, a mitigation strategy would be
developed, implemented, and, in most cases, mandated, resulting in an incremental overall
improvement in safety” (p. S178). Both airlines and federal regulators understood a change had
to occur. The stakeholders created the cooperative Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS)
program to gather useful prevention and safety data from airlines (McFadden & Towell, 1999).
Airlines voluntarily adopted variations of basic SMS concepts into customized safety programs.
The success of a cooperative and voluntary airline SMS program cannot be denied. There have
been two United States certificated airline accidents out of over 160 million flight hours since
formal SMS adoption in 2006 and no accidents at all since 2009 (National Transportation Safety
Board, n.d.).
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Researchers have also tied the effectiveness of airline SMS program to safety culture.
Lin (2012) conducted a quantitative factor analysis of Taiwanese airline pilots and found safety
culture and performance of a SMS were positively significant by answering the question “The
safety culture positively affects the performance of SMS” (p. 168). Similar results in FernandezMuniz et al. (2007), McNeely (2012), Byrnes (2015) found SMS serving as a key dependent and
independent variable for behaviors leading to sustainable safety culture. The intensive airline
SMS design and its associated complexities were visually demonstrated as an impact relations
map in Figure 8. Commonly referred to as the safety triangle, the graphic demonstrates
interrelationships identified by researchers using mathematical evaluation of system design and
accident data (Liou et al., 2008). Unfortunately, the extent and complexity of SMS programs
established for airlines have minimal application to the limited CNATO industry segment human
and physical resources available.
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Figure 8. Airline SMS impact relations map. Shows dependencies of an effective SMS
program. From “Building an Effective Safety Management System for Airlines,” J. J. H.
Liou, L. Yen, and G.H. Tzeng, 2008, Journal of Air Transport Management, 14(1), p. 24.
Copyright 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. Reprinted with permission.
Adoption of safety programs to general aviation. While logic would suggest the reduction in
airline accidents would suggest wide-scale implementation to all sectors of aviation, including
CNATOs, there is a lack of literature to support any effort undertaken. Some suggest business
aviation is embarking on an effort to implement voluntary SMS programs (National Business
Aircraft Association, n.d.). The FAA continues to encourage all operators to use SMS and other
safety culture tools, but has stopped short of mandating it through regulation. International
guidance has been more far-reaching and comprehensive.
Dating back to 2001, the ICAO had been working to establish the Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) for adoption by the organization. The impetus for SARPs was
in direct response to the desire by member countries to enact a comprehensive safety
management system across all aircraft operations. United States based CNATOs were
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repeatedly asking FAA officials how to effectively conduct operations internationally in ICAO
countries. In response to mounting pressure, the FAA issued Advisory Circular 120-92A,
mirroring the more stringent requirements created by ICAO and changed the advisory circular
previously created for airlines from “Introduction to Safety Management Systems for Air
Operations” (FAA, 2006) to “Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers”
(FAA, 2010). The revised document outlined the components of a SMS, but lacked specific
guidance on SMS development. CNATOs were left to use customized SMS solutions or
commercially available solutions from a highly fragmented market (Cacciabue, Cassani, Licata,
Oddone, & Ottomaniello, 2014). Effectiveness of the limitless amount of SMS programs in
CNATOs has not been examined in literature.
Accident rates in aircraft operators. Research suggests that airline accident rates on
their own are not a predictor of future accidents (Liou et al., 2008). Latent factors have been
given minimal consideration to help define casual relationships of accidents. Human behavior is
inherently unpredictable and therefore accident data can only represent trends that may influence
failures. Complex system factors such as those found in aviation are inextricably entwined.
Existing literature support the linkage of HRO, safety culture, and leadership to accident rates in
commercial operators (O’Neil & Kriz, 2013; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Placing strict
context on how accident data is analyzed can eliminate improper assumption as to whether
factors are directly or indirectly mutually related.
Sources for gathering accident data for the study has been traditionally limited to publicly
available sources such as the NTSB, FAA, and industry groups. However, the literature has
often suggested adaptation of military rates to other aviation industries (Desai et al., 2006).
While correlations of civilian to military flight operations could be drawn in limited
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circumstances, CNATOs do not act in a similar manner to military operators, nor are there many
commonalities in organizational structure. Researchers agree that factors pertaining to other
HRO industry segments are not easily translated to CNATO operations (Cooke & Szumal, 2000;
Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Scott, Mannion, Davies, & Marshall, 2003).
Summary
The study seeks to find similarities and relationships between highly established CNATO
operational dimensions and variables. Existing literature, or in some cases a lack of academic
and industry literature, has provided insight into leadership characteristics, high-trust
organizations, organizational accidents, HROs, organizational culture and climate, safety culture,
SMS, and instrumentation. A synthesis of theoretical frameworks emerge from further
examination of each topic comprising study programmatic themes.
What has emerged from the literature review were three overarching themes to guide the
study. First, an almost absolute of certainty exists in literature that leadership affects follower
compliance with safety culture and organizational accident prevention. Additionally, the
literature was close to certain of strong organizational culture creating a foundation for safety
culture effectiveness and reduction of organizational accidents. Finally, artifact creation and
implementation through SMS development and implementation effects organizational accidents
to a fair degree of certainty.
The varying degree of certainty with which the literature addresses each of these
intervening and independent variables provides a springboard to investigate the research
questions, primarily: To what degree does each variable have on its own to affect organizational
accident avoidance?
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Wide scale adoption of core theoretical concepts used in literature regarding aviation
safety culture, organizational accidents, and HRO served as an exciting discovery.
Groundbreaking social science work exemplified by Wiegmann, Reason, and Roberts
respectively in their fields provided invaluable insight. Theoretical frameworks described in the
literature review allow further research an opportunity to investigate highly specific relationships
between variables such as the one explored in this study. However, a lack of healthy academic
debate regarding specific aviation industry drivers within those frameworks served as a potential
limitation. Literature topics within the study used comparative rather than contrasting analytic
methods due to the homogeneity of thought. Identification of this limitation and concluding
more review that is academic only reinforces the importance and significance of the study.
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Chapter III: Methods and Procedures
Restatement of Research Problem
The Chapter II literature review demonstrated CNATOs operate in a high-reliability
organizational environment where safety culture and programs are necessary to prevent
organizational accidents. HRO analysis of United States Naval carrier operations and adaptation
of SMS programs in airlines have dramatically reduced accidents in those two applications.
Unfortunately, there has been little scientific or academic focus in determining safety culture
factors in CNATOs. In an effort to seek further understanding, this study employed an
ethnographic method to explore insights and experiences of participants. Through ethnography,
data collected provides insight into values held and allows general patterns to emerge. Probing
participant experiences in operating a CNATO placed in context with variables leads
understanding the research questions. The purpose of this study is to (a) examine the way
leadership introduces and reinforces safety culture within an organization, (b) how the safety
culture is implemented by followers, (c) investigate the types of artifacts used by the aircraft
operator to provide reinforcement of established safety processes, and (d) determine the extent to
which safety culture has an effect on organizational accidents.
Accident rates in CNATOs have continued at levels high in contrast to scheduled airline
operators - 0.157 per 100,000 flight hours for scheduled airlines and 1.02 per 100,000 for
CNATOs (NTSB, 2015a). The CNATO accident rate is more than six times that of the
scheduled carriers. Identification of relevant factors may assist in reducing CNATO accidents to
a rate closer to that of airlines. As these statistics suggest, CNATO safety culture may lack
consistency and provide an opportunity to examine various factors that influence a reduction in
accident rates. Examining factors such as leadership style, development of a strong safety
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culture, SMS implementation, organizational culture, and regulatory influence enhance CNATO
operational safety and mitigation of organizational accidents. Integrating both qualitative and
quantitative methods in an examination of CNATO activities more accurately identify
relationships between variables than a single investigative method. This chapter articulates the
selected research methodology, including the process for selecting data sources, instrumentation,
quantitative and qualitative data collection procedures, and human subject consideration.
Restatement of Research Questions
As mentioned in Chapter I, the study employed quantitative methods to address the
following questions:
1. What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO organization possess?

(descriptive)
2. To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a relationship with

performance outcomes, including accident rates? (relational)
3. To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of CNATOs that use

safety management system programs and those that do not? (comparative)
4.

To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a relationship with the
development of a safety culture and accident rates? (relational)

Research Design and Rationale
This quantitative study’s ultimate purpose was to inform policy as to how CNATOs
develop strategies used to operationalize framework components and maximize the efficacy of
safety culture. A combination regression and multivariate analysis study required development
of a more comprehensive understanding toward both depth and breadth in CNATO operations.
In addition, adaptation of a qualitative leadership instrument using quantitative data results
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indicated the degree to which responses allowed identification of comparison and contrasts
between respondents. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) advocated a combination of
“quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language
into a single study” (p. 15). Another practical application for study approach was the use of
abductive reasoning. Abductive reasoning utilizes the experience, expertise, and intuition of
researchers and applies both deductive and inductive skills to answer the research questions
(Wheeldon & Åhlberg, 2012). This study will benefit from a comprehensive examination of
quantitative data through a sequential transformative method of research approach.
Sequential transformative design. A sequential transformative design employed “a
two-phase project with a theoretical lens overlaying the sequential procedures” (Creswell, 2009,
p. 219) . Sequential mixed method data collection involved collecting data in iterative phases.
Iterative data collected in one phase contributes to data collected in subsequent phases,
effectively creating a sequential model. The 'sequential' portion of the research design entailed a
quantitative organizational climate and safety survey to clarify numerical trends and obtain
relevant artifacts. The next phase used qualitative leadership measures to understand how
leadership influences organizational climate and safety. The 'transformative' portion involves
reviewing the results from a CNATO leadership lens, which will produce meaningful correlation
to organizational accident rates. Creswell (2009) asserted that the sequential transformative
strategy allows the researcher to provide context for diverse perspectives and better advocate
participants’ worldview.

SCI/SMS (quant) + MLQ (quant) + SMS (quant)
Figure 9. Study sequential transformative design model.
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Accident Data (QUANT)

The four research questions encouraged methodological triangulation; no single method
adequately addresses the four questions. Multiple perspectives gained by using sequential
triangulation aid in guiding subsequent phases due to “the results of one method are essential for
planning the next method” (Morse, 1991, p. 120; Richards & Morse, 2013). Triangulation
validates results using a mixed method context to determine variable impact on accident rates.
This design creates dominant versus equal paradigm emphasis. One single method did not
prevail as an important dimension and determine weight and sequence. Design of this study
included both concurrent and sequential time order decision design, as well as equal and
dominant status paradigms. Figure 9 graphically represents the order and importance of the
study instruments that guided research design. The sequence of research represented within
Figure 9 shows activities performed first beginning on the left and time ordered left to right.
Each concurrent data set revealed a more detailed understanding of the research question and
provided context for the sequential collection stage represented right of the arrow. Due to the
mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, capitalization represents a higher weighting of each
instrument in their importance answering the research questions. Special attention to
legitimation of data collected frames research actions. The legitimation step involved assessing
the trustworthiness of both the qualitative and quantitative data and subsequent interpretations
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).
Selecting a sequential transformative strategy allowed the researcher to provide context
to answers provided by CNATOs prior to drawing conclusions on variable relationships to the
accident data. Performing qualitative and quantitative investigation in phases enabled the
research to dictate the necessary categorization to achieve effective data analysis.
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Research Methods
CNATOs are dynamic social organisms developing over time influenced by internal and
external forces. Examination of the research questions identified a set of dependent, intervening,
and independent variables for further study. Taking a social constructivist view of CNATO
culture development framed the research. In general, social constructivists seek understanding of
environments in which participants experience culture development. They “rely as much as
possible on the participants’ views of the situation being studied” (Creswell, 2009, p. 8). While
the constructivist view shaped the method, a factorial design using interaction effects also
influenced the approach. Identification of an interaction effects design and assists in later data
analysis by accounting for spurious or negative interaction. Experimental mixed method
research of CNATOs using qualitative and quantitative instruments to gather variable
information allowed comprehensive research question coverage.
Qualitative method. A qualitative, ethnographic component benefited the study; it
enabled the collection of background information on participants to construct an overall setting.
The ability to show patterns and processes demonstrated through values, beliefs, and practices of
CNATOs fit an ethnography typology (Richards & Morse, 2013). Measuring CNATO
interaction and experiences with predetermined variables using specific qualitative instruments
provided the data necessary to develop these patterns. Comprehensive variable experience
inquiry also provides comparative context within the industry and peers. Qualitative inquiry
regarding leadership architype measures gave key data information on dependent variable
relationships. Employing the interpretive explanation typology of qualitative findings allowed
full exploration of emerging participant patterns.
In contrast to findings that survey topics and themes without linking them, or that
conceptually or thematically describe elements of experience without explaining them,
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interpretive explanations offer a coherent model of some phenomenon, or a single thesis
or line of argument that addresses causality or essence. (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2003, p.
914)
Techniques within the research questions use require experimental ethnographic design
techniques. Qualitative method will allow identification of variations between responses and an
opportunity to differentiate CNATO safety compliance approaches. Third, leaders in charge of
implementing the safety programs have varying degrees of experience. The behaviors of the
leader is of particular importance to understand the context in which CNATO implemented SMS
and safety culture inculcation. Finally, leader aptitude will potentially have an impact on
whether a safety system is effective or not. Each of these phenomena will be further
operationalized using ethnographic methods.
Data gathered used the industry standard MLQ-5x Short Form survey instrument
measuring 9 factors designed by Avolio and Bass (1995). Collection of data occurred over a 3week period via online survey tool Qualtrics. As described in previous summaries, a first level
analytical style places the user inside the context of an aviation safety program. Next, thick
description using a comparison of the various safety programs and their differences provided
further context. It was presumed each CNATO used their own technique of implementation and
effectiveness inside individualized leader and follower groups.
Quantitative method. Aviation is a science, and as such, the study benefited from the
use of statistical quantitative data to answer the research questions. An explanatory correlational
quantitative research methodology found simple associations and investigated the extent to
which variables have an observable relationship defined by magnitude and/or an incremental
change. This type of design recognized trends and patterns in data, but it did not seek to prove
causes for observed patterns or predict outcomes. Correlational method examined pre-existing
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interaction and relationships between variables with no attempt to manipulate independent
variables. Explanatory correlational methodology was ideally suited to the study because of a
need to explain complex relationships of multiple variables. It is important to note that
correlational methods cannot determine causality, only a relationship and/or association with
variables (Chen & Popovich, 2002). Quantitative data collected in two phases was consistent
with a sequential transformative mixed method approach. Two quantitative instruments
combined to determine whether independent and intervening variables had an effect on CNATO
accident rates.
Measurement of organizational safety culture was operationalized and collected in phase
one using existing instruments which included the SCSMI, a 5-factor, 55-item quantitative
survey, and MLQ Form 5X-Short, a 45-item scaled survey. Numeric data from the Pepperdine
Qualtrics hosted survey yielded observational data. Data gathered during the survey informed
researchers as to basic demographics and the extent to which culture existed within the sample
size. This research design ensured relevant data for safety culture triangulation between
quantitative and qualitative results. Collection of survey data occur over a 3-week period and
managed by the web-based software Qualtrics. Results were exported to Microsoft Excel which
provided greater ease in data analysis.
Accident data from the FAA, NTSB, and NASA residing on publicly available
government websites comprised phase two. To assist in organizing large amounts of data from
these sources, each database import into Microsoft SQL used common Primary Keys for ease of
merging data into one output. Frequent federal agency crosschecking of information residing
within these databases ensure reliability. Maintainers of these resources are full-time employees
of the United States government and are dedicated to integrity of the data. Data analysis of all
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qualitative data and quantitative surveys preceded accident data collection in order to account for
any organizational accidents occurring after phase one data collection.
Population, Sample Size, and Response Rate
The study’s unit of analysis can be defined as a CNATO based in the United States who
may or may not have experienced an organizational accident. The study’s population
represented all FAA certified CNATOs. Measurement of leadership characteristics and culture
opinion served as an aggregate descriptor to measure culture development. Since the analysis
unit is at an organizational level, aggregated data from individuals served to define representative
patterns. The following section describes the process undertaken to define population, sample
size, and targeted response rate.
Population. According to the publicly available FAA Air Operators database, the total
population comprising all CNATOs in the United States was 2,046 (Federal Aviation
Administration, n.d.). Table 6 provides a breakdown of total CNATO population by Flight
Standards Regional Office (FSRO). CNATOs must comply with an extensive compliance
proposal and on-site examination prior to certification. Regulations clearly establish required
elements under 14 C.F.R. §119, Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators, but
specific guidelines delegated to the FAA Administrator. A more comprehensive application
process described in Advisory Circular 120-49 set specific tasks to become a CNATO. Such
things as pre-application, initial meeting, invitation for application, formal application, document
compliance, demonstration and inspection, and certification make the process daunting for any
potential applicant (Federal Aviation Administration, 1988). Demographic information for each
CNATO authorized by the FAA resided within a database on a publicly available website.
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Table 6
Total Population by FAA Flight Standards Regional Office
FAA Flight Standards Region (States covered by Region) CNATO
Population
Eastern (CT, DE, DC, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, NC, PA, RI, VT, VA, WV) 311
Western Pacific (AZ, CA, HI, NV) 300
Southern (AL, FL, GA, SC, PR) 292
Alaska (AK) 291
Great Lakes (IL, IN, MI, MN, ND, OH, SD, WI) 253
Northwest Mountain (CO, ID, MT, OR, UT, WA, WY) 241
Southwest (AR, LA, MS, NM, OK, TX) 221
Central (IA, KS, KY, MO, NE, TN) 137
Total (N=) 2046
Note: Data taken from “ACTIVEAIROPERATOR” data table contained within Aviation Data
and Statistics: Air Operators for Compensation or Hire, FAA, n.d. Database publicly available.
Criteria for inclusion. In order to focus the sampling frame of this relatively large
population, a purposive non-probabilistic method narrowed the study population by limiting
inclusion criteria to the following:
1.

Participants represent CNATOs based within in the United States.

2.

Participant organizations certified as a CNATO and currently listed in good
standing within the FAA Air Operator Certificate Information database.

3.

Participant organizations operating two or more turbine powered, fixed-wing and
non-seaplane aircraft within the operating certificate.

4.

Participants have one of three title positions identified in 14 CFR 119.69(a) or the
primary executive leader and only serve in one of the preceding roles.

5.

Participants are over the age of 18.
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Application of inclusion criteria narrowed the total population to 605 eligible participants.
Sample size. Study sample size methodology employed a multi-stage sampling method
utilizing stratified random cluster and systematic random sampling. Stratified sampling divided
a population into sub-populations called strata and in each of these sub-populations, a simple
random sample is taken (Cochran, 2007). CNATOs earn initial certification by demonstrating
compliance standards with FAA regulations. Once awarded, each CNATO reports to a FAA
Flight Standards Regional Office (FSRO) for ongoing compliance monitoring. The purposeful
sample size of participants from three FSROs provided first stage strata data. Sampling three
FSROs provided study efficiency by geographically focusing data collection efforts. Eight strata
included Alaska, Western Pacific, Northwest Mountain, Southwest, Great Lakes, Central,
Southern, and Eastern.
All eight FSROs were entered in an Excel spreadsheet and sorted by inclusion population
in decreasing value from highest to lowest to determine strata inclusion. Six fields of random
generator formulas created a list of numbers from one to eight. The first three fields generated
non-reoccurring numbers equating to the line number of a FSRO. Randomly selected regional
offices include: Eastern, Southwest, and Western Pacific. Based on the inclusion criterion stated
previously and the initial cluster sampling method, potential participants narrowed from 2,046
total CNATOs to a sampling frame of 289 participant organizations. The 289 CNATOs shared
many similar characteristics such as size of operation, revenue, and fleet size.
Finally, to ensure probabilistic integrity, the study continued with the stratified random
sampling method. Proportionate random sampling required taking the sum of each strata and
dividing it by the sample size. The resulting formula f = (N1 + N3 + N5) / n yielded a sampling
integer of 11.56 = (109 + 99 + 81) / 25. Sampling integer determines random participant
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selection intervals from the list. Table 7 displays the data value progression from strata
population to sample size for each FSRO. By dividing the sampling frame by the sampling
integer, the sample size was calculated for each FSRO and indicated in Table 7 as n Strata or
sample size.

Table 7
CNATO Stratified Random Sampling Methodology
Strata (FSRO)
N1 (Eastern)
N3 (Western Pacific)
N5 (Southwest)
Total

N

Sampling Frame

Sampling Integer
(N / n = f)

n Strata

311
300
221
832

109
99
81
289

11.56
11.56
11.56

9.43
8.56
7.00
25

A Priori power analysis. The goal of any study is to reach a high probability and
confidence level demonstrating any data collected accurately represents the entire population.
Avoidance of Type I (α) errors, false positive, and Type II (β) errors, accepting a null that is
actually positive, depend upon factors such as level of significance, power level, and effect size.
Determining the CNATO sample size necessary to reach statistical significance involved a
multistep process and was cross-checked using two methods; kMeans and Poisson Regression.
A kMeans calculator available within SAS JMP Pro 12.2 (JMP) performed a standard
deviation calculation. After entering the total population stratified by FSRO, a bivariate fit
model determined a total population standard deviation of 58.31 and μ = 256.88. Using the JMP
sample size calculator with the following parameters, α = 0.05, std(X) = 58.31, and Power =
0.80, it was determined n = 25. Therefore, the CNATO sample size was 25 for the purposes of
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this study. Based on these calculations, a sample size of 25 was statistically significant to
represent the total population.
The second validation of sample size calculation involved employing a Poisson
regression or z-Test. Additional sample size values used G*Power, another popular statistical
calculator program. Inputting existing parameters used during previous testing, α = 0.05, Power
= 0.80, and one-tail modeling, G*Power calculated the sample size of 25 with a critical z of
1.644 and actual Power = 0.812. Complete parameters and results from testing are included in
Figure 10. Using a z-Test reinforced kMeans results with the sample size as statistically
significant.
z tests - Poisson regression
Options:

Analysis:
Input:

Large sample z-Test, Demidenko (2007) with var corr
A priori: Compute required sample size
Tail(s)

= One

α err prob

= 0.05

Exp(β1)

= 1.75

Power (1-β err prob)

= 0.8

Base rate exp(β0)

= 0.7

Mean exposure

= 1

R² other X

= 0

X parm μ

= 0

Critical z

= 1.6448536

X distribution

Output:

= Normal

X parm σ

= 1

Total sample size

= 25

Actual power

= 0.8124172

Figure 10. G*Power test results for sample size.

Participant selection. While the analytical unit is CNATOs, the hierarchal model relies
upon individuals to measure organizational characteristics. Federal regulations require CNATOs
to maintain three positions of operational importance as part of the application process.
Specifically:
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(a) Each certificate holder must have sufficient qualified management and technical
personnel to ensure the safety of its operations. Except for a certificate holder using only
one pilot in its operations, the certificate holder must have qualified personnel serving in
the following or equivalent positions: (1) Director of Operations (2) Chief Pilot (3)
Director of Maintenance. (14 C.F.R. §119.69)
Qualifications for each position are further defined in the regulations under §119.71. Due
to operational complexity of some larger CNATOs, many have elected to hire a Chief Executive
Officer. A key position not identified in the regulations, but serves an important role in
developing safety culture and internal policy affecting accident rates is the non-flying manager.
These four influential positions in the organization comprise the CNATO. The study population
was comprised of organizations and persons described herein to provide further context to the
analysis unit.
The study recruitment of any CNATO key personnel previously described yielded
meaningful data. Each have direct responsibility for safe operation of the aircraft and
organizational accident avoidance. Solicitation for data collection included all key personnel
holding one of the following titles within the CNATO: Chief Executive Officer, Director of
Operations, Chief Pilot, or Director of Maintenance. Delegation of responding may have fallen
to a designated safety officer that does not hold one of these titles. This delegation does not rise
to the level of snowball sampling due to positional nuances unique to aviation. Specialization
often occurs and operational functionality remained the primary intent. SCISMS instrumentation
accounted for positional title variations and properly captured substitutions in the demographic
questioning.
Human Subjects Consideration
The United States Department of Health and Human Services established compliance
criteria in the protection of Human Research Subjects and maintains jurisdiction of all research
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based regulations. Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 45 C.F.R. §46.101, provides
compliance guidelines on research study submission to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of
the Pepperdine University Graduate School of Education and Psychology. Research conducted
and designed within this study met the standard for exemption under Category II of the federal
guidelines. In accordance to U.S. Department of Health and Human Resources (2009) exempt
guidelines set forth, the following applies to this study:
(b) Unless otherwise required by department or agency heads, research activities in which
the only involvement of human subjects will be in one or more of the following
categories are exempt from this policy:
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude,
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior,
unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of
the human subjects’ responses outside of the research could reasonably place the subjects
at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing,
employability, or reputation. (p. 28012)
The study utilized survey procedures described herein to obtain voluntary information from
participants regarding operational and organizational aspects of the CNATO. Study adherence to
Federal guideline (b)(2)(i) dictated all participants remain confidential and pseudonyms
immediately documented for all data collection. Although CNATOs operate in a highly
regulated environment, inclusion in this study did not expose participants to undue risk. Due to
the standardized survey instrument construction, participants’ responses did not expose them to
criteria outlined in (b)(2)(ii). Survey results were collected using the online tool Qualtrics and
stored online via a password protected account only available to the researcher and research
supervisor. Within each online survey were comprehensive instructions as to the nature and
completion expectations of the participant. Application to the Pepperdine IRB took place after
dissertation proposal acceptance and a Notice of Approval has been included in Appendix E as
evidence of compliance.
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While ethical issues have the potential to compromise any research project, the study
provided no personal monetary gain to the researcher; therefore, the likelihood of ethical issues
was minimal. All research submitted to participants accurately reflected any study sponsorship,
clearly stated the purpose of the study, provided a chance to answer confidentially, and requested
consent. The nature of this topic involved testing human subjects in an interaction method but
did not incorporate intervention or private information data gathering. In accordance to the
ethical standards, an age verification and method of informed consent statement preceded any
online survey conducted within this research to ensure compliance with the regulation.
Participant permission obtained ensures study parameter and guideline acknowledgement. No
participants received compensation for their responses. Any proprietary, copyrighted,
trademarked, or confidential company information shared during the study remains the sole
property of the provider. A copy of the informed consent declaration and outline of risk is
included in Appendix D.
Certification from the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) ensured
responsible conduct of research prior to data collection. The training raised awareness to avoid
any ethical conflicts presented during research. Certification covered conflicts of interest,
physical science responsible conduct of research, information privacy security, and two modules
of social, behavioral, and educational researchers (SBE). Thousands of academic institutions
recognize CITI as the leading provider of online training for human subject research.
Instrumentation
Recent literature suggests a triangulated use of ethnography, case study, and empirical
methodology has gained favor among researchers to measure safety culture (Glendon & Stanton,
2000; Guldenmund, 2007). “There appears to be agreement among researchers that both
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qualitative and quantitative methods have unique potential for assessment and theory testing and
that there is a benefit to combining methods to gain a comprehensive understanding of safety
culture” (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Gibbons, 2004, p. 129). For this reason,
the literature led to an instrument that captures safety culture values quantitatively but allows for
qualitative clarification.
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire, Form 5X-Short (MLQ). A meta-analysis
conducted by Hartnell, Ou, and Kinicki (2011) made reference to over 4,600 articles on the topic
of organizational culture since 1980. Researchers have since developed a wide range of tools to
measure and assess organizational culture effectiveness. The goal of such surveys is to assess
leadership elements in a context when culture is developed as an organization learns to cope with
the dual problems of external adaptation and internal integration (Schein, 1990). One of the
most comprehensive and utilized leadership psychometric tools is the MLQ (Northouse, 2012).
According to WorldCat, MLQ appeared in peer-reviewed academic works 6,690 times.
MLQ has been in use for over 20 years and demonstrated both validity and reliability.
The survey comprised 45 items, including 36 items that represent seven leadership behavior
factors that measure three distinct leadership archetypes using a 5-point Likert scale. Given that
promotion and prevention focused affect differ in their motivational consequences, prior metaanalytic work supports the differences in predictive validity for promotion and prevention
focused affect (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). Scholarly analysis suggests the MLQ
demonstrates invariant homogeneous characteristics in various testing conditions. Results
testing all nine factors using covariant analysis proved significant where goodness of fit was
0.93, n = 6,195 and p < .001 (Antonakis, 2001; Antonakis, Avolio, & Sivasubramaniam, 2003).
The MLQ enabled an examination of the regulatory influence of leader trait affect as a moderator
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of the relationship between leader trait affect and leadership. Overall instrument validity was
confirmed by meta-analysis using confirmatory structural equation of the nine single-order
factors (Antonakis, 2001).
Using the MLQ allows categorization of CNATO leaders into seven behavioral areas:
idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, individualized
consideration, contingent reward, management-by-exception, and laissez-faire. From those
behavior traits, three leadership styles (transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire) will be
identified and allow for trends between the variables to emerge. Electronic copyright permission
to administer the MLQ obtained from Mind Garden allowed up to 300 participants and proof of
compliance was included in Appendix F. MLQ Form 5X-Short instrumentation delivery used
the Pepperdine Qualtrics online survey platform.
Leadership instrument constructs. Leadership style in the development of safety culture
is well represented in the literature (Bass et al., 2003; Schein, 2010; Tsai, 2011; Yukl, 2008).
Bass and Avolio’s (2003) multifactor leadership questionnaire (MLQ) version 5X-Short served
as an instrument used by studies across numerous organizations, including military, business,
industrial, education, government, and nonprofit organizations. Researchers agree a reliable
survey instrument to operationalize leadership factors, comprising the full-range leadership
theory (FRLT), have been demonstrated within the MLQ 5X as evidenced by WorldCat cited
inclusion in over 4,300 peer-reviewed articles. The MLQ 5X serves as a construct to explain
FRLT, whereby leaders are described on a scale from highly avoidant to highly inspirational
(Antonakis et al., 2003). The constructs comprising the FRLT describe three typologies of
leadership behavior: transformational, transactional, and non-transactional leadership and
represented by nine factors. Literature also refers to non-transactional typology as laissez-faire
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or passive leadership (Bass & Riggio, 2006). Table 8 describes factors associated with each
leadership type and a short description of their meaning. Research meta-analysis posits effective
leadership was represented when transformational and transactional are used in response to
organizational challenges (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).

Table 8
MLQ Leadership Typology and Constructs
LEADERSHIP
TRANSFORMATIONAL

TRANSACTIONAL

LAISSEZ-FAIRE

FACTORS

MEANINGS

Idealized Influence
(Attribute)

To influence the associates as role model in moral
and value.

Idealized Influence
(Behavior)

To inspire associates to achieve the goals by extra
effort.

Inspirational Motivation

To communicate their vision and mission,
identify the right and important things and find
the ways to achieve the goals.

Intellectual Stimulation

To simulate associates to question old problems,
challenge others, think problems in new ways and
make innovations by their own.

Individualized
Consideration

To meet associates' individual needs and develop
them to their full potential uniquely.

Contingent Reward
Leadership

To set obligations, objectives, and tasks for
associates, and reward associates when
contractual obligations are fulfilled.

Management-byException Active and
Management-byException Passive

To check the standards of work to be met actively
or passively.

Passive Avoidant

To avoid making decisions, does not take
responsibility, and does not use authority.

Note. From Mind Garden MLQ Author’s Guide, by B. Avolio and B. Bass, 1995, Menlo Park, CA: Mind Garden,
Inc. Copyright 1995 Mind Garden, Inc. Adapted with permission.

SCISMS questionnaire. The Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System
(SCISMS) was the product of a second generation CASS survey tool administered to scheduled
airline participants. Using a survey instrument with high reliability and validity, the 4-factor
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SCISMS has passed extensive and academically rigorous scrutiny (Gibbons et al., 2006).
SCISMS has demonstrated both reliability through internal consistency and construct validity.
Review of the instrument has demonstrated overall fitness with results of a RMSEA = 0.04
where χ2 (27, N = 427) = 452.29 and p < .001 (Gibbons et al., 2006). The study has obtained
permission from a private company to administer the SCISMS to aviation organizations
identified in the sample size discussion.
This instrument utilizes a 7-point Likert scale to measure organizational commitment,
formal safety indicators, operations interactions, and informal safety indicators. The
Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS), a previous application of the SCISMS survey,
measured safety culture within Part 121 airline operators. Recognizing CNATOs operate
differently, the original CASS survey included CNATO participants to ensure validity. Inclusion
of CNATO participants recognize SMS nomenclature, safety techniques, and collection
methodology, and therefore the SCISMS application is logical. Use of this survey will also
allow researchers to draw meaningful comparisons between CNATO and airline results.
Instrumentation delivery uses the Pepperdine Qualtrics online survey platform. Due to limited
distribution, a sample SCISMS survey questionnaire is included as APPENDIX A
SCISMS SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE.
Safety culture instrumentation constructs. As stated previously, academic debate
continues in meta-analytic data analysis as to whether safety can be categorized as either a
prolonged state of existence known as culture, or as climate, a temporary state subject to change
(Clarke, 2013; O’Connor et al., 2011; Patankar et al., 2005; Zohar, 2010). Whether culture is a
result of group values (Cox & Flin, 1998), workforce attitudes (Flin et al., 2000), or procedures
(Guldenmund, 2000), researchers agree that any instrument capturing safety characteristics
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prove difficult to conclusively assess culture. Frazier et al. (2013) conducted the Safety Culture
Survey (SCS), a confirmatory factor analysis of core safety culture utilizing a 92-item survey of
25,574 respondents, and found 12 first order factors. The SCS was administered to five different
industries and multiple countries. As shown in Figure 11, the study concluded safety culture is a
multidimensional variable with 12 factors influencing safety culture with a CFI = 0.95 and a
RMSEA = 0.08 (Frazier et al., 2013). Despite a large number of factors identified, SCS
nonetheless served as a step forward in identification of relevant safety culture dimensions by
describing inclusionary categories in the following areas: management, SMS, personal
responsibility, and peer support (Frazier et al., 2013). These findings were consistent with
additional studies which added factors such as organizational culture (Edwards et al., 2013),
training (Glendon & Stanton, 2000), and organizational lifecycle stage (Guldenmund, 2010) to
the four categories. This body of academic work validated the foundation of a measurement
instrument for aviation safety culture known as CASS.
CASS represented the first application measuring aviation safety-specific activities. In
addition, CASS converted an unmeasurable activity into a quantitative tool. Factor analysis
contributed to narrowing previously unwieldy list of 12 contributing factors of previous studies
into the 5-factor model on measuring organizational commitment, management involvement,
pilot empowerment, reporting systems, and accountability systems (Gibbons et al., 2006). The
groundbreaking work synthesized the previous literature in an attempt to standardize an
instrument for HROs attributing for a safety culture variable. Formal feedback to the 81question Likert scale CASS used 108 participants in operations and administrative roles at Part
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Figure 11. Meaningful variants of safety culture. SC = Supervisor Concern, SMC = Senior
Management Concern, WP = Work Pressure, SMB = Supervisor/Management Blame, RB =
Risky Behavior, IR = Incident Reporting, CO = Caution Others, RF = Respectful Feedback,
CM = Communication, TR = Training, DC = Discipline, R&R = Rewards and Recognition.
From “A Hierarchical Factor Analysis of a Safety Culture Survey,” C.B. Frazier, T.D.
Ludwig, B. Whitaker, and D.S. Roberts, 2013, Journal of Safety Research, 45, p. 24.
Copyright 2013 by National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. Reprinted with permission.
121 air carriers. Questions also included a field for additional comments to allow participants an
opportunity to clarify or notate further information. Response rate was 40% with n = 43 surveys
returned, and concluded “none of the fit indexes for the five-factor model met conventional
criteria for acceptable fit” (Gibbons et al., 2006, p. 224). The small sample size limited the
effectiveness of any confirmatory factor analysis and rendered the results inconclusive.
Researchers continued to refine the instrument to gain statistical validity. In a subsequent
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revised CASS study, 503 completed surveys were returned from Part 121 air carriers and a
confirmatory factor analysis confirmed conceptual revisions yielded high category correlations
(Gibbons et al., 2006). Changes made to the original CASS model resulted in a new 55-item
survey with higher reliability and validity known as Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement
System (SCISMS).
The study will employ the SCISMS construct which represents a four-factor model
reflecting organizational commitment, formal safety indicators, operations interactions, and
informal safety indicators which are correlated with the personal safety attributes/behaviors of
the individual (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). No one factor serves as primary, but rather each
are interrelated similar to Reason’s (1997) Swiss Cheese Model. SCISMS modifications also
included confirmation of Zohar (2002a) the role of leadership in safety climate promotion.
Tying key indicator importance to previous safety culture standards provided a context to
complex interrelationship dynamics within the field of study. Figure 12 graphically represents
transitional thinking from Gibbons et al. (2006) on changing the 5-factor CASS to 4-factor
SCISMS. SCISMS continues to utilize a 7-point Likert scale with only three anchors identified
for participants: 7 for strongly disagree, 4 as neither agree or disagree, and 1 for strongly agree.
An EBSCOhost search shows 11 occurrences of SCISMS in peer-reviewed academic journals
and five dissertations since released in 2008. Authors claim additional usage, but the private
company who acquired the rights to the SCI/SMS tool has not disclosed additional data points.
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Figure 12. CASS to SCISMS comparison. Comparative diagram of CASS to SCISMS and a
factor mapping using interrupted lines connecting core dimensions. From “Development and
Initial Validation of a Survey for Assessing Safety Culture Within Commercial Flight
Operations,” A. M.Gibbons, T.L. von Thaden, and D.A. Wiegmann, 2006, The International
Journal of Aviation Psychology, 16(2), p. 230. Copyright 2006 by Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates. Reprinted with permission.
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS). Safety data related to the
operation of aircraft in the United States is available through the Federal Aviation
Administration information program called ASIAS. Within the ASIAS program, two key data
sources were used for the study. The FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS) contains data
records for all aircraft incidents and accidents since 1978 searchable by a variety of search
criterion (FAA, n.d.).
A second component of ASIAS is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The ASRS provides a catalog of voluntary safety
reports filed by participants in the National Airspace System. Voluntary reports increase the
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safety and reliability of aviation processes, are widely referred to as a source of research, and act
as a precursor to change. Participants in the ASRS are free to report unsafe situations without
fear of recourse from other government mechanisms commonly referred to as “whistleblower”
programs. The data was verified and a part of the national archival records maintained by the
federal government. Data collected through these instruments will provide unbiased information
to calculate Certificated Non-Scheduled Air Carrier operator safety records.
Variables. Table 9 describes the method in which variables will be operationalized using
data sources and instruments to report data. Each independent and intervening variable relates to
the multitude of paths in which participants achieve organizational accident avoidance or
dependent variable (anticipatory). To assist in identifying variables and their interrelationships,
Figure 13 graphically represents the independent, intervening, and dependent variables. Data
collection various relationships between variables will be a critical factor in analysis. The
following section describes each variable and their relationship with research question.
Regulatory
Influence (X1)
(-)

Leadership
Influence/Attitude
(Y1)
( +/- )

( +)

Organizational
Culture (X2)

Organizational
Accidents (Z1)
( +)

( +/- )

Safety Culture (Y2)

Dependent Variable

( +)

Safety Management
Systems (X3)

Intervening Variables

Figure 13. Variable
path analysis
Independent
Variables casual model. Demonstrating interaction (and effect,
either +/-) of independent, intervening, and dependent study variables.
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Independent variable. The study included three independent variables: regulatory
influence, organizational culture, and SMS. An independent variable “identifies forces or
conditions that act on something else” (Neuman, 2014, p. 161). These attributes act
independently to the other variables. RQ2, RQ3 integrated the independent variables and their
effect on dependent variables. Regulatory influence serves as a constant presence in CNATO
operations. No less than three Federal agencies have direct operational oversight and this
constant oversight provides a foundation upon which CNATOs function. Regulation also forms
organizational culture. Cultural development of CNATOs influence the way safety and
leadership form. Finally, implementation of a SMS program determines whether safety cultures
develop organically or aided by institutionally developed systems. Each of these independent
variables share a precursor time value relationship with the intervening and dependent variables.
The SCISMS instrument captures regulatory influence and presence of a SMS. MLQ Form 5XShort assesses basic organizational culture measures allowing participant level comparison.
Independent variables identified here help to explain the behavior that lead to CNATO
organizational accidents.
Intervening variable. Literature review demonstrated numerous factors comprise safety
outcomes (Reason, 1997; Roberts, 1990a; Schein, 1990). The two intervening variables selected
represent an important bridge between independent and dependent variables: leadership style and
safety culture. Intervening variables, or sometimes referred to as mediating variables, “stand
between the independent and dependent variable, and they mediate the effects of the independent
variable on the dependent variable” (Creswell, 2009, p. 50). Foundational research demonstrates
leadership style and safety culture mediate the independent variables in other industries, but no
measurement to CNATOs exist. Therefore, RQ1 and RQ4 sought to answer how intervening
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variables effect outcomes. SCISMS captures four dimensions of safety culture: Organizational
Commitment to Safety (OC), Operations Interactions (OI), Formal Safety Indicators (FS), and
Informal Safety (IS) Indicators. Using SCSMS provides safety culture insight and develops a
foundation to begin grouping participants in the sequential transformative process. The MLQ
Form 5X-Short serves as the industry leading leadership style measurement tool. The study
sought understanding of independent variable and organizational accidents relationships
accounting for leadership style. MLQ provided seven behavioral areas in which to relate safety
outcomes.
Dependent variable. Organizational accidents in aviation occur in varying degrees. The
ASAIS data set captured two types of events; incidents, described as damage to property or
aircraft, and accidents, characterized by loss of life. These two organizational accident
categories require different responses and thus are a determining factor in how leaders and the
organization respond. Capturing the type of organizational accident data and comparing
CNATO independent and intervening variables provided additional insight on safety outcomes.
The study purpose to examine factors influencing organizational accidents relied upon the other
variable types to explain influences on the dependent variable. For this reason, RQ2, RQ3, and
RQ4 all used dependent variable data examining relational and comparative aspects of CNATOs.

Table 9
Instrumentation of Variables
Hypothesis

Variable name

RQ1: Safety culture 1. Safety Culture
characteristics of
CNATO
(descriptive)

Variable type
1. Intervening

Measure
name
1. SCISMS

Type of
measurement
1.Safety culture
dimension; (FS,
IS, OI, OC)
(continued)
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Hypothesis

Variable name

Variable type

RQ2:
Organizational
culture impact on
performance
(relational)

2a. Leadership
type

2a. Independent

RQ3: Accident
rates of CNATOs
usage of SMS
(comparative)

3a. Regulatory
influence

2b.
Organizational
accidents

3b. SMS use
3c.
Organizational
accidents

RQ4: Leadership
style relationship to
culture and
accidents
(relational)

4a. Leadership
type
4b. Safety
culture

Measure
name
2a. MLQ-5X

2b. Dependent

2b. ASIAS; 2
measures

3a. Independent

3a. SCISMS

3b. Independent

3b. SCISMS

3c. Dependent

3c. ASIAS; 2
measures

Type of
measurement
2a. Leadership
type; 9-factors
2b.
Accident/incident
3a. Formal safety
indicators; 2factors (OC, FS)
3b. Formal safety
indicators; SMS
use
3c.
Accident/incident

4a. Intervening

4a. MLQ-5X

4b. Intervening

4b. SCISMS

4c. Dependent

4c. ASIAS

4c.
Organizational
accidents

4a. Leadership
type; 9-factors
4b. Dimension
safety indicators
4c.
Accident/incident

Data Collection Procedures
External and internal reliability provide a framework throughout the data collection
process. Internal reliability relates to the ability of two researchers to reach the same results
using the same ethnographic constructs, while external reliability relates to the ability of the
constructs to apply in multiple settings to achieve the same (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982).
Researchers followed a well-documented data collection process in order to provide consistent
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results. A proposed timeline and data collection checklist was included in Appendix B Data
Collection Timeline for reference purposes.
Participant selection. As previously described within sample size calculations, the
entire population follows a three-step filtering process. An inclusion criterion applies to clarify
CNATOs best matching study parameters. Next, a stratified random cluster used three FAA
regions to allow geographic focusing. Randomization of the membership database entries after
stratification ensured compliance with proper protocol. Without randomizing the stratified
participant data set, unintended weight may have occurred because entries appeared in
alphabetical order. Finally, a proportionate random sample selected participants at random from
the FAA CNATO membership database. CNATO participant contact information resided on
publically available FAA Airline Certificate Information database. These databases provided
names and contact information for targeted CNATO leaders or those having met inclusion
criteria to participate in the study. According to details outlined within the sample size section,
the random stratified sample size narrowed using a specific proportionate random sampling
calculation by taking the sum of each strata and dividing it by the sample size. Randomization of
database entries after stratification ensured compliance with proper confidentiality protocol. The
result of the sample selection formula yielded a formula of N/n or 289 divided by 25. Thus, the
sampling formula equals 11.56 with an integer of 11. Therefore, each eleventh CNATO within
each stratum were included in the sample size as a participant.
Initial contact with CNATOs introducing study objectives and goals uses email to solicit
participation. Multiple responses from a single CNATO was possible due to various roles within
the organization responding but did not occur. These professional aviators will be from the ages
of 25 to 60 (operational boundaries set by regulation), 95% male, earning an average of $85,000,
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and will have at least a bachelor’s degree from an accredited university (FAA, n.d.). Participants
had sole discretion in deciding whether to take part in the study. Regulatory agencies and other
industry groups had no bearing on the ability of participants to take part, as any information
shared is proprietary to each participant.
Survey delivery. Administration of SCISMS and MLQ Form 5X-Short was conducted
concurrently and follow the described method. Participants introduced to the study via an initial
email sent using the stratified and systematic random sampling method. Upon reaching the
Pepperdine Qualtrics study portal, participants land on an informed consent page. Clicking the
“I Agree” link indicated a participant was willing to participate. Participants were informed that
participation is voluntary and they may opt out at any point in time during the study. The survey
was interactive and had basic question logic integrated in order to allow participants to opt-out at
any point. Participants not responding to the survey request email after 5 days received a system
generated reminder email. Those not responding after 14 days from the reminder email received
a final system generated email notice. Failure to respond to the final email did not generate
further emails. Due to the nature of online survey results, only the investigator knew the identity
of participants, and pseudonyms reference the participant and their respective organization. Data
captured in Qualtrics was stored online via a password protected account only available to the
principal investigator and research supervisor.
The MLQ Form 5X-Short was optimized by the copyright owner and authorized for use
on the Qualtrics platform and memorialized in Appendix F. Previous instances of SCISMS used
electronic delivery and had been previously validated for reliability online. SCISMS survey
questions included in Appendix A combined with MLQ questions comprised the 106 question
survey. MLQ questions were not included in appendices due to compliance with the license
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agreement. The question order comprised SCISMS then MLQ to build on participants’ logical
situational thought process. According to the MLQ construct validation guidelines, combining
the survey with others does not diminish result efficacy (Avolio & Bass, 2004).
Organizational accident data collection. In order to establish key safety factors for the
representative sample, the study used accident databases containing safety information relative to
the entire population and a safety culture survey. Accident data sources were publicly available
online from the FAA, NTSB, and NASA. Each data set examined used a confirmatory factor
analysis to confirm a hypothesized pattern of relationships predicted from the theoretical
frameworks referenced. Due to the nature of the intervening variables, the study used
multinomial regression testing. This analysis method did not require special consideration nor
did it affect data collection procedures.
In order to assist the aviation safety community in accessing information, the FAA
created an area within the website to consolidate reporting data critical to the safety of flight.
ASIAS AIDS data contains over 98,356 records of aircraft incidents and accidents since 1978.
ASRS reporting within the ASIAS accounts for 663,493 records captured since 1988. Collected
safety data follows a cross-sectional design from the date of study commencement. ASIAS
utilizes a freeze date on all databases to ensure data integrity of snapshot data. Any data
collection will occur after the 15th of the month to ensure complete data from the previous month
is included in the study. All operational safety data reside on publicly available sources collected
and reported by the United States government. As such, consent is not necessary to be compliant
with protecting human subjects. The FAA has previously removed any personal information
contained in the databases in accordance to privacy laws.
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Data collection nomenclature. The study utilized pseudonyms for each CNATO at all
times. Participant name assignment followed the convention P^x (strata) followed by x (their
randomized database row position). Therefore, a convention example would appear as P345,
meaning Western Pacific FSRO and randomized participant appearing in table row 45. Upon
closure of the survey, all data was analyzed and coded by the PI as a large group. Comparing
anonymous accident/incident data responses and analyzing for matches allowed no identifying
data existed within the relational database. Once complete, anonymously categorized data
emerged using subgroup comparisons based on the factors identified by the survey. Further,
subgroupings of commonalities were found and identified using distribution analysis methods.
Survey results were password protected and stored in a secured via the Qualtrics online tool for a
minimum of three years.
Analytic Technique
Due to the sequential transformative design model, large amounts of data collected relied
on two primary analytic techniques to describe results from lengthy culture and leadership
surveys as well as accident data. Application of meaning to nominal MLQ results using defined
descriptive techniques allowed meaning behind leadership architypes. Without analyzing the
context afforded by descriptive methods and validating multiple data points for each CNATO, a
definitive conclusion was unlikely. In contrast, the interpretive nature of traditional quantitative
analysis using interval scale data tabulation within the SCISMS provided concrete values without
a need for interpretation. Despite the mixture of categorical and interval values, logistic
regression analysis provides a viable measurement method. “The guiding principle with logistic
regression is the same: compare observed values of the response variable to predicted values
obtained from models, with and without the variable in question” (Hosmer, Lemeshow, &
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Sturdivant, 2013, p. 12). Since least squares in a linear regression model will not conform to the
study directional hypothesis, a dichotomous outcome conforms to observed values. Analysis of
each CNATO data relied upon use interval data tabulation as well as descriptive methods that
included central tendencies, subgroup comparison, and distribution.
MLQ Form 5X-Short Survey analysis. In using categorical descriptive analytic
techniques, the study will place the reader inside the participants’ setting and time. The
construction and aligning of multiple categories using subgroup comparisons and identifying
patterns among the participants was particularly useful in creating commonality trends. A series
of filtering occurred by reviewing the results of the collection after data capture. Each pass at
categorical data point values yielded a more refined analysis of CNATO leadership
characteristics, also called progressive focusing (Richards & Morse, 2013). The goal was to
allow the data to identify key commonalities and clarify a large amount of information into a (or
series) of salient points. These “pieces of the puzzle” were then be fit together to provide a
“complete, holistic, thick, and rich description of the cultural perspective” (Richards & Morse,
2013, p. 190). The result was a monograph of individual participants’ role or thoughts on
leadership that tie together with others to form patterns.
Identification of first-level descriptions gathered from participants was critical to form a
strong foundation in which the reader can gain understanding about the setting. By analyzing
central tendencies, survey data yielded answers critical to understanding the context in which
CNATOs live and operate. Each participant holds deep knowledge of the setting and personal
experiences of operating within a CNATO. Answers to MLQ 5X-Short survey questions created
abstraction aids in describing the site, situation and setting from participant observation.
Choosing a stratified random cluster sample method created an opportunity to gain an emic
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perspective to the study. Aviation is rich in symbolism and signs. Semiotics can be described as
a sign that makes sense in the mind of some person, but may be seen usefully as the connection
between an expression and a content (Hjelmslev, 1961). The MLQ survey includes questions
featuring this method by challenging survey participants to interpret self-reflected actions of
leaders into participant feelings. One such example of this would be the question “I re-examine
critical assumptions to question whether they are appropriate”. This concept uses leaderfollower dynamic questions within descriptive scenarios on how followers interpret leader
actions. Analyzing MLQ nominal values using descriptive methods of central tendencies and
subgroup comparison insights on leadership characteristics within participant CNATOs helped
form conclusions on CNATO safety behaviors.
Quantitative analysis. To examine the quantitative research questions, the study
conducted a two-phased data analysis approach to describe differences between CNATO
operators. Each research question employed various regression analysis methods to identify
respondent deviations from statistical norms. Ultimately, a multivariate logistic regression
assisted in determining whether leadership influence and safety culture inculcation have a
relationship to organizational accidents. Regression is a statistical technique used to predict the
behavior of an ordinal level dependent variable multivariate intervening and independent
variables. This method of statistical analysis for aviation safety has been well rooted in literature
where safety measurements indicate retrospective causes and understanding of complex systems.
In logical regression, the dependent variable is the ordered response category variable and the
intervening variable may be categorical, interval, or a ratio scale variable. The assumptions of
linear regression include only one dependent variable and one regression normally distributed
value for each category of the dependent variable. In a multiple logistic regression test using a
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Poisson dichotomous approach, data evaluation can occur on nominal and ordinal values.
Therefore, a maximum likelihood estimation for variances and covariance matches study
objectives for fit (Hosmer et al., 2013). JMP version 12 from SAS Software served as the study
statistical tool of choice. Testing included whole model, lack-of-fit and Wald effect tests
ensuring data fitness in addition to interval-level regression testing.
Summary
In order to answer the research questions, a two-phased sequential transformative
research design guided the study. Performing qualitative and quantitative data collection in a
two-phased approach allowed for sufficient analysis of baseline data prior to determining the
effect of independent and intervening variables on the dependent variable. Collection of both
qualitative and quantitative data required individualized collection and analytic methods to
achieve meaningful analysis. Figure 9 demonstrated how the study assigns weight and sequence
to each data set. This research strategy aided in evaluating a complex set of variables and their
effect on organizational accidents. Qualitative instruments used within this study included the
MLQ survey and SMS information gathering. Ethnographic research methodology provided an
investigative foundation for qualitative research methodology while progressive focusing data
analysis allowed refinement of large information stores into meaningful patterns. Quantitative
instruments are the SCISMS survey and multi-agency CNATO accident data. Explanatory
correlational research methodology, specifically a multiple logistic regression model,
investigates the extent to which variables have an observable relationship to explain participant
data. Nominal data regression performed during analysis determined the degree of relationship
between accident rates (dependent variable) with leadership and safety culture (intervening
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variables). The resulting comprehensive mixed method approach to design, collection, and
analysis created a framework to answer the research questions.

96

Chapter IV: Findings
Introduction
The goal of this study was to gather information on an inclusionary subset of CNATOs
using a random stratified sample. Data collected from these CNATOs helped researchers
discover attitudes and descriptors that aided in answering four research questions. Study
findings represented a three-week collection period survey delivered via online technology. A
106-question survey comprised of one qualifying question, five demographic, 55 questions from
the SCISMS, and 45 MLQ Form 5X-Short questions yielded a response rate of 20 out of 25
participants identified as the targeted sample size. Every participant who reached the consent
page moved forward and indicated acceptance of study conditions. Anticipated time to complete
the survey was 18.01 minutes against a stated 20-minute completion time.
An overview of participant demographics begins the findings chapter to provide insight
as to study responses. From there, the chapter followed study sequential transformative design
methodology where findings are organized by instrument and analyzed individually. Data
presented individually provided researchers with an opportunity to examine trends prior to
forming consolidated conclusions. Finally, analysis by research question act to tie individual
findings together having previously presented analysis for context.
Participant Demographics
As discussed within the Population, Sample Size, and Response Rate section, the total
CNATO population equated to 2,046. The total population narrowed to a sampling frame of 286
using inclusion criteria and geographically stratified sample method. An Excel number
randomizer selected three numbers that corresponded to eight individual geographic regions
from potential FAA flight standards regional offices for participation. This combination of
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methods created a randomized stratified sampling frame. Finally, using a priori power analysis,
it was determined a sample size of 25 was appropriate and valid to survey the total population.
After submitting surveys to the sample size per participant selection criterion identified within
Chapter III, the total number of participants was 20 (n = 20). The difference in sample size
power of 0.80 to 0.72 between initial study and final analysis to compensate for response rate
results in an 8.0% higher chance in probability of rejecting the null hypothesis. However, due to
the homogeneity of CNATO demographic composition, actual CNATO accident rates per
operator as reported in government databases compared to sample size, and the nature of
CNATO regulated operating parameters; the adjusted power value has little impact on study
conclusions.
Table 10 graphically represents respondents by FAA Flight Standards Regional Office.
Of 20 responding organizations, half indicated they have held a FAA operating certificate for
over 16 years, the other half for between 6 years and 15 years. An inclusion criterion required
participant CNATOs operate two or more turbine powered, fixed-wing and non-seaplane aircraft.
All participants met inclusion criterion. Four operators indicated 2-5 aircraft on their certificate,
eight had 6-10 aircraft, and eight operated 11 or more aircraft meeting the criterion. All of the 20
participating CNATO representatives were male and their self-identified positions fell into the
following categories (counts): Director of Operations (6), Chief Pilot (4), Safety Officer (8), and
Chief Executive Officer (2). Only one representative from each organization responded. Based
on demographic information collected, all responses included participation by someone actively
involved in safety for the organization.
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Table 10
Participant Demographics by FAA Flight Standards Regional Office
FAA Flight Standards Region (States covered by Region) CNATO
Participants
Eastern (CT, DE, DC, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, NC, PA, RI, VT, VA, WV) 10
Western Pacific (AZ, CA, HI, NV) 8
Southwest (AR, LA, MS, NM, OK, TX) 2
Total (n =) 20

In keeping data confidential, study investigators assigned participants aliases.
Geographic regions remained for comparison purposes only. The database row numerically
identifies participants and all original data known only to the researcher on initial entry into the
Qualtrics survey collection tool. Therefore, participants appear by strata as P^(1,3, or 5)
followed by database row number. An example would be P5 representing the Southwest FSRO
and database row 1802 expressed as P51802. The following overview of participants contains
general knowledge and does not include detailed information beyond roles and organization
demographical information.
1. Participant P1143: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Chief Pilot role, Eastern FSRO
2. Participant P1371: operates 2-5 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, performs
Director of Operations role, Eastern FSRO
3. Participant P1399: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years,
performs Safety Officer role, Eastern FSRO
4. Participant P1482: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years,
performs Safety Officer role, Eastern FSRO
99

5. Participant P1577: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years,
performs Director of Operations role, Eastern FSRO
6. Participant P1750: operates 2-5 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years, performs
Director of Operations role, Eastern FSRO
7. Participant P1784: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Safety Officer role, Eastern FSRO
8. Participant P1921: operates 6-10 aircraft, performs Safety Officer role, Eastern FSRO
9. Participant P11009: operates 2-5 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Chief Executive Officer role, Eastern FSRO
10. Participant P11015: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Safety Officer role, Eastern FSRO
11. Participant P31098: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Chief Pilot role, Western Pacific FSRO
12. Participant P31112: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years,
performs Safety Officer role, Western Pacific FSRO
13. Participant P31158: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years,
performs Chief Pilot role, Western Pacific FSRO
14. Participant P31218: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years,
performs Safety Officer role, Western Pacific FSRO
15. Participant P31294: operates 2-5 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Chief Executive Officer role, Western Pacific FSRO
16. Participant P31303: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Director of Operations role, Western Pacific FSRO
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17. Participant P31324: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate between 6-15 years,
performs Chief Pilot role, Western Pacific FSRO
18. Participant P31326: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Director of Operations role, Western Pacific FSRO
19. Participant P51802: operates 6-10 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Director of Operations role, Southwest FSRO
20. Participant P51936: more than 11 aircraft, held certificate over 16 years, performs
Safety Officer role, Southwest FSRO
Research Questions
The study addressed the gap in knowledge as to whether inculcation of a safety culture in
CNATOs has an effect on organizational accidents. The study (a) examined the way leadership
introduces and reinforces safety culture within an organization, (b) how the safety culture is
implemented by followers, (c) investigated the types of artifacts used by the aircraft operator to
provide reinforcement of established safety processes, and (d) determined the extent to which
safety culture has an effect on overall safety results. Using the following research questions,
answers to these key themes emerged:
1.

What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO organization possess?
(descriptive)

2.

To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a relationship with
performance outcomes, including accident rates? (relational)

3.

To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of CNATOs that use
safety management system programs and those that do not? (comparative)
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4.

To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a relationship with
the development of a safety culture and accident rates? (relational)

Analysis of Findings
Sequential transformative design as explained by Creswell (2009) and previously
displayed as Figure 9, allowed for collecting data in iterative phases. Analysis of data in
aggregate allowed an organized review of data within a specific lens prior to reviewing within a
global context. Phased analysis of each instrument created an individual finding that aided
understanding of potential interaction between variables. This method of data analysis fit nicely
into a traditional logistical regression framework. Calculation for independence and
homogeneity of variance of the sample data used Levene’s Test for group comparisons. The
resulting Levene’s Test indicated F > 1.798 at α = 0.05 and therefore conclude that there is
insufficient evidence to claim that the variances are not equal.
Analyzed data from the SCISMS survey created an overall understanding of
organizational safety attitudes and characteristics within four dimensions. Four dimensions
identified by the survey authors created categories as organizational commitment (OC),
operation interactions (OI), formal safety indicators (FS), and informal safety indicators (IS).
Each quantitative measurement provides insight to how organizations perceive and treat safety
elements, directly aiding to instrumentation of study research questions expressed in Table 9,
Instrumentation of Variables. RQ1, RQ3, and RQ4 all relied upon quantitative data gathered
from the SCISMS survey.
Examination of MLQ 5X-Short data indicates which type of individual leadership style
existed within each organization. An organizational variable value revealed measurable
characteristics by determining individual style of leadership. Analysis tools supplied by survey
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author Mind Garden allowed each participant organization to fit within three leadership styles
and seven behavior traits. Identification of leadership traits assisted in assigning variable values
to RQ2 and RQ4. Specific MLQ 5X-Short data was presented in aggregate due to specific
copyright requirements by survey authors. Appendix F specifies only five specific questions
could be presented within this study. Therefore, data findings focused on traits and results rather
than actual survey questions.
Once organizational characteristics were analyzed, generalized quantitative accident data
from the ASIAS was reviewed categorized by FSRO. Prior to survey distribution, a review of
database information after application of inclusion criteria yielded no participants had accidents
or incidents since database collection began in 1978. Since more than half of participants held
their operating certificates for 16 years or more, any ASIAS entries would appear. One
participant organization had an accident or incident according to the data. As a result, specific
FSRO accident data referenced each organization in the findings for contextual purposes. RQ2,
RQ3, and RQ4 used ASIAS data to support interrelationships between intervening variables
culminating in organizational accidents. More details about possible relevance of accident or
incident data appear further in discussion and conclusions.
Findings
Findings are presented in various formats due to the large volume of data collected for
multiple variables and 20 participants aid in creating more comprehensive picture of CNATO
characteristics. Sequential transformative design demanded individual evaluation of each data
set individually prior to applying a specific research question lens. To assist in creating a clearer
picture of each individual participant based on their organizational context, data presented by
instrument preceded research question findings. Presentation of different data included within
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the appendices aided clarity when presenting conclusions. The order of presentation follows
Figure 9 and chronologically includes SCISMS, MLQ Form 5X-Short, SMS, and ASAIS data.
Findings directly answering research questions were then presented to synthesize disparate
elements, represented by variables, into a more comprehensive presentation format allowing
further analysis.
SCISMS questionnaire. Qualtrics presented SCISMS questions to participants and
described the survey tool as a dynamically generated survey that measured overall safety culture
at the organization level. Questions taken directly from the Safety Culture Indicator Scale
Measurement System (SCISMS) survey appear in Appendix A and use a Likert scale. Four
dimensions measured overall safety culture within the organization. The following quantitative
data relied upon descriptive statistics to identify broad themes that emerged. Descriptive
statistics data gathered by the survey follow categories of formal safety system, informational
safety systems, operation interactions, and organizational commitment combined into
organizational dimensions.
Formal safety system (FS). Survey results started by measuring formal safety systems.
These questions centered on organizational uses of safety reporting systems, response and
feedback safety actors receive from reporting systems, and operationalization of information by
safety personnel. Existence of safety management systems demonstrate each CNATO
organization utilized a SMS. Table G1 displays formal safety data responses for all participants
and a μ = 6.12. Results within this section present verification of broad SMS usage and the
standard deviation among all 280 participant responses was σ = 0.790. A value less than one
sigma indicates very little difference in overall responses across all participants according to
Chebyshev’s Theorem. Tight responses in this section also reflect existence of reporting and
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responding processes. Safety culture relies upon these tightly coupled systems. Two outliers
emerged where μ = 6.14 was below expected. After performing a MANOVA fit model on
survey results, P1371 and P31324 were significantly below mean score at r2 = 5.142 and r2 =
5.285 respectively and therefore warrant observation in subsequent data points for potential
commonalities. Figure 14 showed the entire data set least square means results where two results
fall below other participants. The following question in Section 5.2 scored the lowest among all
participants.
•

Section 5.2, Question 4: Pilots don’t bother reporting near misses or close calls
since these events don’t cause any real damage

Figure 14. Formal Safety Systems dimension least square means chart.

A willingness to report all types of potential hazards serves as a critical component of
safety improvement methodology. Rationale centers on a basic concept that if CNATOs do not
have sufficient data, discovering reoccurring issues is impossible.
Informational safety systems (IS). SCISMS measured informational systems by focused
questions related to accountability, pilot’s authority, and professionalism. Culturally speaking,
this dimension was one of the most critical since aircraft operations directly relate to these core
functions. Professionalism in aviation broadly defined by industry leaders is defined as the
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pursuit of excellence through discipline, ethical behavior, and continuous improvement (National
Business Aircraft Association, n.d.). The concept of professionalism was included within both
pre-packaged SMS measures and suggested customized SMS literature as a core element.
Informational safety responses in Table G2 begin to show unique patterns emerging. With a
dimension μ = 5.94, the data reveals participants high reliance and belief in organizational
informational safety systems.
Responses in this section begin to deviate from expected results. An assumption that all
respondents were pilots, despite not holding a positional title explicitly stating a flying role, may
be implied. Deviation in responses centered on survey section 5.5 - Accountability described as
“These items refer to the ways in which pilots are treated based on their safe or unsafe behavior
at your organization” and 5.7 – Professionalism described as “items refer to the attitudes you
perceive among your fellow pilots in regard to safety” (von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008, p. 15).
Despite pilots having a perceived reputation for extreme self-confidence and arrogance, the data
must be analyzed for its value in determining trends. Two questions emerged as areas of interest
due to low mean scores.
•

Section 5.5, Question 1: Management shows favoritism to certain pilots

•

Section 5.7, Question 5: Pilots don’t cut corners or compromise safety regardless
of the operational pressures to do so

Management showing favoritism and pilots cutting corners scored μ = 5.10 against a 5.94 mean
for all informational systems. By running a MANOVA least square fit model, analysis showed
once again, P1371 and P31324 scored significantly below the mean section score at 4.79 (r2 =
3.928) and 4.36 (r2 = 4.35) respectively and warrant observation within the research question
context. Figure 15 shows results from analysis where the two participants demonstrated below
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average least square means where N = 14 and DF = 13. A pattern has started to emerge between
these two CNATOs based on raw SCISMS data.

Figure 15. Informational Safety Systems dimension least square means chart.

Operations interaction (OI). CNATOs are complex organizations with
interdependencies among various roles. While pilots are ultimately responsible for the safe
operation of aircraft, policies set by Chief Pilots, flight parameters and planning performed by
Dispatchers, and training or instruction received by pilots all have a profound effect on safety
culture. Operations interaction data in Table G3 captured participant attitudes regarding these
interactions. Non-responses within OI answer banks were intentional and caused by a participant
selected Chief Pilot primary role. SCISMS authors believed inaccurate information would be
gathered by asking those participants to measure a role in which they were directly responsible.
This approach deserves debate; however, initial academic review provided data reliability and
validity using this approach.
An outlier question posed within the Chief Pilot responsibilities demonstrated a mean
below norms. When asked about safety reporting habits, respondents believe reporting safety
deviations to Chief Pilots over the safety department. This phenomenon was understandable
seeing that safety department personnel could be less understanding about such deviations. The
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extent to which respondents answered where μ = 5.06 provided insight as to the extent
organizational members had a difficult time relying upon established SMS protocol. Question
wording allowed a truthful answer by using “often” as actual verbiage below demonstrates.
•

Section 5.8, Question 5: Pilots often report safety concerns to their chief pilot
rather than the safety department

Survey results in this section centered on actions taken by dispatchers due to below mean
scores. Dispatch questions had below mean scores across the all questions in survey Section 5.9.
The lowest scoring question involved dispatchers sharing information having a value μ = 5.20
against an overall section where μ = 6.03. The specific question has been included below.
•

Section 5.9, Question 1: Dispatch consistently emphasizes information or details
(e.g., weather requirements, NOTAMs) that affect flight safety.

Overall, Instructors/Trainers scored the highest within this section, μ = 6.38, leaving little
statistical doubt of their positive impact to safety culture. CNATOs are required to complete
recurrent training every 6-months and therefore, some line pilots have more interaction with that
constituency than any other. Chief Pilots were slightly above the mean at μ = 6.05 despite their
exempted answers which presumably would have boosted scores. Three participants scored
below least square mean in operations interaction, P1371, P11015, and P31324. Analysis in this
category showed less conclusive evidence, as several participants scored below average. Figure
16 showed operations interaction dimension less effective in statistically differentiating
respondents. At this point in the SCISMS it should be noted two participants consistently scored
below mean in every section and now constitute a statistical trend.
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Figure 16. Operations Interaction dimension least square means chart.

It is interesting to note this section had the highest variance and standard deviation of any
other section. Questions contained in operations interaction deal a great deal with feelings about
others’ role and function as related to safety. A lack of objectivity could explain this statistical
phenomenon. However, the section deviation of σ = 1.092 is not statistically significant to cause
doubt as to survey results. In order to verify its fitness, a Chi-square model performed in JMP
for all responses in this section sought to validate the data. The results included indicated
acceptance of a null hypothesis of N0 = the data within the SCISMS OI section is valid with a
result of p > 0.0423.

Table 11
Verification of All SCISMS Responses in OI Section
Model
Difference
Full
Reduced

-LogLikelihood
10.796731
22.547610
33.344342

DF
12

χ2
21.59346

p> value
0.0423*

Organizational commitment (OC). The final section of the SCISMS survey ask specific
questions regarding safety culture organizational commitments, typical safety culture practices,
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and management commitment to safety. Measuring safety culture commitment involved 14
questions and covered the aforementioned dimensions as displayed in Table G4. Two questions
identified areas below mean and attracted further review. Section 5.11 question 5 discussed
organizational tendencies to deviate from safety norms. This question scored μ = 5.40 against a
section mean of 6.35. Another question which scored μ = 5.25 against a section mean of 6.13
pertained to pilot scheduling. Past safety has been compromised when flight crews were not
properly rested and this issue was identified by NTSB officials as a necessary improvement area
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2015b). Both questions are included below for reference.
•

Section 5.11, Question 5: Management does not cut corners where safety is
concerned

•

Section 5.13, Question 2: Management schedules pilots as much as legally
possible, with little concern for pilots’ sleep schedule or fatigue

Worthy of note in this section were three non-responses to the questions in Section 5.13
related to management commitment. Two of these responses were by survey design because
they answered as CEO of the participants. One respondent simply did not choose to complete a
section displayed on the final page prior to completing the MLQ. As such, the excluded data
removed from that section for the participant became necessary. Survey design allowed
participants to voluntarily avoid answering questions. Lack of data in this participant field did
not affect survey outcomes. Three participants scored below mean in this section. P1374
indicated μ = 5.57, P1784 scored μ = 5.86, and P31324 responded with μ = 5.79. While P1784
appears for the first time, the other two appeared as below mean in every SCISMS statistical
dimension. Figure 17 also graphically demonstrates the appearance of P1784 is not at an
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intercept significantly below other study participants. Based on SCISMS author conclusions,
these two CNATOs could be at risk for an organizational accident.

Figure 17. Organizational Commitment dimension least square means chart.

SCISMS dimension summary. The SCISMS survey provides critical quantitative data
for participant comparatives. Four dimensions comprised of 55 questions on critical areas of
safety culture and gave insight to activities within the 20 participant CNATOs. Core safety
elements such as professionalism, management commitment, and functionality of formal systems
measured in the SCISMS were important to measure inside each CNATO, but also for
comparison purposes.
Comparing participant safety dimension mean scores across each FSRO showed very
little difference. Table 12 indicated regional differences are not significant enough to justify
varying treatment in future studies. Consistently higher than average mean scores across
dimensions also supported safety culture being familiar to CNATOs. If CNATO responses
corresponded to original SCISMS safety culture grid constructs, regions could be described as
“collaborative”. Von Thaden & Gibbons (2008) characterized collaborative organizations as
“safety is seen as a primary integrated concern throughout the organization. Organizational
leadership encourages employees to share in decision-making and problem solving, and keeps
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employees informed about matters that affect them. Leaders are visible and approachable. A
generative approach” (p. 31).

Table 12
SCISMS Safety Dimension Responses by FSRO
1

P - Eastern
P3 - Western Pacific
P5 - Southwestern

FS

6.14
6.25
6.50

IS

5.93
5.92
6.04

OI

5.89
6.10
6.23

OC
6.14
6.33
6.46

Mean
6.03
6.15
6.31

Table 13 displays participant dimension in one table, allowing easy identification of
broad themes. As can be viewed, FS and OC dimensions had higher mean scores than IS and OI.
Placing data in this format also quickly identified low performers such as P1371 and P31324 in
comparison to other participants.

Table 13
SCISMS Dimension Mean Score Comparison
Safety Culture Dimension
Participant
P11009
P11015
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P31098

Formal Systems
6.50
6.00
6.00
5.14
6.57
6.00
6.00
6.71
6.00
6.50
6.00

Information
Systems
6.64
6.14
6.00
4.79
5.64
6.14
6.00
6.79
5.79
5.36
5.79
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Operations
Interactions
6.54
5.62
6.13
5.38
5.62
5.62
6.15
6.15
5.69
6.00
5.63

Organizational
Commitment
6.60
6.14
6.21
5.57
6.14
6.10
6.07
6.50
5.86
6.21
6.00
(continued)

Safety Culture Dimension
Participant
P31112
P31158
P31158
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

Formal Systems
6.50
6.57
6.00
6.50
6.43
5.29
6.71
6.50
6.50

Information
Systems
6.64
5.64
5.71
6.50
5.93
4.36
6.79
6.71
5.36

Operations
Interactions
6.54
6.18
6.69
6.46
5.92
5.25
6.15
6.46
6.00

Organizational
Commitment
6.71
6.36
6.36
6.60
6.36
5.79
6.50
6.71
6.21

Mean score over all participants averaged a full point higher in four of five dimensions
compared to airlines surveyed in the original survey. Figure 18 shows a comparison histogram
of CNATO to airline mean scores. While sample size of the original SCISMS survey was n =
503 airlines and study only n = 20 CNATOs, demographic similarities with personnel and
general operating requirements provided valid similarities. An exception exists in only one
category. The μ = 0.30 difference in CNATOs organizational commitment could be attributed to
SMS programs being newly implemented to this industry segment. Questions within OC strictly
addressed management opinions toward safety culture methodologies and processes. Data
results indicated an internal struggle between procedural burdens of SMS and operational
flexibility.
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire, Form 5X (MLQ). Specific questions from the
MLQ cannot be disclosed due to copyright protections imposed by Mind Garden. As a result,
generalized data using three suggested qualitative themes has been included. Descriptive coding
frameworks in Table 14 demonstrate arrangement according to MLQ leadership characteristic
descriptions. Each final coding framework used descriptive data to answer research questions. It
is important to note that MLQ measures characteristics against norms rather than definitively
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labeling a leader. Therefore, results contained herein provide broad understanding as to leader
behavior and not meant to label leaders as transformational, transactional, or passive avoidant.

Mean Score Over All Respondents

7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
121

3.00

CNATO

2.00
1.00
0.00

OC

OI
FS
Safety Culture Dimension

IS

Figure 18. SCISMS comparison of Airlines vs. CNATO mean score. Airline data adapted from
“The Safety Culture Indicator Scale Measurement System (SCISMS)”, by the Office of Aviation
Research and Development, T.L. von Thaden and A.M. Gibbons, 2008. In the public domain.

Table 14
MLQ Form 5x Leadership Themes
Final coding framework theme (characteristic)
1. Transformational

2. Transactional
3. Passive Avoidance
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Initial thematic coding framework (scale)
•

Individualized consideration

•

Idealized influence (attributed)

•

Idealized influence (behavior)

•

Inspirational motivation

•

Intellectual stimulation

•

Contingent reward

•

Management-by-exception (active)

•

Laissez-faire

•

Management-by-exception (passive)

MLQ participant leadership type findings. In order to understand leadership influences
on organizations and their willingness to inculcate safety culture, an examination was necessary
of each participants’ leadership characteristics. The summary contained in Table 15 represented
a participant leadership characteristics and dominant scale. An absence of passive avoidance is
consistent with the highly regulatory nature of CNATOs and supports previous assumptions of
passive avoidance leadership being a below normal phenomenon within the industry. Where
transactional characteristic was above the norm in five participant organizations, a dominant
scale of contingent reward (CR) existed in every response. This phenomenon should not go
unnoticed and four MLQ questions determined a CR dominant scale.

Table 15
Participant Leadership Characteristic and Dominant Scale
Participant
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P11015
P11009
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31218
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

Characteristic

Dominant Scale

Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational

IC, IB, IS
CR
IM, IC
IC
CR
IA
CR
IB, IM
IB, IM
IB, IM, IS
IC
IB, IS
CR, MBEA
IA, IS
IA
CR
IM
IA, IM
IA
IC

Note. Idealized attributes (IA), Idealized behaviors (IB), Inspirational motivations (IM), Intellectual stimulation (IS),
Individualized consideration (IC), Contingent reward (CR), Management by exception – active (MBEA),
Management by Exception – passive (MBEP), Laissez-faire (LF).
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Comparing participant geographic strata in Table 16 provides insight as to similarities
and differences between CNATOs operating in different regulatory oversight FSRO
jurisdictions. Generally, higher than normal transformational leadership style emerged as
predominant within CNATOs across strata. Transactional appears in two of three stratum.
Presence of these two leadership characteristics was consistent to literature assessments of
aviation organizations discussed in Chapter II. MLQ measures described as outcome of
leadership were also consistent with high reliability organizations in overwhelmingly selecting
effectiveness. Strict focus on compliance and safety heavily rely upon effectiveness over other
behavioral outcomes. Extra effort and satisfaction behaviors closely followed in each case. The
P1 and P3 strata indicated satisfaction as a behavior outcome while P5 responded extra effort as
second behind effectiveness.

Table 16
Mean Percentage of Leadership Characteristics by Strata
Participant leadership characteristic percentage
MLQ Description

P1 (N = 10)

P3 (N = 8)

P5 (N = 2)

Leadership Characteristic
Transformational

70.0% (7)

62.5% (5)

100.0% (2)

Transactional

30.0% (3)

37.5% (3)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

Passive Avoidant
Outcome of Leadership (behaviors)
Effectiveness

100%

100%

100%

Extra Effort

0%

0%

0%

Satisfaction

0%

0%

0%
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Aggregate responses to MLQ leadership characteristics expressed in Table 16 initially
seem heavily skewed toward an existence of transformational leadership dominance, but
examining data further reveals mean transactional data closely follows transformational styles
among participants. Table 17 shows leadership characteristic means within strata and by
comparison to other FSRO participants. A large gap existed between both transactional and
transformational and passive avoidant. The data suggests passive avoidant leadership is not
prevalent in participant organizations and therefore to the CNATO population.

Table 17
Comparison of Leadership Characteristics Scores by Strata
P1 (N = 10)
Leadership Characteristic

M

P3 (N = 8)

SD

M

SD

P5 (N = 2)
M

SD

Transformational

4.00

0.1458

4.05

0.1118

3.60

0.2404

Transactional

3.55

0.7071

3.72

0.3977

3.06

0.4419

Passive Avoidant

1.45

0.0707

1.41

0.1326

0.88

0.1768

Existence of Safety Management System (SMS). Previous academic research
attributed statistically significant decreases in accident rates among airlines upon implementation
of a SMS. Participants revealed within Section 5.1 of the SCISMS whether a formal SMS
existed in their organization. When responding affirmatively, survey logic inquired whether that
SMS was commercially available or developed internally. Each participant response captured in
Table 18 show all participants have implemented SMS and a high use of commercially available
programs. Only P1482 neither used a commercial package nor developed an internal program. It
was unclear from survey responses what type of SMS this outlier employs.
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Table 18
CNATO Use of SMS by Participant
Participant
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P11009
P11015
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

SMS Implemented

Commercial

Internal

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No

Note. Commercial heading indicates SMS sourced from for-profit entities specializing in
providing pre-packaged programs. Internal signifies participant created SMS in-house.
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS). Safety data contained
within the ASIAS accident and incident database includes any aircraft accidents and incidents.
The study treats either type of ASIAS entry as an organizational accident due to theoretical
constructs identifying events within high-reliability organizations, however small, as a process
failure. Table 19 expresses ASAIS data for each confidential participant. The data showed only
one study participant had any type of organizational accident since ASAIS began collection data
in 1978. P31324 incurred an accident in 2014 and an incident in 2006. Accident investigation
conclusions suggested controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) as the primary cause. The accident
resulted in a loss of five souls and total destruction of the airframe. NTSB data did not cite any
118

organizational culture or operations elements as contributory causes to the accident. An ASIAS
entry was also included for 2006. Database entry concluded this issue was a gear collapse
attributed to a hard landing. No loss of life was noted and airframe was only slightly damaged
with prop strikes and engine damage. While this incident is common and appears not to have
included any organizational accident elements, an 11-year old NTSB report does not speak to
safety climate that may have existed at the time of the incident. Generally, NTSB reports are
limited to facts only and rarely contain supposition or comments which could be construed as
opinion.

Table 19
ASIAS Accident and Incident Data for Study Participants
Participant
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P11009
P11015
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

Accident
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Incident
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Year of accident
and/or incident
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2014*, 2006
NA
NA
NA

Note: Accidents indicated by * otherwise chart entries are Incidents.
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It is important to note that CNATOs do not include highly hazardous flying conditions
such as air ambulance or helicopter tours, which have a higher instance of accidents among all
aviation related groups (FAA, n.d.).
Findings by research question. While the raw data provided in the appendices was
helpful in giving context to participants, the complexity of multiple data points for each research
question required greater understanding of how data operationalization occurs. As described
previously, an instrumentation of variables describes each relevant variable and corresponding
data point. Table 9 reappears from Chapter III to assist in understanding section organization of
findings by research question. For comparative purposes, P31324 is bolded in each result table
and represents the only participant who experienced an organizational accident.

Table 9
Instrumentation of Variables
Hypothesis

Variable name

Variable type

Measure name

RQ1: Safety
culture
characteristics of
CNATO
(descriptive)
RQ2:
Organizational
culture impact on
performance
(relational)

1. Safety
Culture

1. Intervening

1. SCISMS

2a. Leadership
type

2a. Independent

2a. MLQ-5X

2b. Dependent

2b. ASIAS; 2
measures

RQ3: Accident
rates of CNATOs
usage of SMS
(comparative)

3a. Regulatory
influence

3a. Independent

3a. SCISMS

2b.
Organizational
accidents

3b. Independent 3b. SCISMS

Type of
measurement
1.Safety culture
dimension; (FS, IS,
OI, OC)

2a. Leadership
type; 9-factors
2b.
Accident/incident
3a. Formal safety
indicators; 2factors (OC, FS)
(continued)
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Hypothesis

Variable name
3b. SMS use

Variable type
3c. Dependent

3c.
Organizational
accidents
RQ4: Leadership
style relationship
to culture and
accidents
(relational)

4a. Leadership
type
4b. Safety
culture

Measure name
3c. ASIAS; 2
measures

Type of
measurement
3b. Formal safety
indicators; SMS
use
3c.
Accident/incident

4a. Intervening

4a. MLQ-5X

4b. Intervening

4b. SCISMS

4c. Dependent

4c. ASIAS

4c.
Organizational
accidents

4a. Leadership
type; 9-factors
4b. Dimension
safety indicators
4c.
Accident/incident

Research question 1. What safety culture characteristics does a typical CNATO
organization possess? (descriptive)
As described by the study instrumentation table, research question one involves a
descriptive analysis of participants using SCISMS safety culture dimensions. Overall mean
dimension scores and consolidated score provides a general description of CNATOs in a safety
culture context. Participants having an above average tendency for formal safety systems (FS)
indicated a proclivity toward orderly process oriented practices and processes. Heavy reliance
on informational systems (IS) suggests command and control methods for safety adherence.
High operations interaction (OI) scores indicated a more people centric reliance to achieve safe
operating environments. Finally, organizational commitment (OC) used leadership and policy as
the primary motivator for safety culture development. Each dimension provided insight into
culture characteristics participant organizations subscribe. Table 20 shows each mean dimension
score and dominant dimension by participant. Top quartile SCISMS mean scores include P3112,
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P31802, P11009, P1750, and P31326 ranked in that order. Bottom quartile mean scores from
highest to lowest were P1482, P31098, P1784, P1371, and P31324.

Table 20
SCISMS Composite Safety Dimension Responses by Participant
Participant
P11009
P11015
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31158
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

FS

IS

OI

OC

Dominant Dimension

6.50
6.00
6.00
5.14
6.57
6.00
6.00
6.71
6.00
6.50
6.00
6.50
6.57
6.00
6.50
6.43
5.29
6.71
6.50
6.50

6.64
6.14
6.00
4.79
5.64
6.14
6.00
6.79
5.79
5.36
5.79
6.64
5.64
5.71
6.50
5.93
4.36
6.79
6.71
5.36

6.54
5.62
6.13
5.38
5.62
5.62
6.15
6.15
5.69
6.00
5.63
6.54
6.18
6.69
6.46
5.92
5.25
6.15
6.46
6.00

6.60
6.14
6.21
5.57
6.14
6.10
6.07
6.50
5.86
6.21
6.00
6.71
6.36
6.36
6.60
6.36
5.79
6.50
6.71
6.21

IS
IS, OC
OC
OC
FS
IS
OI
FS
OC
FS
FS, OC
OC
FS
OI
OC
FS
OC
IS
IS, OC
FS

Three participants exhibited multiple dominant dimensions with instances of identical
mean scores for each dimension. It is relevant to note that P11015 and P31098 ranked 15th and
17th respectively in overall SCISMS score while P51802 ranked second. Therefore, it cannot be
said that a presence of multiple dimensions equated to higher overall SCISMS scores. Further,
P11015, ranked 15 of 20, and P51802, ranked 2 of 20, shared exactly the same dominant
dimensions. CNATOs holding a specific dominant safety culture dimension had no correlation
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with higher overall mean scores. Data suggests the degree to which safety dimension exists, as
represented by a higher mean score, was far more important than which dimension was
represented.
Using safety culture dimension as a CNATO descriptor may give insight to
organizational objectives, however, commonalities among participants was inconclusive. As
demonstrated in Figure 19, OC appeared the most among participants, but only slightly over FS,
followed closely by IS. Therefore, no dominant dimension emerged to describe the entire
CNATO population. It can be said about study participants that all scored significantly above
SCISMS average as a group with μ = 6.16 on a scale of 1.0 to 7.0 where 4.0 represented average.

Figure 19. Study participant culture dimension dominance. Displays a breakdown of number of
responses to each dominant dimension within the SCISMS safety survey. Participants may have
more than one dominant dimension.

Research question 2. To what extent, if at all, does organizational culture have a
relationship with performance outcomes, including accident rates? (relational)
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Reviewing accident data, then comparing trends in leadership characteristics yielded an
unexpected finding. Data contained in Table 21, a composite of Table 15 and Table 19, for
relationships between leadership and organizational accidents yielded information relevant to
answering the research question. P31324, the only operator with organizational accidents,
identified themselves as having transformational leadership behavior above norm. Due to 14
other participants exhibiting transformational characteristics and five others with the same
dominant IM scale not incurring any organizational accidents, no conclusive data can support
transformational leadership had a relationship to enhanced safety culture. Further, study data
indicated to a reasonable certainty IM dominance had no relationship with a higher accident rate
risk since no accident existed in other IM participants.

Table 21
Leadership Behavior and Organizational Accident Relationship Outcomes
Participant
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P11015
P11009
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31218
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

Characteristic
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational

Dominant Scale
IC, IB, IS
CR
IM, IC
IC
CR
IA
CR
IB, IM
IB, IM
IB, IM, IS
IC
IB, IS
CR, MBEA
IA, IS
IA
CR
IM
IA, IM
IA
IC
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Organizational
Accident
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Figure 20. MLQ participant dominant leadership scale. Compiled from respondents answers
within each leadership characteristic. Participants could have more than one scale attributed.

Research question 3. To what extent, if at all, is there a difference in accident rates of
CNATOs that use safety management system programs and those that do not? (comparative)
SMS programs include formalized, systematic, and methodical processes for aviation
operations. These comprehensive written processes serve as the basis for safety culture
formation. Presence of CNATO participants with a SMS program indicate basic understanding
and presence of safety culture. SMS existence indicated an organization already applied airline
style safety into normal operations. Verifying SMS in participant organizations appeared
through formal safety systems SCISMS questions and a demographic question included by the
researcher. Both responses served as a crosscheck during sequential transformative
individualized findings to insured integrity.
Table 22 combined relevant data from SCISMS, accident data from ASAIC, and a
demographic question. As shown, all participants had implemented a SMS program. Formal
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system score, a dimension of SCISMS provided an informal measure as to the extent SMS
appears across 20 degrees of freedom. In addition to P31324, which suffered an organizational
accident, one other CNATO participant scored even lower. Presence of a lower formal system
score and the absence of an organizational accident from P1374 provided conflicting statistical
proof of safety risk. Since all participants implemented a SMS, any conclusions based on this
data point would be inconclusive. For all these reasons, data analysis proved to high degree of
certainty there is no difference in accident rates of those who use SMS programs and those who
do not.

Table 22
SMS Program Existence Comparison
Participant
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P11015
P11009
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31218
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

SMS Implemented
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Formal System
Score
6.00
5.14
6.57
6.00
6.00
6.71
6.00
6.50
6.50
6.00
6.00
6.50
6.57
6.00
6.50
6.43
5.29
6.71
6.50
6.50

Org Commitment
Score
6.21
5.57
6.14
6.10
6.07
6.50
5.86
6.21
6.60
6.14
6.00
6.71
6.36
6.36
6.60
6.36
5.79
6.50
6.71
6.21

Organizational
Accident
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

Note. SCISMS dimensional FS and OC scores indicated as mean for entire dimension.
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Research question 4. To what extent, if at all, does CNATO leadership style have a
relationship with the development of a safety culture and accident rates? (relational)
Research question four combines each data set into one and asked the question whether
observed values from participant surveys result in predictable relationship with organizational
accidents as identified in the ASIAS database. Using non-experimental research method, an
analysis of data in Table 23 showed key participant responses for each variable. Using JMP,
data analysis revealed some interesting results.

Table 23
Survey Results Composite Snapshot

Participant
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P11009
P11015
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31158
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

Leadership
Characteristic
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transactional
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational
Transformational

Leader
Average by
Scale
3.80
3.55
3.60
4.25
4.00
3.70
3.50
3.75
4.40
4.35
3.60
3.60
4.50
4.00
3.70
3.50
3.40
3.60
4.60
2.60
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Dominant
Dimension
OC
OC
FS
IS
OI
FS
OC
FS
IS
IS, OC
FS, OC
OC
FS
OI
OC
FS
OC
IS
IS, OC
FS

SCISMS
Mean Score
6.08
5.22
5.99
5.96
6.05
6.53
5.83
6.01
6.57
5.97
5.85
6.59
6.18
6.19
6.51
6.15
5.17
6.53
6.59
6.01

Organizational
Accident
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No

The following two figures represent multivariate analysis of leadership characteristics in
comparison to SCISMS mean score. Figure 21 represented a multivariate analysis scatterplot of
transformational responses to SCISMS mean scores. The trend line and elliptical boundaries
indicate some relationship among transformational leadership characteristic scale and SCISMS
mean score. While there are two outliers out of 15 data points, the reliability value of r = 0.3134
(existing between -1 and 1) does indicate a predictable trend. Conversely, a scatterplot for
transactional responses to SCISMS also had an r = 0.4915 and its five data points extrapolated to
include predictable values. However, the research question did not ask simply if there was a
leader-safety culture relationship. The addition of organizational accident yielded different
results.

Figure 21. Multivariate scatterplot of transformational leadership characteristic.
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Figure 22. Multivariate scatterplot of transactional leadership characteristic.

Adding the organizational accident parameter to statistical calculations yielded the
following results. Figure 23 shows a box plot of CNATO SCISMS mean score responses with
no organizational accidents overlaid with a normal continuous fit distribution line. Since only
one participant experienced an organizational accident, the graphics for results is inconclusive.
However, it showed a value of 5.17 as mean response. This value would place it at the lower end
of the distribution curve, but within the range of values for participants without organizational
accidents.
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Parameter

Estimate

Mean
Std Dev

6.147895
0.348801

Lower CI Upper CI
6.009134
0.27542

6.286655
0.482915

1-Alpha
0.900
0.900

Figure 23. SCISMS mean score of CNATOs with no organizational accident.

Considering a leadership characteristic scale using an organizational accident lens yields
the same result. Figure 24 represents a box plot of leadership scale averages among CNATOs
without organizational accidents with the normal distribution line added. Results for participant
P31324, the only participant that experienced an organizational accident, scored a 3.40 on the
transformational scale. As noted, 3.40 falls well within the normal range of non-accident
participants, and would fall in the last 10% of those CNATOs. It is also important to note that
3.40 is only 0.3 points off being within the median.
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Parameter

Estimate Lower CI

Mean
Std Dev

6.147895
0.348801

6.009134
0.27542

Upper CI

1-Alpha

6.286655
0.482915

0.900
0.900

Figure 24. MLQ leader average by scale with no organizational accident.

Despite finding that transformational leadership characteristic can predict SCISMS safety
culture dimension mean score, the research question asked whether a relationship existed
between organizational accidents and leadership influence on safety culture development. Based
on the data presented, it appears there is no relationship between those variables.
Summary of Key Findings
Numerous data points collected using individual instrument resulted in creating
mountains of data. Using theoretical frameworks presented in prior chapters, measurements
yielded definitive results based on specific research questions posed. Respondents appeared to
answer survey questions honestly and completely. The quality of overall data was encouraging
since 106 questions can sometimes be onerous to complete. Participants have a commitment to
improving industry safety as evidenced by participating and offering their experiences. Further
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study may help identify CNATOs using safety culture best practices and unlock key influencing
factors.
Data collected suggests CNATO safety culture best practice existed in several
participants. There was ample evidence of data providing mixed or conflicting data when
attempting to answer research questions. One such example was P31112 who scored highest in
SCISMS mean score at 6.59 but last among all transformational respondents with a MLQ Form
5X-Short score of 3.60. This juxtaposition revealed itself in RQ4 since 14 other organizations
scored higher in transformational leadership. Study results proved that the degree to which an
organization exhibited a specific characteristic did not correlate to high scores in other measures.
This chapter presented results obtained from quantitative and qualitative survey
instruments used to measure safety culture and leadership attitudes of selected CNATO
participants. Study findings contribute to a limited body of research focused on increasing safety
culture within a narrow industry segment that has higher organizational accident rates than their
airline counterparts. Major findings and implications to policy, CNATO practices, and
conclusions are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

132

Chapter V: Discussion and Conclusions
The final chapter discusses findings in the context of each variable, draws conclusions
about data sets, addresses implications for policy and practices, and recommends future research
on the study topic. Chapter I introduced a theoretical directional hypothesis and discussed
potential implications should the data suggest relationships exist. Study findings indicated
CNATOs are hard to uniformly compare and while organizational accidents were rare, the
participants were not immune from safety lapses.
Discussion of Key Findings
Beyond study research questions was an overall goal to better understand the
motivations, variable weights, and their relationship with safety culture. In performing this
study, it became apparent that CNATO employees directly responsible for implementing safety
culture have limited exposure to safety leaders. Based on the results of OI section of the
SCISMS, participants indicated a strong positive opinion of instructors and trainers. This finding
was encouraging and discouraging at the same time. It uncovered a divide in organizational
trust, described in Chapter IV as a core component of organizational accident avoidance,
between CNATO departments. However, it was encouraging because CNATO pilots undergo
recurrent training every 6-months and had frequent exposure to instructors and trainers.
Subsequent sections address this finding in more detail.
Describing CNATOs was generally not possible in the context of safety culture. Findings
suggested that categorizing CNATOs into safety culture dimensions (a) does not determine
whether they run a higher risk of organizational accidents, and (b) individualized nature of
CNATOs dictate various approaches to safety culture development. RQ1 could have uncovered
this phenomenon, but inconclusive evidence existed to broadly describe CNATOs. While it was
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not the question asked by RQ2, findings did uncover that CNATOs overwhelmingly characterize
themselves in transformational and transactional terms. Of participants responding, 75%
indicated transformational characteristic and 25% transactional. None responded passive
avoidant.
RQ3 asked a binary question as to whether CNATOs had implemented SMS in their
organizations. SMS usage emerged as more important than a mere existence of a program.
Since the only participant suffering an organizational accident indicated the presence of a SMS,
the degree to which CNATOs use the SMS became a factor. SCISMS formal safety systems
scores were inconclusive in identifying issues related to SMS usage primarily because P1371
scored below P31324 in formal safety system (FS) mean score, yet had no accident or incidents.
Therefore, future studies should investigate the type and the degree to which CNATOs use SMS
as a variable to organizational accidents.
Perhaps the most encouraging result from the study revolved around a question that was
not asked, but uncovered because of the study sequential transformative design methodology.
SCISMS scores of CNATOs identifying as transformational was predictable. Figure 21
conclusively demonstrated safety culture scores across all dimensions followed predictable and
reliable trends. While there were outliers, respondents were inside the boundaries of the
scatterplot and JMP multivariate modeling proved reliability was high related to these datasets.
Examination of Variables
Leadership. Literature meta-analysis determined aviation safety culture is best
cultivated under a transformational-transactional leadership style (Clarke, 2013). While this may
be true, data collected in this study does not support MLQ measured leadership characteristics
having an impact on safety culture outcomes. What is less clear was any influence it may have
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on daily attitudes surrounding safety culture. CNATO employees mostly operate outside direct
influence from organizational leaders. Isolation in the cockpit and spending an extended period
of time away from headquarters lend itself to individualized action. It makes sense a line pilot
may only see an organizations leadership once every six months when regulations dictate
mandatory recurrent training, or at other company-sponsored events. This lack of daily, direct
contact places heavy reliance upon hiring practices. Leadership influence on hiring practices and
hiring in one’s image emerges as a possible variable not contemplated by this study.
Study results uncovered a clear fracture among departments within a CNATO.
Examination of SCISMS OI dimension scores demonstrated an overall distrust of safety culture
behaviors within dispatch. Dispatchers are directly responsible for crew scheduling, passenger
coordination, logistical arrangements, and flight planning. Data showed dispatch scored below
OI average across all questions. While one or two occurrences may be normal, as was the case
with chief pilot questions, scores below average across all questions raise concerns. This
phenomenon deserves closer evaluation in future studies.
Use of MLQ Form 5x provided a large amount of data as to CNATO characteristics and
scale. However, the MLQ instrument did not measure a degree of each scale, only behavioral fit
within nine constructs. The degree to which a CNATO demonstrated individualized
consideration, or inspirational motivation would be helpful to potentially describe CNATO
operators. Figure 24 showed scale distribution, but there were several instances where a
CNATO demonstrated evenly distributed scores across multiple scales. Therefore, no real
conclusions emerged about leadership scale and CNATO participants.
Organizational accidents. Identification of data leading to avoidance of any CNATO
organizational accident was an aspirational goal of this study. Due to the nature of being either
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subject of an accident/incident or not, data was very straightforward. Few similarities existed by
examining data from the only participant to suffer an organizational accident.
Safety culture. Conclusions drawn from study data allowed insight as to how CNATOs
use different strategies to achieve safety culture and to what degree safety existed in the
organization. As discussed previously within the findings, P31324 did score lowest on SCISMS
aggregate scores, but did not score lowest on every dimension. Data suggested that just like 15
other participants, they identified themselves as having transformational leadership
characteristics and like five others identified as having high inspirational motivation scale.
Safety culture as a construct involves numerous factors and this study attempted to narrow the
focus to stated SCISMS variables.
The SCISMS uncovered numerous individualized findings worth noting. First, dominant
dimensions identified in Figure 19 resulted in organizational commitment being common in most
CNATOs. When looking at the components of that dimension, it included broad organizational
aspirations as driving culture. A close second was a more expected result of formal safety
systems. Reliance upon humans rather than predicable processes does pose an interesting
question as to how sustainable safety culture can be when relying upon a human element.
Another area of analysis granted by the sequential transformative nature of the study was
within the informational systems dimension. Scores across all CNATOs were very low in
professionalism. Safety culture development relies upon everyone in an organization. Flying
passengers for compensation has a high reliance upon professionalism. Low scores presented a
concern and were consistent with original airline mean responses being lowest in the IS
dimension. This SCISMS dimension may have long-term consequences and would benefit from
a longitudinal study.
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In general, SCISMS survey results failed to relate with other variables to discover larger
trends resulting in organizational accidents. However, CNATO data gathered reveled a great
deal about safety culture attitudes. As stated previously, scores across the study sample size
indicated higher awareness than airlines at roughly the same safety culture development stage.
Figure 18 displayed this achievement in histogram form. This finding was encouraging and
exhibited a general understanding of safety culture importance within CNATO operations.
Safety programs. Capturing SMS usage through the SCISMS and demographic
question also yielded unexpected results. Since CNATO implementation of SMS programs is
voluntary, expectations existed that not all participants would have already complied. While it is
true participants may be more actively involved in safety culture activities due to their voluntary
participation, the stratified random sample method would equalize any potential bias. Data did
uncover that how a CNATO uses an SMS program was more important than a mere existence of
a program. Since all operators implemented SMS, any relationship to other variables seemed
unlikely. Had a respondent indicated no SMS usage, the study would have been able to assess if
a relationship existed. There was no other remarkable information related to SMS program use.
Conclusions
Voluminous data collected during this study allowed researchers to reach three
generalized conclusions. The study used four bodies of data to answer four research questions
and attempted to find descriptive, comparative, and relational findings of CNATOs.
Conclusion 1: Safety culture within a CNATOs is difficult to describe. Early in the
study, Table 5 described the challenge researchers had agreeing on a definition for safety culture.
Theoretical framework used for this study relied upon an aviation specific construct that
borrowed from culture luminaries Schein, Perrow, Pidgeon, and Reason. “The safety culture of
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an organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions,
competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management” (Cox & Flin, 1998, p. 191).
SCISMS survey captured these behavioral patterns through four dimensions following exactly
the Cox and Flin definition. CNATOs exhibited a strong indication of developing safety culture
in their organizations as evidenced by Figure 18 where higher means existed in comparison to
airlines for the same stage in safety program development. Unfortunately, a pattern did not
emerge suggesting safety culture was more or less present if certain SCISMS safety dimension
scores were achieved. This lack of fit along with a potential for CNATOs to hold more than one
dominant dimension created a situation where a single conclusion could not be reached as to
defining an ideal safety culture to avoid organizational accidents.
Analyzing SCISMS data for each CNATO participant did allow some generalized results
to emerge. While the only CNATO to suffer and organizational accident did not score lowest in
every dimension, it did have the lowest aggregate mean score. This could suggest that the degree
to which a CNATO scores on the SCISMS may have a bearing on overall organizational
accident risk. In both IS and OC, participant P1371 had lower scores. Following this participant
long-term could determine whether a low score had a relationship to at-risk safety behaviors.
Based on the finding they scored lower than another who already suffered an accident, it seems
reasonable this CNATO is at risk. SCISMS measures provide data that FAA inspectors should
have access to monitor activities and actively engage in accident prevention.
Conclusion 2: Sequential transformative design was appropriate. Research design
was critical to gain an overall profile of study participants using individualized results. The use
of sequential transformative design allowed a complete picture of each participant to emerge
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over extended study analysis. When conducting research from afar and not benefiting from onsite visits with CNATOs, conducting data collection and analysis in sequence was critical to
gaining an understanding of the participants. By the time it was necessary to review data within
the research question lens, an intimate knowledge of each CNATO was already obtained. RQ1
asked for descriptions for CNATO using safety culture dimensions. Placing each into context of
leadership also allowed an understanding of organizational culture beyond safety constructs.
RQ2 sought to answer a relational question about organizational accidents and leadership types.
Knowing that all participants fell into either transformational or transactional assisted in
determining no relationship existed without much effort. Sequential transformative design was a
significant help in gaining detailed understanding of CNATO participants.
Conclusion 3: Safety culture, as a broad construct, is hard measure. The study
found that while categorization of CNATOs provided an easy way to define characteristics, it did
not give any insight as to organizational accident predictability. Using a single survey gained
valuable data that answered the research questions sufficiently, but use of more than one survey
may have provided more detail as to safety culture. Participant fatigue is always a concern when
designing research and inclusion of The Organization Safety Culture Questionnaire (Kelly &
Pantakar, 2004), a 50-item survey, would most certainly have been too much for participants.
Conducting a follow-up survey to the same participants using this measure would give additional
insight to culture and specifically professionalism. As identified earlier, responses surrounding
professionalism were remarkably low in comparison to expected results. Additional data would
help clarify SCISMS dimensions to assess whether those have a greater relationship with
organizational accident avoidance.
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Directional hypothesis analysis. Figure 3 contained in Chapter I presented a directional
hypothesis based on researcher general observation and personal assumptions. The research
question posed as follows:
H1: Organizational accidents moderate the curvilinear relationship between safety culture
and leadership influence in such a way that an intermediate level of detail of leadership influence
is associated with higher safety culture when the priority of safety is high rather than low.
Data collected in this study was inconclusive to prove the quantitative research question.
Conclusive data would have included a larger sample size and response rate including purposeful
sample size having organizational accidents in the past, but not presently. One participant in a
geographically diverse group cannot obtain a level of specificity to answer the question.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Study implications for policy and practice centered on two constituencies: the CNATO
and its industry groups, and federal regulators. Results contained within this study suggest
actionable steps that effect safety culture. Focused interaction between researchers and industry
influencers allow open a dialog about how data is captured, shared, and disseminated. All
CNATOs need to participate in the process if any hope exists in creating a near accident free
environment. Regulation alone rarely modifies behavior, but industry leaders and groups can
convince CNATOs widespread cooperation is in everyone’s best interest.
Commercial safety auditor involvement. Aviation has long relied upon outside
agencies to assess and advise CNATOs. Agencies such as ARGUS International, Wyvern, or ISBAO commonly certify CNATOs through a safety audit. Each of these providers use various
safety criterion for certification. A unified, universal, industry recognized measurement tool is
necessary to provide researchers and regulators an opportunity to benchmark the industry.
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Anonymous data sets submitted for honest and thoughtful review would help all CNATOs in
developing best practices and pre-organizational accident prevention identification. Disparate
nature of current data does not allow CNATOs to effectively predict at-risk organizations.
Airlines realized this flaw early on and collectively solved the issue. Safety auditors have a
professional responsibility to promote unification of safety measurement tools.
Impartial safety collection practices. Non-profit industry groups have attempted to
address data collection concerns. Air Charter Safety Foundation created a voluntary reporting
system called Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). Presently, there are only 40 participants
in the program and data is not available to non-members. These small-scale efforts have limited
ability to impact safety. This same type system should be expanded to include all CNATOs and
made mandatory. NASA already collects massive amounts of voluntary data through existing
programs and would be well suited to serve as an impartial conduit for information of this nature.
Status quo will not change without industry leaders calling for unification of data collection and
developing solutions. Airline safety leaders realized this early in the process and a cue from
their example may be effective in convincing CNATO leaders to adopt similar voluntary safety
practices and reporting.
Highly regulatory CNATO operating environments make voluntary reporting programs
operated by government officials unlikely. Industry groups serve as a likely conduit to broker a
mandatory program accepted by CNATO leaders. Some private safety consultants hold monthly
calls to allow safety officers a forum to hear others challenges and solutions. This should happen
on a broader scale to include the entire CNATO population. Voluntary programs are effective,
but psychology proves participants in those programs already value safety and strive to improve.
These operators are not the ones at greatest risk. Inclusion of all CNATOs, and especially those
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who score below average through a common assessment tool such as SCISMS would benefit
future study outcomes. Professionalism and accountability mentioned earlier in this study
continue to play an active role in determining safety culture development. It is incumbent upon
every CNATO, potentially through industry groups, to hold every operator accountable to
professional standards that includes constant evaluation for at-risk safety behaviors including
variables discussed in this study.
FAA policy development. Extensive safety culture development practices developed
jointly by airlines, regulators, and the NTSB have nearly eliminated air carrier organizational
accidents (Logan, 2008). This same level of stakeholder scrutiny does not currently apply to
CNATOs. Studies such as this one help to identify factors involved in identifying numerous
challenges preventing safety culture inculcation. One clear point gained from this study revolved
around SMS usage and effectiveness. The mere presence of a SMS does not reduce the risk of
organizational accidents. How it is used and which party developed a SMS program further
complicates effectiveness. Many other factors comprise an effective SMS and detailed
instrumentation addressing overall effectiveness did not appear within this study. Because the
FAA is directly responsible for flying public safety, policies should be developed addressing
CNATO safety inculcation.
Extensive paperwork is required of every CNATO during certification, including a full
SMS plan and demonstration. This review and evaluation occurs prior to the first passenger
flight. Very rarely does the FAA review safety programs once an operator obtains certification.
They require pilot skills be reviewed every six months, aircraft maintenance standards upheld,
and a myriad of other checks, but safety is only addressed post organizational accident. Policies
that periodically measure safety culture as a part of the Principal Operations Inspector (POI)
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routine evaluation address current gaps in regulatory oversight. POIs are FAA FSDO employees
directly responsible for oversight of each CNATO. Current POI staffing levels make it
impractical for routine inspections outside spot-checks or crisis response. Simply conducting an
open conversation between CNATOs and POIs about how a safety program is evolving after
real-life application could help establish best practice. Properly staffing these positions and
adding routine assessment of safety culture elements would begin to mark a worthy and
significant policy change.
A change in FAA policy to include a standardized instrument such as the SCISMS to
measure safety culture against averages would serve as a good start in identifying where POI
best resource allocation to avoid an organizational accident occurs.
Recommendations for Future Research
As evidenced by the study literature review, CNATOs received little research focus.
Safety inculcation and development of safety culture directly effects aviation accident
prevention. At some point, the FAA will modify regulations to include mandatory safety
program usage in CNATOs. Understanding how airlines succeeded and adapting best practices
to unique idiosyncrasies of CNATOs provide a blueprint to successful implementation. The
following ideas for future research could assist that transition.
•

A study to repeat methods used and adjust inclusion criterion to a purposeful method
including CNATOs with identified organizational accidents and compare those to
safety culture best practice organizations.

•

A study using these same CNATO participants and conduct a longitudinal research
project to determine changes in scores over time and whether low scores identified
here relate to higher accident risk.
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•

A study to examine to what extent leaders influence hiring practices and to what
extent do characteristics of hires mirror that of the leader since CNATO employee
exposure to organizational leadership is limited due to a unique work environment.

•

A study further clarifying other academic research that examine variable relationships
between SMS programs and overall safety culture effectiveness.

•

A study to target bottom quartile SCISMS mean score participants within a FSRO for
more qualitative details on why survey yielded lower than norm results and correlate
whether organizational accident risk is higher.

•

A study to examine a potential CNATO disconnect in safety culture as evidenced by
below average SCISMS safety culture dimension scores describing dispatchers.

Summary
This study sought to find relationships, describe phenomenon, and seek to describe a
population that does not get the academic attention it deserves. Quantitative methodology
allowed an impartial statistical look into ordinal and interval variable values. Use of sequential
transformative collection and analysis provided an opportunity to examine data individually for
their trends outside a more rigid research question lens. Data collected during this study was
interesting and valuable if for no other reason than having never been measured before. The
stratified random cluster and systematic random sampling revealed sufficient participant pool for
data diversity. While priori power analysis proved study sample size was sufficient, broader
patterns may have emerged with a larger sample. Randomization of the sample size
unexpectedly yielded a CNATO who suffered not one, but two organizational accidents;
remarkable since CNATO accidents remain rare as percentage of overall aviation accidents.
Analysis of data gathered for participant P31324, the only participant to experience an
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organizational accident, did yield a lower than norm score across all instruments. Findings
suggest efficacy of safety measures determine the degree to which at-risk organization may be
valid. Only further research using a longitudinal research study would determine whether mean
scores truly relate to increased accidents. It is worth noting that a further qualitative field visit
may have also reinforced mean score validation.
Instrumentation used during the study provided easy to understand and measurable data
sets. After testing SCISMS in numerous ways throughout this process, it proved resilient in
identifying participants consistently in the top and bottom quartiles. The stalwart MLQ Form 5x
and its evaluation tools created easily obtained classification of leadership scales. Information is
power and there remains no better source of information than aviation regulators and evaluators.
Making accident data so accessible through ASAIS helped study data become meaningful in a
larger context. Hopefully, data gathered through this process can be repurposed and evaluated
by the five participants who requested a copy of this study. Expanding future studies to a larger
sample size represents no harm to CNATOs and benefit the industry. Therefore, methods being
sound, examination of each research question could occur based on observed results.
Finding descriptive commonalities among any group presents challenges and CNATOs
were no different. Using 106 questions, the study sought to find similar leadership
characteristics between 20 participants, but no pattern emerged. Transformational leadership
was present in 16 of 20 participants and suggests CNATO commonality with this leadership
characteristic. Early in the study, literature identified that transactional and transformational
leadership types are prevalent in aviation. That stated fact proved valid through data collected.
However, as measured against the nine leadership scales, no pattern emerged within either the
sample size or strata. An extensive safety culture measurement attempted to find relationships
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among those who had organizational accidents and those who did not. None was found. Despite
finding no relationship existed, data gathered showed CNATOs were ahead of airlines in
understanding safety culture importance as shown by higher mean scores at the same stage.
When complex safety system processes appeared, organizational accidents would be reduced.
Participant data demonstrated that is not true. Data showed CNATOs used safety programs
across all participants, eliminating any distinction indicating a relationship existed. CNATOs
seem to understand an implemented safety system provided the first step in cementing
organizational safety culture evidenced by high formal safety system mean scores. Finally, how
do all these variables interact and was there a relationship between one or more variables.
Again, nothing found to indicate a relationship. However, we know more detailed investigation
beyond cursory variable analysis will be necessary to achieve a goal of CNATO safety culture
inculcation.
The goal when embarking on an academic journey such as this was gathering data
leading to a new and innovative finding. Structuring research questions focused on how
leadership may impact aviation safety in a meaningful way led to many important answers.
While the data did not support any quantitative measures which suggested leadership influence
on safety at CNATOs, it did remind this researcher of the philosophical fallacy theory post hoc
ergo propter hoc. Aviation serves as an example of a highly complex process where millions of
factors determine either positive or negative outcomes. Remembering “after this, therefore
because of this” underscored complex processes subjected to millions of operations may never
be explained simply by a finite set of defined variables. Interaction between external and
internal variables controlled by no one action created an accident. Even if study data concluded
leadership did have an impact on safety, the argument would still be subject to inductive
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reasoning. Leadership may very well be an influencer to overall safety and perhaps the correct
combination of variables were simply not examined by this study. Scientific study has proven
statistical correlation does not imply causation. This realization underscored a study ancillary
finding of causal relationships, especially in aviation contexts, may actually provide inconclusive
evidence as to accident cause.
Despite the challenges of identifying accident precedents, our continued quest for
knowledge serves as a motivator to find answers through scholarly investigation. Hopefully,
building on this and previous studies may unlock a finding which breaks the highly complex
code of CNATO accidents. The question is not how research questions could have been changed
or clarified to get the expected result. In reality, the study did exactly what any good scientific
study was intended to do – prove facts. CNATO safety continues to evolve and encouragement
of academic research assisting forward movement must continue. The study identified a higher
than industry average accident rate currently exists among CNATOs in comparison to scheduled
carriers. Safety will remain a challenge until the industry embraces the professionalism and
accountability required to address challenges. Continuing to investigate variable relationship is
key to CNATOs reaching unprecedented safety levels currently achieved by airline operators.
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APPENDIX A
SCISMS Sample Questionnaire
Formal safety program
Reporting system
Please rate your airline’s official system for reporting safety issues and concerns.
1. The safety reporting system is convenient and easy to use.
2. Pilots can report safety discrepancies without fear of negative repercussions.
3. Pilots are willing to report information regarding marginal performance or unsafe
actions of other pilots.
4. Pilots don’t bother reporting near misses or close calls since these events don’t
cause any real damage.
5. Pilots are willing to file reports about unsafe situations, even if the situation was
caused by their own actions.
Response and feedback
These items refer to the response pilots receive from your airline’s official safety system.
6. Safety issues raised by pilots are communicated regularly to all other pilots in this
airline.
7. When a pilot reports a safety problem, it is corrected in a timely manner.
8. Pilots are satisfied with the way this airline deals with safety reports.
9. My airline only keeps track of major safety problems and overlooks routine ones.
Safety personnel (e.g., director of flight safety)
These items refer to the person or people in your airline who are formally designated as
responsible for safety. (This does not include union representatives.)
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10. Personnel responsible for safety hold a high status in the airline.
11. Personnel responsible for safety have the power to make changes.
12. Personnel responsible for safety have a clear understanding of the risks involved
in flying the line.
13. Safety personnel have little or no authority compared to operations personnel.
14. Safety personnel demonstrate a consistent commitment to safety.
Informal Aspects of Safety
Accountability
These items refer to the ways in which pilots are treated based on their safe or unsafe
behavior at your airline.
15. Airline management shows favoritism to certain pilots.
16. Standards of accountability are consistently applied to all pilots in this
organization.
17. When pilots make a mistake or do something wrong, they are dealt with fairly by
the airline.
18. When an accident or incident happens, management immediately blames the pilot.
Pilots’ authority
These items refer to the extent to which pilots have the authority to provide input and
make decisions regarding safety.
19. Pilots are seldom asked for input when airline procedures are developed or
changed.
20. Pilots are actively involved in identifying and resolving safety concerns.
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21. Pilots who call in sick or fatigued are scrutinized by the chief pilot or other
management personnel.
22. Pilots have little real authority to make decisions that affect the safety of normal
flight operations.
23. Management rarely questions a pilot’s decision to delay a flight for a safety issue.
Professionalism
These items refer to the attitudes you perceive among your fellow pilots in regard to
safety.
24. Pilots view the airline’s safety record as their own and take pride in it.
25. Pilots who don’t fly safely quickly develop a negative reputation among other
pilots.
26. Pilots with less seniority are willing to speak up regarding flight safety issues.
27. Decisions made by senior pilots are difficult to challenge.
28. Pilots don’t cut corners or compromise safety regardless of the operational
pressures to do so.
Operations Personnel
Chief pilots
These items refer to the chief pilots with whom you interact regularly.
29. Chief pilots do not hesitate to contact line pilots to proactively discuss safety
issues.
30. Chief pilots are unavailable when line pilots need help.
31. As long as there is no accident or incident, chief pilots don’t care how flight
operations are performed.
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32. Chief pilots have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight operations.
33. Pilots often report safety concerns to their chief pilot rather than the safety
department.
Dispatch
These items refer to your airline’s dispatch procedures.
34. Dispatch consistently emphasizes information or details (e.g., weather
requirements, NOTAMs) that affect flight safety.
35. Dispatch inappropriately uses the MEL (e.g., use when it would be better to fix
equipment).
36. Dispatch is responsive to pilots’ concerns about safety.
37. Dispatch would rather take a chance with safety than cancel a flight.
Instructors/trainers
These items refer to your airline’s flight instructors or trainers.
38. Instructors/trainers have a clear understanding of risks associated with flight
operations.
39. Safety is consistently emphasized during training at my airline.
40. Instructors/trainers teach shortcuts and ways to get around safety requirements.
41. Instructors/trainers prepare pilots for various safety situations, even uncommon or
unlikely ones.
Organizational commitment
Safety values
These items refer to the value that your airline’s upper level management places on
safety.
42. Safety is a core value in my airline.
43. Management is more concerned with making money than being safe.
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44. Management expects pilots to push for on-time performance, even if it means
compromising safety.
45. Management doesn’t show much concern for safety until there is an accident or
incident.
46. Management does not cut corners where safety is concerned.
Safety fundamentals
These items refer to your airline’s typical practices related to safety in various
areas.
47. Checklists and procedures are easy to understand.
48. My airline’s manuals are carefully kept up to date.
49. My airline is willing to invest money and effort to improve safety.
50. My airline is committed to equipping aircraft with up-to-date technology.
51. My airline ensures that maintenance on aircraft is adequately performed and that
aircraft are safe to operate.
Going beyond compliance
These items refer to upper level management’s commitment to meeting or exceeding
safety requirements.
52. Management goes above and beyond regulatory minimums when it comes to
issues of flight safety.
53. Management schedules pilots as much as legally possible, with little concern for
pilots’ sleep schedule or fatigue.
54. Management tries to get around safety requirements whenever they get a chance.
55. Management views regulation violations very seriously, even when they don’t
result in any serious damage.
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APPENDIX B
Data Collection Timeline
Summer 2016
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Figure B1. Data collection timeline.
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APPENDIX C
Participant Email Solicitation

The subject line of the email will clearly state that it is an advertisement for a research
study, such as: "Seeking participants for an important aviation safety research study"

Dear [CNATO PARTICIPANT],
You are receiving this email because you and your organization have been randomly
selected as a Part 135 operator meeting specific study inclusion criterion. Your email address
was obtained from the FAA Aviation Data Systems Branch Part 135 “active air operator”
database.
The study seeks to investigate intervening variables that lead to organizational accidents
in Part 135 Air Carriers. Using the data collected, various theoretical frameworks will be used to
measure the relationship between an existence of strong safety culture and organizational
accidents. Participants will take part in an online survey delivered via a secure and anonymous
Pepperdine University survey platform. Your participation will assist in advancing the
understanding of aviation safety within organizational contexts.
I would greatly appreciate your participation by clicking on the following link to proceed
to the anonymous online survey: [INSERT QUALTRICS LINK HERE]
Thank you,
[COMPLETE CONTACT INFORMATION SIGNATURE]
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APPENDIX D
Informed Consent

PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
SAFETY CULTURE INCULCATION IN CERTIFIED NON-SCHEDULED AIR TAXI
OPERATORS: ASSESSING THE PROBABILTY OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS
USING MULTIVARIATE FACTORS
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Stephen Birch, under the direction of Dr.
Eric Hamilton, at Pepperdine University, because you are over the age of 18, a member of a Certified
Non-Scheduled Air Taxi Operator (CNATO), and have operational responsibility at your respective
company to significantly influence safety activities.
Your participation is voluntary. You should read the information below, and ask questions about anything
that you do not understand before deciding whether to participate. Please take as much time as you need
to read the consent form. You may also decide to discuss participation with your family or friends.
If you choose to participate, please select AGREE. By selecting AGREE, you are indicating that you
freely and voluntarily are participating in this study. Completion of the survey is considered to be giving
full consent. It is recommended that you print a copy of this consent page for your records before you
begin the study.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The study aims to address the gap in knowledge as to whether inculcation of a safety culture in CNATOs
has an effect on organizational accidents. The study will (a) examine the way leadership introduces and
reinforces safety culture within an organization (b) how the safety culture is implemented by followers,
(c) discover investigate the types of artifacts used by the aircraft operator to provide reinforcement of
established safety processes, and (d) determine the extent to which safety culture has an effect on overall
safety results.
STUDY PROCEDURES
This online research study will involve completion of an online questionnaire. The questionnaire will ask
for general perceptions and personal opinions and reflections regarding leadership and safety experiences
in your organization. You may skip any questions that you do not wish to answer. Participants will be
expected to complete the questionnaire only once. It should take you about thirty (30) minutes to
complete.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
The potential and foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study do not exceed risks
associated with day-to-day activities. Potential risks subjects may be exposed to include fatigue, boredom,
or feeling uncomfortable with certain questions. Other risks may include disclosures of internal policies
and procedures in reference to participant’s role at their relative place of employment, which may impact
their relationship with their employer.
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POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
While there are no direct benefits to the study participants, there are several anticipated benefits to society
by contributing to the current gap in literature.
CONFIDENTIALITY
I will keep your records for this study confidential, as far as permitted by law. However, if I am required
to do so by law, I may be required to disclose information collected about you. Examples of the types of
issues that would require me to break confidentiality are if you tell me about instances of child abuse and
elder abuse. Pepperdine’s University’s Human Subjects Protection Program (HSPP) may also access the
data collected. The HSPP occasionally reviews and monitors research studies to protect the rights and
welfare of research subjects.
Any identifiable information obtained in connection with this study will remain confidential. Audio
recordings from the interview will be immediately transcribed, and all recordings will be destroyed. Your
responses will be coded with a pseudonym and transcript data will be maintained separately. Any
reference made to you, or respective institution will be redacted from the transcripts. Upon completion of
each transcript, the associated audio file will be immediately destroyed. The transcribed data will be
stored on a password protected computer in the principal investigators place of residency. The transcribed
file will not be named, to ensure additional confidentiality. All records, handwritten and electronic, will
be stored in a secure file cabinet in a locked office, in the principal researcher’s home. The data will be
stored for a minimum of three years, after which the data will be destroyed. Reporting of the data will be
done in aggregate. Participants will be provided a copy of the formal report, upon completion of the
study.
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Your participation is voluntary. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled. You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue
participation without penalty. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your
participation in this research study.
ALTERNATIVES TO FULL PARTICIPATION
The alternative to participation in the study is not participating or completing only the items which you
feel comfortable.
INVESTIGATOR’S CONTACT INFORMATION
I understand that the investigator is willing to answer any inquiries I may have concerning the research
herein described. I understand that I may contact Dr. Eric Hamilton at eric.hamilton@pepperdine.edu if I
have any other questions or concerns about this research.
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT – IRB CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have questions, concerns or complaints about your rights as a research participant or research in
general please contact Dr. Judy Ho, Chairperson of the Graduate & Professional Schools Institutional
Review Board at Pepperdine University 6100 Center Drive Suite 500, Los Angeles, CA 90045, 310-5685753 or gpsirb@pepperdine.edu.
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APPENDIX E
IRB Exempt Study Approval
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APPENDIX F
Mind Garden MLQ 5X Survey Copyright Approval
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APPENDIX G
Raw SCISMS Survey Results

Table G1
SCISMS Formal Safety System Participant Reponses
Formal Safety System (FS)

Participant
P11009
P11015
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P31098
P31112
P31218
P31158
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

Reporting System - Q5.2
1
2
3
4
5
1
1
2
6
3
2
1
2
4
3
3
1
2
6
2
2
2
3
3
5
1
1
1
6
1
2
1
2
4
3
3
1
2
6
2
1
1
2
7
2
3
1
2
6
2
2
1
3
6
2
3
1
2
6
2
1
1
2
6
3
2
2
3
3
5
1
1
1
6
1
1
1
2
6
2
3
2
4
4
4
3
2
4
4
4
1
1
2
7
2
1
1
2
6
2
2
1
3
6
2

Response and
Feedback - Q5.3
1
2
3
4
1
1
1
7
3
2
2
5
2
2
2
6
2
2
3
6
1
3
3
7
3
2
2
5
2
2
2
6
1
1
2
6
1
2
2
5
1
1
2
7
1
2
2
5
1
1
1
7
2
2
3
6
1
3
3
7
1
2
1
6
3
2
3
5
3
2
3
5
1
1
2
6
1
2
1
6
1
1
2
7
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Safety Personnel - Q5.4
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
1
6
2
1
1
1
6
1
2
2
2
6
2
3
3
2
5
3
1
1
1
7
2
1
1
1
6
1
2
2
2
6
2
1
1
1
7
1
2
2
2
6
2
2
1
1
7
1
2
2
2
6
2
1
2
1
6
2
3
3
2
5
3
1
1
1
7
2
1
2
1
6
1
2
2
2
6
2
2
2
2
6
2
1
1
1
7
1
1
2
1
6
1
2
1
1
7
1

Table G2
SCISMS Informational Safety System Participant Reponses
Informational Safety Systems (IS)
Accountability - Q5.5 Pilot’s Authority - Q5.6
Participant
P11009
P11015
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31158
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

1
6
4
6
6
5
4
6
7
6
3
6
6
3
2
7
7
3
7
7
3

2
7
6
6
5
7
6
6
7
6
6
6
7
7
3
7
6
4
7
7
6

3
7
7
6
5
6
7
6
7
7
5
7
7
6
5
7
6
4
7
7
5

4
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
5
5
5
7
6
6
6
5
5
7
6
5

1
6
7
6
5
6
7
6
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
7
7
5
7
7
6

2
7
7
6
5
7
7
6
7
6
6
6
7
7
5
7
6
3
7
7
6
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3
7
7
6
6
6
7
6
7
6
7
6
7
6
6
6
6
2
7
6
7

4
7
7
6
5
2
7
6
7
6
6
6
7
2
5
7
6
5
7
7
6

5
7
7
6
3
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
7
3
7
7
2
7
7
6

Professionalism – Q5.7
1
6
7
6
4
7
7
6
6
6
5
6
6
7
4
7
4
4
6
7
5

2
6
6
6
5
6
6
6
6
5
6
5
6
6
5
7
6
6
6
7
6

3
7
6
6
2
7
6
6
7
6
5
6
7
7
2
7
7
6
7
7
5

4
6
3
6
7
5
3
6
7
5
3
5
6
5
1
2
4
6
7
6
3

5
7
6
6
5
4
6
6
6
4
6
4
7
4
6
7
6
6
6
6
6

Table G3
SCISMS Operations Interaction Participant Reponses
Operations Interaction (OI)
Chief Pilots - Q5.8
Participant
P11009
P11015
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31158
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

Dispatch - Q5.9

1
6
7

2
6
5

3
7
7

4
7
7

5
4
5

3
7
7
7
1
6
6

6
5
5
6
6
6
6

6
6
7
6
7
6
7

6
7
7
7
7
6
7

6
4
5
5
5
5
5

6
8
3
7
6

6

7

6
7
7

6
6
6

7
8
6
7
6

4
8
6
5
4

1
7
6

6
7
6

7
6
7

7
7
7

5
5
5

1
7
4
6
3
4
4
6
6
3
6
3
7
4
3
7
6
3
6
7
6

2
7
4
6
6
4
4
6
7
6
5
6
7
4
6
7
5
6
7
7
5

3
7
4
6
5
6
4
6
7
6
6
6
7
6
5
6
6
4
7
6
6

Instructors - Q5.10
4
7
4
6
5
5
4
6
7
6
6
6
7
5
5
6
6
4
7
6
6

1
6
6
6
6
7
6
6
7
6
6
6
6
7
6
7
6
6
7
7
6

2
7
7
6
6
6
7
6
7
6
7
6
7
6
6
6
6
6
7
6
7

3
7
7
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
6
7
7
6
6
6
7
7
7
6
6

4
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
7
6
6
7
6
6
6
7
5

Table G4
SCISMS Organizational Commitment Participant Reponses
Organizational Commitment (OC)

Participant
P11009
P11015
P1143
P1371
P1399
P1482

Organizational
Commitment – Q5.11
1
2
3
4
5
7
7
7
7
4
7
6
6
6
5
6
7
7
7
8
5
6
6
6
6
7
6
6
6
4
7
6
6
6
5

Safety
Fundamentals – Q5.12
1
2
3
4
5
7
7
7
6
7
6
5
6
7
7
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
6
6
7
5
7
7
7
6
5
6
7
7
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Management
Commitment – Q13
1
2
3
4

6
5
7

5
6
4

6
6
6

6
5
7

(continued)

Organizational Commitment (OC)

Participant
P1577
P1750
P1784
P1921
P31098
P31112
P31158
P31158
P31294
P31303
P31324
P31326
P51802
P51936

Organizational
Commitment – Q5.11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7
7
5
7
7
6
7
5
6
7
7
7
5
7
7
7
7
5
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
4
7
6
6
6
7
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
6
7
5
7
6
6
7
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
6
7
5
7
7
6
7
5
7
7
7
7
5

Safety
Fundamentals – Q5.12
1
2
3
4
5
6
6
6
6
6
7
7
6
6
7
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
6
5
5
6
6
6
7
7
7
6
7
7
5
7
7
7
5
5
5
6
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
6
6
6
4
6
6
4
7
7
7
6
6
7
7
7
6
7
7
6
6
6
5
6

177

Management
Commitment – Q13
1
2
3
4
6
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
6
3
7
6
6
6
6
7
6
3
7
6
7
5
7
7
6
6
7
6

4
6
7
6
3
6
7
6

6
6
7
7
7
7
7
6

7
5
7
6
6
7
7
7

